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CHRONOLOGY 
(By no means exhaustive, this listing is 
intended only as an incidental aid to the 
reader in ordering events ~rom 1949 through 
1953 in Eastern Germany.) 
29 Jan. - First SED party conference provides for 
organization of a Politbuero. 
19 Mar. - Volkskongress accepts proposed Constitution 
for the DDR. 
12 May - Berlin Blockade ends as traffic resumes between 
Berlin and West Germany. 
30 May - Third Volkskongress meets and elects new Volksrat. 
2 July - 11 Society f'or Study of the Culture of the Soviet 
Union" is renamed nsociety f or German-Soviet 
Friendship. 11 
15 Aug. - Last non-SED Premier, Huebener of Sachsen-Anhalt, 
resigns. 
23 Sep . - Third party congree o~ CDU elects Otto Nuschke 
chairman o~ party. 
10 Oct. - SMA transfers all admi nistrative functions to 
new DDR government. 
11 Oct. - Meeting of provisional Landeskammer elects Lobedanz 
as its first ~resident. 
11 Nov. - Dissolution of SMA announced by Gen. Chuikov; 
replaced by Soviet Control Commission. 
v 
12 Jan. - Public Prosecutor Melsheimer announces that 
derogatory remarks about government, listening 
to western broadcasts, and spreading tendentious 
news will be re garded as crimes. 
18 Feb. - Pieck appoints Wilhelm Zaisser hlinister of 
State Security. 
7 Apr. - Chairmen of all parties agree to draw up Unity 
List for fall elections. 
8 June - Dengin, a civilian, replaces Maj. Gen. Kotikov 
as head of SKK. 
18 June - Formation of Sea Police announced by government. 
6 July - Signing of Polish-East German treaty accepting 
Oder-Neisse Line as permanent border. 
24 Aug . - SED ZK announces dismissal of several of ficials 
because of contact with "American spy 11 Noel Field. 
15 Oct. - Election for Volkskammer and Land parliaments 
approves the Unity List. 
15 Nov. - Volkskammer confirms cabine t proposed by Grotewohl. 
Also, Neues Deut schland announces S~D purge. 
1 Jan. - Selbmann inaugurates Five-Year-Plan. 
23 Feb. - Government announces end of rationing of certain 
textiles. 
26 June - Gromyko visits Ulbricht in Berlin. 
5 Aug . - World Union of Democratic Youth opens festival. 
15 Aug . - T!'DJ demonstrators clash with West Berlin police. 
13 Oct. - President Pieck confers medals on Activists. 
18 Oct. - People's Police occupy Steinstuecken, American 
Secto r of Berlin enclave in Soviet Zone, but 
leave by orde r of SKK five days later. 
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2 Jan. - SKK orders equipment of militarized formations 
of People's Police with Soviet weapons. 
1 April- Opening of German-Polish Friendship Month. 
26 May- Ministry of State ~ecurity ordered to seal 
fronti er between DbR and Federal Republic. 
9 June - Scope of State Security Service activities 
broadened by ordinanceon defense of the DDR. 
9 July - Second SED :party conference opened by Pieck. 
17 July- New order announced legalizing confiscation of 
property of escapees. 
7 Aug. - "Sport and Technical Association" established for 
par a-military training of youth. 
7 Oct. -Military ranks introduced f or militarized People's 
Police. 
6 Nov. - 'Grotewohl severely criticize s shortcomings in 
Ministry of 'f r ade and Supply. 
19 Dec.- Government announces Statutes for Agricultural 
Production Associations. 
15 Jan.- Foreign Minister Dertinge r (CDU) arres t ed by 
State Security Service. 
6 March- Official mourning proclaimed for Stalin's death. 
22 Apr.- Semyonov, political advisor to SKK , re~laced by 
Yudin. 
28 Apr.- Minist ry of Inte rior describes Di e Junge Gemeinde 
(Christian Youth ) as illegal. 
28 May - SKK ordered dissolved; Semyonov appointed Soviet 
High Commissioner; Chuikov remai ns as Commander-
in-Chief of Soviet armed forces. 10% increase in 
work norms announced. 
5 June - Chuikov r eplaced by Grechko. 
vii 
11 June - Passage of orcilnance restoring property to 
escapees who return. 
16 June - Strike and demonstrations begin in East Berlin. 
17 June - General strike and revolt put down in East 
Berlin and throughout DDR by Soviet troops. 
18 June - Scattered disturbances ;ontinue despite martial 
law. Mass arrests fol]w. 
29 June - Fechner, Minister of Justice, admits unjustified 
arrests, says membership in strike committee not 
grounds for conviction. 
11 July - End of martial law. Further disturbances in 
Jena. 
16 July - Fechner dismissed, replaced by Hilde Benjamin. 
24 July - Grotewohl and Ulbricht report on New Course to 
SED ZK. 
26 July -SED ZK adopts resolution on New Course; Zaisser 
dismissed, to be succeeded by Wollweber. 
29 July - Grotewohl protest s US offer of foodstuffs as 
11 insulting." 
5 Aug. - SED ZK orders sharp control of persons who have 
received food parcels in West Berlin. · 
17 Aug. - Announcement of delegation to Moscow led by 
Grotewohl and Ulbricht. 
7 Oct. - Pick unanimously reelected President. 
1 Dec. - Joint Soviet-German commission signs protocol 
on restoration of last SAG's to DDR. 
8 Dec. - France, Great Britain, and United States propose 
foreign ministers meeting in Berlin. 
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Introduction 
The choice of East Germany as a subject for this 
study originated with my own exposure to Iron Curtain 
practices while ·on active duty with the United States. 
Army in Berlin. The experience of two . years in th~t 
pivotal city, culminating in the June revolt in 1953, 
aroused two desires which this study attempts to sat~sfy: 
I 
the wish to m~~e my observations more meaningful to 'me 
p ersonally through research, and the hope of being able 
to elucidate for others the deliberately shrouded course 
of Sovietization in East Germany. 
This effort is thus compounded of two elements, a 
sense of involvement deriving from my r ole as spectator 
while. a critical ~rocess was unfolding , and the research 
which has placed my experience in what I believe to be the 
proper context and perspective. I feel no need to apologize 
for the first element, although it comprises certain feelings 
and judgments as well as critical observation, provided the 
second element has been successful, i.e., has eliminated 
hasty impressions and refined ily conclusions. I am convinced 
in fact that my fortuitous p resence so near the scene of 
important developments has been most usef ul in dispelling 
for me the air of unreality which often surrounds political 
events essentially alien to Ameri can experience. It has 
ix 
provided, to use a vague expression for an equally vague 
concept, the "atmosphere" within which the facts acquire 
a fuller meaning. 
To anyone who has attempted to study developments in 
the Soviet sphere, it is mere adumbration to disclose 
that research in this area is full of traps and unnatural 
hazards. Information is systematically withheld at the 
s ource, or worse still, it is deli~erately manipulated and 
falsified to convey the impressions desired by the regime. 
The usual organs of public information, including news-
papers, radio , academic r e search, and government p ronounce-
ments, are among the first targets in the drive to subdue 
a potential satellite. In s)lort, wher ever Soviet control 
has been es ~ ablished, information is scarce and the little 
that is available must be very carefully weighed. In 
addition, the frequently s ensational nature of events in 
East Germany has been an invitation to Western writers to 
emphasize pyrotechnics at the expense of careful analysis. 
And finally , the very nature of Soviet-style rule is still, 
I despite hundreds of books and articles on the subject, an 
essentially alien thing to Western eyes, and therefore 
doubly difficult to understand. 
Yet East Germany remai ns a more fruitful subject of 
- st~dy than the other satellites. It is still observable 
from West Berlin. Escapees continue to pour across the 
X 
border keeping us informed of developments almost as 
rayidly as they occur. Germans maint ain both postal and 
j 
p ersonal c ontact across zonal and sector boundaries. Not 
only the official intelligence organizations, but also 
private group s like the Free Jurist s are still successful 
in maintaining intelligence operations on a scale impossible 
in the other satellites. And last but not least, the 
Soviet regimen has not yet altered the people of East Germany 
beyond recognition. They remain, as they always we ·r e, 
somewhat easier to understand psychologically than other 
East Europeans who, by and large, share less of our Western 
background than the Germans. 
As yet there have been few full-scal e efforts, from 
the academtc world outside of Germany on the subject of 
East Germany. J. P . Nettl's book, The Eastern Zone and 
Soviet Policy in Germany, s t ands almost alone in this category 
and is invaluable for the period ending in 1950. But for 
recent years in particular one is forced to rely largely on 
periodical material, at least so long as one is confined 
to sources in English. It was therefore most fortunate that 
I could return to Germany for the completion of the study, 
for here where the final draft is being written there is a 
relative abundance of source material. A glance at the 
bibliography will reveal the extent to which I have relied on 
German sources. Nevertheless, the situation in this respect 
xi 
falls far short of the ideal, and one can only reflect 
that the shortcomings displayed by the body of available 
material are those afflicting all research in Soviet and 
3astern ~uropean affairs. And so long as the op ening of 
the official files in all the cap i t als of the :2:ast 
European states remains a distant dream of scholars, we 
must content ourse lves witD what we have and make of it 
what we can. 
f 
) 
To a certain extent, I suspect, the seeming imminence 
of change in East German s t atus - foste r ed perhaps by the 
frequent mention of' Ge rman unity as a matter for ne gotiation -
has s e rved to deter scholarly research in this area • . It 
has been said t hat East Germany could not be treated apart 
from the whole Ge r man .iJ roblem. Others may have av0.ided the 
subject because it fail ed, or seemed to fail, to c onform 
fully i::iO the satellite pattern. ·r o ans we r t he latter 
objection here would be premature, for my whole thesis 
is devoted to a portrayal of East Germany as a sat ellite. 
As to the former obj e c t ion, it is impossible t o deny the 
important, continuing relationship between ~ast and livest 
Ge :cn any, although it is no longer as close as some would 
like to believe. It must be remembered, however, that the 
lines of control run from Moscow, and not from Bonn, to 
East Berlin. It the refore seems to me more p r ofitable to 
conside r t he p r oblem of German unity only afte r a t horough 
xii 
examination of the German Democratic Republic, as an entity 
and as an appendage of Kremlin policy . That, at any rate, 
has been my intention: by offering a picture of East 
Germany to cast light in both directions, to further 
illuminate both the satellit,e complex and the problem of 
German unity. 
In the preparation of this s t udy, as part of my work 
for the degree of Master of Arts at Boston University, I 
have been assisted by Professors Benedict and Newman, and 
particularly by Professor Gyorgy whose guidance and suggestions 
launched the project on its way, all of the Department of 
Gevernment of that institution. Since returning to Germany, 
I have been graciously assisted by many individuals, most 
of whom wish to remain anonymous, and by the librarie s of 
HICOG, Am.erika Haus, and Haus der Zukunft. 
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Chapter I 
Satellitism: The Soviet System in East ern Europe 
As long as one is dealing with the countries of ~ast 
Europe which a r e generally accept ed as satellites, there is 
seldom any need for,onsideration of the meaning Qf the 
conce:pt itself. "Satellitism" is understood to be, in a 
general way, that phenomenon which is found in studying 
these certain ~ast European count ries . In approaching 
a border-l ine case, however, it suddenly becomes necessary 
to examine the term mo r e closely to determi ne whethe r the 
case at hand actually fits the concept of satellite status. 
East Germany, s ometimes regarded as a satellite but usually 
treated as a special p roblem outside the_ Soviet satellite 
bloc, is such a border-line inst ance. By the appa r ently 
exce~tional nat ure of the ~ast German situation, it is incumbent 
on the student to show cause why East Germany should be called 
a satellite and examined accordingly. 
One could of course def ine "satellitism", that is, 
decide what the concept should mean and then ascertain which 
cases fit the definition. This problem of definition seems 
a particularly thorny one for s ocial science, but it should 
be evident that such an a priori approach is less than 
fruitful. Not onl y is definition an infinitely detailed 
process, when followed to an extreme, it is also subject to 
I 
the fault t hat relevant cases may be excluded arbitrarily 
through inability to forecast future developments. On the 
one hand, defining may quite logical ly be carried so far that 
concepts lose their capacity for containing a class of 
similar but not identical instances; on the other hand, there 
is no assurance that an arbitrary definition will have rele-
vance to any real issue, and even if it does at first, the 
relevance may be lost .. thro-qgh subtle changes to which the 
definition cannot adjust. It seems then preferable to first 
examine certain cases which we know to be pertinent to our 
concern, to sort out the distinctions which are decisive 
and those which are merely superficial, and finally to arrive 
at a meaningful concept or pattern which can be applied wherever 
it seems fruitful, yet which is flexible enough to accommodate 
minor diversity. This will not be a definition in the usual 
sense, but a definition is not necessary -may in fact be a 
hindrance - if "satellitism" has a realm of acceptable 
application as a descriptive term. 
At the moment we are accustomed to consider as satellites 
the following East European lands: Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia (between 
1945 and 1948). China is subject to varying interpretations 
and falls, in any case, outside the scope of this work and 
outside my competence. It is evident from this list that the 
.;_;3: 
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decisive relationship involved is with the Soviet Union. 
At the same time, it should ' not be supposed that the concept 
is entirely new. 'ro go no further back in history than the 
era of Nazi German ex-pansion, we have the examples of· Rumania 
and Hungary which were in differing degrees subject to the . 
will of the Third Reich. These two, and others, were regarded 
at the tim.e as satellites. We shall see presently whether 
the exam~le s are appropriate. 
Jacob B. Hoptne r emphasized the astronomical parallel 
when he observed: 
"Maintaining the myth of independence, satellite govern-
ments are always similar in structure and political 
ideology to the prj_mary political planet around which 
they revolve. Thus the path or orbit in which the 
secondary planets travel is preordained by the major 
planet. "1 
The major planet is obviously the Soviet Union, which 
has, in other words, a decisive influence over its satellites. 
They ar e bound by a power relationship in which obedience 
of Soviet decisions is the central factor. Yugoslavia i ·s 
perhaps the best illustration at this point: until 1948 when 
1l i t o was forced out of the Cominform, Yugoslavia was reckoned 
a satellite, in fact that most h i ghly developed inst ance· of 
this relationship ; but as soon as Yugoslavia ceased to . receive 
1. "The Structure of the Soviet Orbit" in C. E. Black (ed), 
Challenge in Eastern iDurope (New Brunswick, N.J. : Hutgers 
University Press, 1954), 196. 
instructions from Moscow, desp ite the continuation of a 
c ommunist domestic program, the he r etofore outstanding 
Soviet conquest ceased also to be a satellite. The 
control .element in the situation, the locus of decision-
making authority, is t hus the core of the conce~t; fo r 
irrespective of the degree of adhe r ence to a plan o.r program 
set f orth by Moscow as the pattern for satellite behavior, 
the moment adherence or non-adherence was determined in 
Belgrade instead of Moscow Yugoslavia was no longer a satellite. 
By t he same token, Italy and France, both subject to the 
multifarious inf luences of a powerful domestic p a.rty controlled 
f rom the Soviet Union, have never been regarded as satellites, 
for satellitism im~lies a much more decisive control apparatus. 
Greece was, in 1947, in dire danger of succumbing to a~ in-
surrection directed and aided from outside Greece. Had 
this communis~led rebellion succeeded, Greece would undoubtedly 
have entered upon a period of satellitism; but as long as it 
was only an insurrection, no matter how extensive the power 
of the insurrectionists over a portion of the country, Greece 
.remained outside the Soviet orbit. F'i nland is another case 
in point. For ten years Finland has been subject to Soviet 
influence, an influence which has shown itself to be very 
nearly decisive in certain connections. Finland's response 
to the Marshall Plan suggests one area where Soviet influence 
is exceedingly powerful. ·.I:ied to the Soviet Union by a 
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broadly conceived treaty of mutual assistance, plus a 
reparations bill only recently paid in full, Finland is 
manifestly not a free agent in international economic 
relations. Nor is Finland fully sovereign in any aspect 
of foreign policy; the given factors of Soviet proximity and 
interest, along with politely expressed advice on significant 
issues, constitute a severe l:Lmitation on Finland's inde-
pendence. Yet she is not a satellite. Soviet influence, 
strong though it may be in many instance s , has never become 
decisive or comp l ete. Communist officials may still be 
removed from the government with imputnity and the Finnish 
domestic scene, both politically and economically, remains 
free of Soviet dictation. ~he revolutionary movement which 
occupied Helsinki shortly after the Russian Revolution and 
the Kuusinen puppet governmen·t which followed in the wake of 
the Red Army in the Soviet-Firu1ish War suggest that complete 
subordination of Finland has not been absent from Soviet 
calculations. But the fact remains, whatever speculative 
reasoning may be employed to account for it, that Finland 
has not been reduced to the subjection implied by the term, 
"satelliti)!lsm". Influence has not become control. 
Eastern Austria and Eastern Germany constitute a 
parallelism of some significance here. Both regions were 
subjected to Soviet occupation on the same (still slightly 
questionable) legal basis which served for the Western 
~6-
occupations in both countries. The Soviet occupation 
zones in both Germany and Aust'ria were victims o:f vigorous 
exploitation by the occupying power. Both zones we+e 
doubtless regarded by the Kremlin as bastions from which 
Soviet influence might be extended westward. Austria was in 
fact victim of one attempt to extend Soviet power, but the 
Putsch of Sep tember and October 1950 was at most a preliminary 
effort which, if it had succeeded, might have paved the way 
toward all-out advance. 2 The disruptive attempt at organi zing 
a general s ·IJrike was, however, as much a failure as had been 
the communist efforts at the polls. :d;as t ern Austria remained 
under the single central government which had exi'sted since 
the end of the war and, despite continued Soviet exploitation 
(particularly in the oil industry), Austria continued on 
its course of development toward independence. East Germany 
has a quite different history, owing chiefly to the :far 
greater importance of Germany in Soviet strategy. Austria would 
no doubt have been gratefully accepted as a gift, that is, if 
it could have been taken over without too great an expenditure 
of effort. Germany, in the other hand, was the key to Europe, 
~d only t he basic confusion in Soviet aims :prevented the 
nussians from making optimum use o~ East Germany as a base 
of operations direc t ed westward. i.rhat is not to say that 
2. In this I accep t the interp retation of Hichard Hiscocks 
who re gards the 1950 strike as an effort to gain control 
of the t rade union movement. The Rebirth of Austria 
(London: Oxford, 1953), 224ff. 
v7.t 
such an operation would. have necessarily succeeded, but 
the danger would have been significantly greater had the 
Soviets been able to reconcile their divergent goals. The 
desire for ec onomic gain which dominated the first years 
of the occupation most certainly retarded the pro"gress 
of sovietization, and, by the time t h e Soviet appetite 
abated , an awakened West barred the way to Western ~'urope. 
At this _t->O int i t; could have been decided to let Germany go 
the way of Austria and the Soviet s could have gradually with-
drawn. However, Germany was still too important in strategic 
or powe r calculations and as a source of economic benefits, 
and the alternative chosen was the erection of a satellite 
stat e. 
Any judgment as t o the exact time when East Germany 
became a satellite is, as will be shown in due course, at best 
a compr omise. Var ious facto r s are involved in satellite 
stat us and they do not all r e ach fruition at the same time. 
It i s , in short, a process which occurs thr ough time. This 
applies to all the satellites, but is par ticularly noticeable 
in Germany whe re a t ransition was made between occupation 
and satellite s t atus. On both sides of' the t ransit ion at 
least one distinguishing factor is clear. As long as the 
occupation f orce governs directly, wi t hout the intervening 
facacle of a native government and party as trusted inst ruments 
of Soviet purpose, t he country in question is occupied but 
.-Ek::_ 
not a satellite. On the other side, the continued · existence 
of the machinery of occupation should not be pe rmitted to 
obscure the development of a satellite; when the conventional 
instr-LllD.ents of puppet rule have been built, endowed with 
the power to initiate the sovietization program, and 
entrus ted with the success of such a program, a satellite 
is in existence. 
To delve now somewhat deeper into the nature of the 
relationship between p rimary and secondary planets, Fainsod 
comments as follows on totalitarian dictatorshi:p in gener al 
and on the Soviet internal system: 
"One of the striking characteristics of modern totali-
tarian dictatorshi p is its dependence on bureaucratic 
organi zat ion to make its c ontrol effective ••.•• Every 
dictatorship faces the :problem of institutionalizing 
its own autho r ity. 'I'he power of the Leader depends on 
his ability to keep the essence of control in his own 
hands or in the hands of r eliable sybordinates while 
transforming t he party machine into an obedient instru-
ment :::·eady to execute his slightest c ommand. 
"The development of the Communist Party apparatus 
as an extension of the long arm of the dictator 
constitute s one of the most impressive and formidable 
organizational achievements of modern totalitarianism. 
To an extent unmatched by its now defunct Fascist 
and Nazi rivals, the Communist dictatorship has succeeded 
in uprooting and destroying every organized form of 
resistance to its demands."3 
The relevance of this description is by no means limited to 
the internal applications of totalitarian authority. Totali-
tarian re gimes of our century have shown themselves p erfectly 
Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), 152. 
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capable of extending this overahelming authority beyond 
national boundaries . Totalitarianism embodies many techniques 
which distinguish it from its older antecedent forms, des-
potism or authoritarianism, but the most characteristic 
perhaps is the systematic elaboration of central control to 
the point where no aspect of life within its reach remains 
p rivat e o r immune, culminating in the demand for and achieve-
ment of an artificial popular approval of the regime. Satellitism 
is the external counterpart of such inte rnal vevelopments and 
bears many of the same symptoms. Comparison with some hypo-
thetical and actual instances of influence or domination 
e xerted by one na-t ion over another may clarify t he distinctive 
nature of satellitism. 
Powerful and imperial states have long practiced var ious 
forms of influence with respect to other nat ions or lands, 
ranging from pressure on a neighbor state to exercise of a 
far-flung imperial dominion. Spheres of influence and im-
perial power are the two types which need particularly to be 
distinguished from modern satellitism. A sphere of influence 
is well-illustrated by the Monroe Doctrine in United States 
history, varying as it did in practice from an essentially 
benevo_lent concern that La t in American policies would se r ve 
the best inte r ests of the hemisphere and of t he weaker count rie s 
themselves to gratuitous interference in internal affairs of 
neighboring nations in order to benefit the United States at 
..:.1 0-
all costs. In i~s initial f orm the Doctrine supported 
United States interests, to be sure, but it also gave a 
measure of support' to the new independent states of .South 
America. In more arrogant form, as embodied in . the ·"Roosevelt 
Corollary" and in measures to protect the Panama Canal, the 
Monroe Doctrine often seemed a free-wheeling exercise in 
power politics at the erpense of weaker neighbors. A more 
modern inst ance would be the relationship between Greece and 
the United States since 1947, where Greek, United States, and 
general Western interest s have been seen as roughly identical 
and have been simultaneously served . The advice and consultation 
offered by the United Stat es have carried an implied threat, 
namely that aid might cease if advice were i gnored. By the 
same token, however, there was a reciprocal threat that the 
United States and the West might be the lose r s if Greek dignity 
were not respected and if Greece shou l d as a consequence choose 
t o take its chances on Soviet ben . .:;volence. Such threats were 
never so plainly stated, but they existed in subtle expressions 
which evidenced the reciprocal nature of the relationship , And 
where dominant powers have fo r gotten the two-way relationship 
which always accompanies a sphere of influence, they have often 
suffered, as did the United States in a loss of influence and 
t rus t in Latin America after the turn of the century. Such 
reciprocality is of course qui t e incidental in a satellite 
relationship which rests, in the last analysis, on sheer power. 
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It could be argued that it was through disregard of Yugoslavian 
dignity and pres~ge that the Soviet Union lost that satellite, 
but this would be an exaggeration of an only apparent similar-
ity.. Had the Soviet Union allowed such considerations ·to 
govern relations with 'J:i to, she would, in her own view of 
sat ellitism, have lost a satellite in any case. The mistake 
then was in permitting a Tito to obtain such an independent 
and powerful status that he could demand his reciprocal 
advantages from the relat ionship. The Soviet Union does, in 
fact, for various reason s , make concessions to the satellites; 
but they are always "concessions", that is, temporary departures 
from the rule of absolute authority and not rac6gnit ion of 
reciprocality. 
':I:he association of a Great Fower and a weaker state in 
a sphere of influence coul d conceiveably go so far as to be 
called suzerainty and to incorporate fairly complete demands 
upon the weaker member.. But it has neve r implied the imposition 
of a det ailed economic and :political pattern ·to which the 
weaker state must submit; and even where puppet ~. heads of state 
could play a role to the Great Power' s advant age, there has 
always been an element of voluntarism present, an element which 
is studiously and systematically avoided in a satellite sphere .. 
Imperialism is a more coml.J licated power relationship , but 
it too reveals important differences from the modern satel l ite 
forms. Imperialism has also presented a wide range of variation, 
from the absolute governance of colonies to the incompa r ably 
milder Commonwealth type of empire wherein, for example, 
the British "possess" dominions in name only. Without 
examining imperialism in any historical detail, it should 
suffice here to note that empires have never in the long 
run been successful where the advantages have been all on 
one side. The usual tendency of imperialism has been for 
the governing power to exploit the colony economically, 
but this has as its concomitant the introduction of means 
whereby profits may be increased. Whether this implies 
"progress'' in any cultural sense is another question, but it 
does historically imply the development of national conscious-
ness. This goes along with technological innovation and 
development of a native bureaucracy. And we can see today 
that attempted suppression of nationalist movements is not 
the solution of the imperial problem, even where the alter-
native, as in India or the Philippines, has been virtual 
encouragement of national consciousness and assistance in the 
matter of self--rule. Satellitism may have the same lessons 
to learn, but for the time being we are justified in pointing 
out significant differences: that the Soviet .orulers syste-
matically endeavor to obviate any necessity for compromise 
wit;h native nationalism or independence movements; that they 
have a thoroughly tested program, not only for preservation 
of Soviet power, but for the increase of authority; and that 
they extend their ideological tentacles to the furthest 
reaches of the subject lands. The essential di:fference 
between imperialiam and satellitism, however, is the 
introduction of a mediating structure, the sat ellite 
parties and governments,. which conceals the lines of authority 
and performs the necessary repressive and doctrinal functions 
in behalf of the Soviet Union. Imperialism has had puppet 
governing agents and police, but it has lacked the mythology -
of voluntary native propagation of and support for the existing 
regime, and it has lacked the tho r oughgoing ideological training 
of yough which is the ostensible basis of an indefinite 
continuation of rule. We may hope that satellitism will 
begin to evidence the same or equivalent weaknesses as those 
displayed in the recent past by imperialism. But it is only a 
hope; we are not yet j ustified in saying that satellitism as 
a system will not work. When we say that the s atellites are 
the weakest points in Soviet armor, probably a valid obser-
vation, we are ~ayi~ that they represent an overext ension 
of Soviet po~wer, that the Soviet Union has not yet been 
able to digest its dominions or to thoroughly effectuate the 
satellite syst em. 
The Nazi regime in Germany showe d itself quite capable 
of thinking in terms of satellitism as the proper role of 
weaker neighbors. This was especially apparent in the Balkans 
whe r e German influence was strong enough to demand certain 
types of regimes and not inconsiderable aid in the prosecution 
of the war. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria (Yugoslavia could 
also be included but for the partisan movements which 
eventually destroyed the value of that count ry for Germany) 
we :;.·e all German sat ellites and were forced, where force was 
needed, to participate in the war on the German side. 4 
But the totalitarian element in the se relationships was 
very much weaker than it is today in East Europe.5 The 
Germans were busy with the prosecution of a war and had, 
in any case, no highly developed theory of satellitism which 
might render the German system comparable to the Soviet. 
The best illustration comes from Italy, which in the course 
of time also acquired a status very like a satellite, where 
the Nazis demanded the injection of antisemitism into the 
Fascist system. This is a mere suggestion of the transforming 
social program which goes along with the Soviet economic 
and political pat tern. The most that can be said of German 
satellitism is that it was an incipient variety. which under 
other circumstances might have developed the systematic 
characteristics of the Soviet program. 
By way of summary, the imposition of the satellite 
system in East Europe, as well as the growing importance 
of spheres of influence and international communities of 
4. Occupied Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia were subject 
to a quite diffe r-ent type of program supervised directly 
by the German occupation, and hence fall outside the 
satellite pattern. 
5. Hungary afforas example s , such as extensive aid to refugee 
Jews, of the comparatively loose supervision exercised by 
Germany. See Stephen Kertesz, Diplomacb in a Vfuirlpool 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre ame Press, 1953), 
Part I. 
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of interest, points to the declining role of the stat e and the 
relativized conce~t of sovereignty which characterize the 
modern inte rnational structure. Satellitism, through its 
manifold agencies of ideological and practical control, has 
taken the final s t e_t; in reducing state, sovereignty, ·and 
national boundaries to hallowed fictions. .The problem· is not 
~ 
t ·o resurrect these f orms but to take advaltange of their declin-
ing importance to build a healthy alternative to satellitism 
as a means of relating people s and regions to each other. 
So far I have only mentioned the elabor ate program imposed 
by the Soviets on its unfortunate sat ellites. It remains to 
charac :.J erize this program briefly and to explore the mechanism 
of control which makes it all possible. 1r he model for a:n:y 
People's Democracy is, needless to say, the Soviet Union 
(although no satellite is allowed to approach the heights of 
accomp lishment or prestige enj oyed by the Soviet Union). It 
follows that the decisive element is the party. It may be 
called almost anything , and may embody a variety of elements, 
which are however in danger of being weeded out quite ruth-
lessly, but it is always that party which submits to Soviet 
guidance through the leadership of Moscow-trained c ommunists. 
'r he leadership element is domi nated by such individuals, 
although old Social Democrats and others are often carried 
on the party masthead. The party extends its predominance to 
all aspect s of national exi stence, being r eflected in t he 
government, in economic p lanning , and in all cultural activities 
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permitted to exist. nopposition11 parties may be tolerated 
for a time, but eventually a front is erected to encompass 
the entire political sphere and within this front the 
opposition is gradually silenced. In support of the Soviet-
style party there are always several fundamental mass organi-
zations, semi-corporative and semi-o£ficial groups, which serve 
as instruments of the pa:vty in injecting official dogma and 
policy into the most important areas of economic and social 
activity. Some such organizat ion tries to enlist the support 
of youth and to thereby dominate the educational system, 
another addresses its appeal to women of the People's Democracy, 
either mass organization or party within the front, or both, 
pretend to represent farm or peasant sectors of t he populace, 
and a trade union movement, clamped firmly under party cont rol, 
is alleged to represent the workers' interest s. This grouping 
of organizational support generally extends to the arts, 
particularly the literary arts, sports, and the churches, ,in 
which area state-devised organi zations attempt to -drain strength 
from the church-oriented groups. 
The police and the system of justice are the most 
important organs of the stat e. They provide the en£orcement 
arm for offi9ial decisions and capitalize on terrorism as a 
force for con£ormity among the people. The police also, as 
a supplement to the Soviet MGB agents, provide an int erlocking 
spy system to maintain discipline among official and semi-
officialt organs of government and party . BUt in addition, 
the entire apparatus of government is only a reflection of 
the dominant party , giving effect to decisions taken within 
the apex of the party pyramid. The .sat ellite governments 
reveal a strong economic orientation which represents the 
crucial role assigned to economic programs. Not only must 
t he government coat the bitter pill of Soviet exploitation, 
but must also effectuate party decisions on planning, 
industrial production, and collectivization. The constitution 
itself, artificial though it may be, also embodies the Soviet 
orient ation and the economic emphasis. 6 
This mechanism, couyled with a carefully calculated 
outpouring of ideology-saturated propaganda, endeavors to 
mold the citizenry into willing participants in the sovieti-
zation of its country. It is not enough t hat the populace 
should give its silent consent. An enthusiast ic assent is 
r equired, and t his r e quires not only the machinery of terror 
and repression, but also positive forces of indoct rination and 
persuasion. This aim demands t he sort of conformity described 
by OI"tvell in 1984, and if success is not yet in sight the 
tendencies are already on display. We may base our hope on the 
duration of the process in the Soviet Union, where absolute 
conformity and reliability are stil l far from realization, 
but that hope shoul d make us no l e ss anxious to see the yoke 
lifted from the suffering peoples of Easte rn Europe. 
6. On satellite constitutions s ee Andrew Gyorgy , Governments 
of Danubian Europe (New York: Rinehart, 1949 ) and C. E. Black, 
"Constitutional Trends in East e r n ·Eur oJ?e , 1945-1948" in 
C. E . Black et al, Soviet Satellites (Notre Dame , Ind .: 
Review of Politics, 1949), 25-36. 
The most myste rious aspect of this whole system remains 
the means through which Soviet orders are t ranslated into 
satellite performance. Accustomed as we are to thinking in 
terms of indef endent states and meaningful national boundaries, 
it seems almost wildly improbabl~ that control of this 
totalitarian character could be maintained over an entire 
nation, that native leaders could be held in obedient 
subservience to a foreign power. But if the explanation 
p roceeds piecemeal fashion, the mechanics of the system 
gradually become clear. One must of course begin with the 
realization that national boundaries in East Europe are 
meaningless in themselves. A satellite could close its 
borders only if it had a reliable army to enforce the decision. 
The next point is that a satellite is not permitted to de-
velop organs of government or law enforcement which are oriented 
to a national point of view. They are all carefully indoetrin-
ated and, as insurance, closely watched and infiltrated by 
persons whose first loyalty is to the Soviet Union. This 
infiltration is rampant throughout all of the apparatus of 
party and state, with the secret police under close supe r vision 
by Soviet sec r et police; and the result is that even the highly 
placed officials and party functionaries are uncertain as to 
who may be watching them. They have been trained to understand 
that their continued usef ulness to the re gime dep ends on absolute 
reliability, and to realize that any deviation will become 
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known. Everyone knows that a tremendous control apparatus 
exists:. it is in plain sight for that very reason. But every-
one also knows that an equally pervasive invisible apparatus 
exists, and this is obviously even more terror-inspiring. 
In essence, no one is allowed to imagine that he is above this 
system, and since he does not know who may be a tentacle of 
the system, he can never feel safe. Such terrorism is un-
questionably very sever e for the population in general; but 
for t he officialdom it is still more oppressive. 
The machinery which is maintained for the transmission 
of directives in one direction and of spy reports in the other 
is comparatively easy to comprehend. There a r e normal diplom-
atic representatives in all count ries, as well as Cominform 
a gencies and sp c:cial missions of various types. ·:rhere is the 
seemingly omnipresent MGB and its spy network. And -lastly 
there is the Soviet Army. The last-named has played various 
roles in the satellites, u sually t he a gency or at least the 
t hreat which imposed cont rol init ially; but in I~ania, HungaY~, 
and East Germany the army has been a continuing instrument for 
maintaining ob edience. The key personnel in the relat i onship 
may be locat ed in any of these places, depending on the situ-
a t ion. ':rhe result is a nea·t ly balanced mntro l mechanism in 
which every individual knows what he must accomplish to val~ 
date his continued prominance (and to secure the attendant 
rewards), but knows also that he is isolated and that severe 
penalties await those who deviate. 
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Finally, to com~lete the background against which East 
Germany must be seen, a summary timetable of sovietization 
in East ~urope will show some of the differences existing 
among the satellites as well as the basic simi larity. It 
should always be borne in mind that conditions vary from one 
People's Democracy to another: the differences range from 
mere nomenclature through methods used in imposing the initial 
Soviet control to comparatively basic factors such as economic 
structure and social composition. The more fundamental differ-
ences sometimes elicit variations in tactics and result in 
inconsist encies in the timetable. But the differences should 
not obscure the basic pattern; it is for this reason that the 
f011owing summary stresses similarity. In any case, it is 
surprising how uniform the course of sovietization actually 
has been. The ·years from the end of the war until 1949 were, 
in all East European lands, a time of consolidation of control 
and economic recovery. The process began early in Bulgaria? 
and late in Czec.hoslovakia8 (and the prize pupil, Yugoslavia, 
was lost in this period), but by 1949 all of the satellites 
had a strongly entrenched regime responsive to ever.Y Moscow 
7. Bulgaria had a head start by virtue of t he appearance of 
the Red Army in 1944. 
8. The coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia occurred in 1948 , but 
Communist influence was strong from the outset and con-
tributed to the passage of measures in line with general 
Soviet policy. The same generalization applies to Hungary 
which succumbed in 1947. 
wish. Political parties underwent a gradual change as the 
non-communist parties were absorbed in fronts from which 
the var iously named communist p arties emerged in complete 
control. Social Democ r ats and peasant representatives were 
either squeezed out or reduced to impotence. Electoral 
techniques were perfected until the unity lists could return 
as large a majority as required. And governmental structures 
were built on the specially designed constitutions, in which 
the communists sp read their authority from the key ministries 
such as interior and information, through the whole apparatus. 
Police forces were established and trained to institute the 
tactics of terror. On the economic side, this was the time 
of modest one- and two-year plans designed to complete the 
post-war recovery and lay the groundwork for advanc e on all 
fronts. Land reforms were pushed through and the mild cooperative 
stage of collectivization was introduced. 
After 1949 all of the satellites underwent an intensified 
program of sovietization, characterized by unlikely demands 
from industrial production, increasingl y unsatisfactory 
conditions for workers and consumers alike, and large-scale 
collectivization on the kolkhoz model. This economic plan has 
been pushed wi t h only one pause, and t .hat largely nominal, 
for t he New Course in 1953. Politics of the period was 
typified by purges of the parties, removals of' leaders not 
regarded as 100% reliable by Moscow standards, and the elaboration 
of an interlocking militarization which culminated in 1955 
in a military alliance system. for the Soviet Union and the 
People.' s Democracies. 9 By this time it had become possible 
to review some of the results. The Five- and Six-Year Plans 
were, in spit e of glowing statistics, largely unfulfilled, 
and farm product ion was lagging badly in all satellites. 
Collectivization is relatively advanced in Bulgaria, relatively 
retarded in Poland. Industrialization, hard to measure because 
of unrevealing statistical practicesl'~ was 'most marked in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany, all of which had been 
p artially industrial from the · outset. ~rrade among the satellites 
rose Greatly in this period on the basis of the Council for 
Mutual Economic. Aid, but the ove r all p icture was one of developing 
autarky in which the whole r egion would be tied to the Soviet 
Union. Some Soviet measures had produced lonf::: -rap.ge benefit s 
for the countries involved (notably the land reforms and 
indusli rialization), but at the same time the economic structure 
,. 
had undergone a lopsided development which might some day 
p rove a liability as well. 
Turning now to Zast Germany, it will become apparent how 
closely the la ~ est addition to the satellit e syst em , despite 
seemingly great differences from its senior p artners, has 
fo l lowed the general t rends of development. 
9 . New York Herald frribune, 16 May 1955. 
10 . In this period it became standard p ractice t o express gains 
in terms of percentage improvement over previous y~ ars 
inst ead of as a percentage of production in a year like 
1938 for which production fi gures are known. 
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Chapter II 
Red Army in Control: Events and Policies, 1945-1949 
Although the limits of this study are specified as 
1949 and 1953~ such a period in the life of a sat ellite would 
be meaningless without the :p rovision of some background. 
Therefore this chapter will be devoted to a very brief review 
of t he history leading up to t he official est ablishment of the 
German Democ r atic Republic, referred to henceforth by the 
initials of the German name, the DDR. For tunately the period 
of Soviet occupat ion dir ect ly following the end of the war has 
already been capably delineated by Nettl1 , thus removing the 
need for more than a rapid survey here. 
First, however, a glimpse into the inter-war history of 
German Communism may :p rove useful. World War I had of course 
been a critical time for German Communism, the well-known split 
in the movement having been brought on by the i s sue of war 
credits. After the war, and af ter the p rospect of immediate 
revolution had subsided, the German :party reestablished itself an~ 
by the 1920's, under the Weimar Republic, was,com:par atively 
fl ourishing organizat ion. R~th Fischer, who herself :played 
a signif_i cant role in the party at this time, describes it as 
having "close solidarity based on free and voluntary a gr eement 
1. J. P . Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 
1945-50 (London: Oxford, 1951). 
arrived at on the basis of ••• substantial equality of political 
experience and political knowledge." The party membership, 
she continues, was jealous of the regional assembly and 
generally distrusted party functionaries or Bonzen2 • This 
characterization, although brief, is immediately recognizable 
as the antithesis of Stalinism; and it will be remembered that 
~ci Stalin had only recently won his battle with Trotsky,[ was in 
the mid-1920's beginning to impose his sys·t;em on the various 
nat i onal Communist Parties. In March 1925, and again in 
February 1926, special organizational conferences were held 
in Moscow to assert for thehenefit of national CP repre s entatives 
the new direction which international Communism was to take3. 
I 
At these conferences was a German Communist, knovn1 as Zelle in 
recognition of his talent for managing t he cell-type of organi-
zation, who was singled out by Stalin to go to work on the 
German Communist Party. This man was Walter Ulbricht. He 
combined his talents with those of another well-known Communist, 
Wilhelm Pieck, to smash t he German organization and impose the 
Stalinist cadre system. 
There is a good deal of evidence that t he Soviet Union 
failed to understand Hitler and Nazism in the prosecution of 
Soviet foreign policy, both before and during the period of the 
2. Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1950), 501-2. 
3. Inprekorr, 1926, 655ff. Summarized by Fischer, QE• cit., 
500. 
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Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact4 • It is a certainty, however,- that 
the German Communists deceived themselve s about Nat ional 
Socialism. A good example is the voluntary surrender of Party 
Secretary Ernst 1orgl er to prove Communist innocence in the 
Reichstag fire incident. Further, the Communists were ordered 
to remain in Nazi Germany to await the demise of the Hitle r 
regime, which was expected to leave Germany ripe for Communism5. 
Fischer lays this policy at the doorstep of the Pieck-Ulbricht 
"\\.e. 
leadershi p as protagonist offStalinist line, which coupled 
silent acceptance of the Nazis. with vigorous opposition to the 
"real enemy," the Social Democrats. 6 
During these same years, many of the German Communist s 
were buSying themselves with the Spanish Civil War, among them 
one Wilhelm Zaisser who will appear later without his name of 
that time, General Gomez. •'fhese instruments of the Comintern 
were later s ent to France, and when that country succumbed to 
German invasion were ordered back into Germany. In the face 
of this well-nigh suicidal order, the special privilege of an 
invitation to Moscow was welcome indeed. f his was reserved 
for such notable as Pieck and Ulbricht. And the latter made 
his next appearance presiding over a conference of German war 
4. See Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, Vol. 2, 
(London: Oxford, 1947). 
5. Allen W. Dulles, Germany's Underground (New York: Macmillan, 
1947), 99. 
6. Fischer, 2£• cit., 655· 
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prisoners in October 19417. This conference presaged a 
barrage of National Bolshevist propaganda di r ected at the 
front-line German t roops, but also, and more important, the 
establishment after Stalingrad (July 1943) of the Free German 
Committee8 with Erich Weinert as Chairman and Count von 
Einsiedel as vice-chairman. This organization gradually 
established branch headquarters in many parts of the world, 
but the most notable adjunct, the League of German Officers9, 
was founded in October 1943 under the chairmanship of Col. Hans 
Guenther von Hooven, former Chief of 6th Army Intelligence. 
A later addition was Field Marshall Friedrich von Paulus, as 
was Gen. Walther von Seydlitz who became head of t he League. 
The Free German Committee and its branches were officially 
dissolved in August 1945 some months after Pieck and Ulbricht 
had led the Moscow contingent, minus those such as Hans Neumann 
and Ernst Remmele who had disappeared , back t o Berlin to share 
in the victory. 
7. Ibid, 658. 
8 . National-Komitee Freies Deutschland. On National Bolshevism 
see Klemens von Klemperer, lliflowards a Fourth Reich? the 
History of National Bolshevism in Ge rmany," Heview of Politics, 
April 1951, 191-210 . 
9. Bund Deut scher Offizie r e, 
--27-
Turning now to war-time p lanning of a mul t ilateral 
character , namely t he Allied deliberat ions concerning the 
fate of a conque r ed Germany, the story may be summarized 
here very briefly. Although the announcement of goals, 
s pecifically the Atlantic Charter , occur red fairly early in 
the course of the war, the planning necessary to impl ement 
t he goals came too little and too late. By far the greater 
part of the war p eriod was occupied exclus ively with military 
considerat ions; the politi cal side of t he probl em scarcely 
appear ed before Yalta and bec ame a governing factor first at 
Potsdam . Particularly on the American side, planning was 
impeded by a view summariz ed in President Roosevelt's comment: 
"I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do 
not occupy."10 This statement supported, on the one hand, 
State Depar tment opposition to the Morgenthau Plan which 
Ch _,rchill and Roosevelt had approved at the second Quebec 
Confe r ence; on the other hand, it threw confusion into current 
• 
efforts to provide for post-war handling of the German question. 
On an inter-allied level such effo r ts had been concentrated 
in the European Advisory Commission, which had been set up 
by the Moscow Conference for this purpose. J ohn G .. -rvinant 
was the American representative on this Commission which sat 
in London, and he was recip ient of official American views 
emanating from the interdepartmental Working Security Committee. 
10 .. Philip E. Mosely, "Dismemberment of Germany," Foreign 
Affair s, April 1950 , 491. 
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It would be misleading however to speak of official ·policy, 
for American attitudes toward post-war Germany were," during 
this period, both various and fragmentary. Not only did 
several leading figures in the government have differing views, 
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau being a conspicuous 
example, but the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department 
contributed to the tangle by its espousal of an at titude that 
everything would be settled by the military in due course and 
without the necessit y of a formulated American poli~y11 • The 
British repre sentat ive, Sir William Strang, was less hampered 
than Winant, owing to his nearness to the fount of British 
policy in London and to the relatively clear line s of authority 
within the British government. And the Soviet representative, 
Gusev, had at least the advantage of dealing with only one 
source of official policy in Moscow. As a result of such 
difficulties on the lowe r levels, plus the confinement of 
policy formulation at the several war-time confe r ences to 
generalities, there was at war's end the greatest uncertainty 
as to the course actually to be pursued in Germany. A contributory 
factor was of course the secrecy which surrounded all deliber-
ations afte r the early decision to ins ist on unconditional 
surrender. 
The Yalta Confe r ence in February 1945 gave more prominence 
to the German p rob l em than had the previous confe r ences. The 
11. A good treatment of this whole issue is given in Philip E. 
Mosely, 1"l'he Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones 
Were Drawn," Foreign .Affairs, July 1950, 580-604. 
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outcome, although vague then and still, incorporated tne basic 
principles which were to guide the occupation: demilitarization 
(including destruction of industrial war-making potential), 
punishment of war criminals, and reparations. Dismemberment 
was al...o included without specificat ions; this problem had 
already developed a long history through the war years12 , and 
was still in such a doubtful status at the time of Yalta that 
the term could only be inserted in the conference report, and 
later in the surrender document, in case agreement should 
eventually be reached. But Stalin, who had made the most of 
"unconditional hate 11 of Germany during the war, made public 
the unilateral Hussian decision, on 8 May 1945, that Germany 
should not be dismembered. It might be argued that this decision 
was the wise one unde r the circumst ances, but the fac t remains 
that it was already eviclence of bad f'ai th on the Russian side. 
At any rate, it eff ectively disposed of the issue. 
As a general comment on Soviet policy , Molotow observed at 
the Yalta Conference that his country's preparations seemed to 
have lagged behind those of the Western nations13. This may 
in general be true. Yet on one issue there was no mistaking 
the car e with which the Soviet Union had considered its position. 
That was of course reparations. At Russian insistence, and 
despite some opposition from Churchill, the conference report14 
12. Mosely, "Dismemberment ••• ", 487-98. 
13. Edward R. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (London, 
1950), 114. 
14. As summarized in Nettl, ££· cit., 38-45, 
included a broad basis for the discussions of the Allied 
Reparation Commission: reparation deliveries from ca~ital 
wealth, i.e., removals; deliveries from current production; 
and use of German labor. The figure mentioned as a basis 
for .furthe r consideration was 20 billion dollars, 50% of which 
was to go to the Soviet Union, but the British delegation 
re gistered its objection to mentioning any specific sum. It 
should be emphasized that this was in no way a policy agreement, 
even by the Russians and Americans; despite allegations by 
the Soviets later, there is no evidence that this provis ion 
was anything more than an effort to avoid detailed negotiation 
at the top levels, perh~s reflecting the general reliance 
of President Roosevelt on future solution of problems within 
the framework of an internat ional organization. The reparations 
disc·ussion certainly exhibited, however, the foremost concern 
of the Soviet Union in post-war Germany. 
Germany surrendered on 7 May 1945. On 17 July the Tri-
partite conference met at Potsdam for the purpose of implement-
ing the broadly outlined Yalta program. In greater detail this 
conference spelled out the aims of the occupation1, , but in 
general conformity with the Yalta decisions. It was made 
.clear that Germany was to be treated as an economic unit 
although establi shment of any central government was to be 
fostered by initial concentrat ion on the rebuilding of local 
15. As presented in "'I'he Potsdam Declaration," International 
Conciliation, September 1945, 539-57· 
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government. The Council of ~oreign Ministe r s was established 
by the Potsdam Conference, as was the Cnuncil for the admin-
istration of Allied policy in Germany. So long as no central 
government existed, the Control Council presumably had to 
assume this function. Satisfactory performance of this function 
was manifestly dependent on continued Allied unity; when dead-
locks occurred the Control Council was almost automatically 
rendered incompetent in this connection, with the consequence 
that eaCh occupation power concentrated on governing its own 
zone. The zonal boundaries had been drawn with regard to the 
needs of occupying forces and had no intended connection with 
German economic or political structure. However, when effective 
collaboration broke down, the zonal borders took on an unfore-
seen significance. The unintentional dismemberment of Germany 
was later mitigated in the West by the establishment of Bizonia 
(which the French Zone eventually joined), but the boundary of 
the Soviet Zone hardened in proportion to the intensity of the 
Cold War and in 1949 became the ~ facto .. ·national boundary of 
the DDR16• 
Meanwhile Soviet aims in Germany were made alarmingly 
apparent in the Eastern Zone. One goal, which was obvious from 
the time of Yalta, was the dismantling of Germany for Russian 
16. Already in May 1946 General Clay could report to Secretary 
Byrnes: "After one year of occupation, zones represent air-
tight territories with almost no free exchange of commodities, 
persons, and ideas." Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1950), 73· 
benefit. This ranged from wholesale reparations removals 
to private scavenging by Soviet soldiers. Reparations teams 
~ of several types descended upon Germany in the wake of the 
invading Red Army (but not subject to control of the military 
commanders) and began the gargantuan task of systematically 
removing capital wealth and sending it eas~ward. This policy 
will be examined in more detail presently. The other major 
aim was not apparent at first, but became increasingly so 
during the early years of Soviet occupation. The Soviet Zone 
e 
was to be the bridgthead for the addition of all of Germany to 
the Soviet s~here. The long-est ablished Soviet concern with 
Germany as the key to Europe and the key to the expansion of 
international revolution became apparent through the esp ionage 
network set up in ~est Germany but based in and supported 
from East Germany17. It was manif~sted in Soviet policy toward 
the other Powers in Berlin and in p ropaganda calculat ed to 
a t tract West German sentiment. The most con~usive, and also 
the subtlest, evidence of Soviet intentions lay in the manner 
with which the Soviet Zone was treated. The eventual app earance 
of t he DDR as a sat ellite state is understandable only in terms 
of these t wo overriding Soviet aims: reparations came first in 
the scale of importance and nothing was allowed to interfere 
with the economic gains of the Soviet Union; in second place 
in this scale was the penetration of West Germany, and the 
17. For evidence t hat this situation has not changed see 
. Leland Stowe, "Conditio.n: Red," Esguire, May 1955, 4-3, 
. 94--102. 
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sovietization of the East ern Zone was carried out but gradually, 
always with an eye on West German reactions. It is in this 
sense that West Germany was, in the early years at least and 
to some extent even now, a vital factor in the Soviet Zone. 
If sovietization had been allowed to proceed t oo rapidly, it 
would have been impossible for the Soviet to po se as the 
exponents of German unity. Every move in the Eastern Zone 
was made in these terms, at least until 1947. After that 
t here was more attention to the third item in the scale, the 
erection of another satellite. By 1947 it had become apparent 
that the Allies were not likely to retire from Germany and then 
the second goal was postponed (though never given up) in favor 
of developing the Sovie t Zone along satellite lines. As late 
as 1949 it was clear that Soviet actions were compounded of 
all three considerations as the East German Constitution and 
government were held in abeyance until the West German gove rnment 
had been established. And even at this writing (1955) the 
DDR is kept in the status of a junior partner in the Eastern 
Bloc, for example, by not receiving full recognition in the 
East European militar y organization. This may salve ant i-German 
sentiments in other satellites, but primarily it is designed 
to show that the Kremlin would still welcome reunification. 
The price tag is hidden, of course, but everyone knows what 
the price would be if the Soviets had their way. 
The most s t riking moves in East Germany di r ectly after 
the war were in the economic r ealm. The economic recovery of 
the Soviet Zone was quite rapid at first, comparing favorably 
with West German gains for the first two year s. In s pite of 
large scale reparat ion r emoval s and related depradat ions, the 
initial impul s e to r ebuild was strong and was moreover permitted 
to exert itself. It was soon apparent , however, that economic 
recovery was of greater benefit to the Rus sians than to the 
Ge rmans themselves. 'I'he initial program of dismantling was 
gradually supp lanted in 1947 by reparations out of current 
production so that plant capacity might recover, and this 
move seemed designed to cut deep inlt'oads in the general picture 
of recovery. At l east the appearance was doubtless suf ficient 
to discourage the East Germans from ext ending themse lves as 
t h ey had at first. 
The dismant ling operations, and in fact the total p ictur e 
of Soviet economic gains from Germany, p resent difficultie s 
in t he matt er of computation. The re a r e seve r al sets of figure s 
and each varies in ce r tain ~ays from the others. 3ome include 
all manner of items, e.g., occupation costs, war damage, and 
SAG profits, while ot hers are confined to actual reparations. 
Some a r e based on loss of productive capacity, others on 
rep lacement or investment value. And reg?.rdless how the 
figuring is done, there a r e ample opportunities for duplication, 
for overlooking certain factors, and for simple failure to 
obtain the necessary statistics. Fortunately it is not 
necessary in this study to present an involved analysis of the 
Soviet economic operations; various estimat es of total losses 
to the German economy, and some attention to t he incidence of 
removals will suffice for present purposes. 
._Jl.f-.;. 
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The dismantling campaign Wf3.S an exceedingly wasteful 
operation, since it was in large part undertaken by unskilled 
workers who were quite unable to maximize Soviet gains. The 
dismantling, to a far greater extent than the later and subtler 
methods of securing economic advantage, was a much heavier 
burden to the German economy than it was a gain for the Soviet 
economy. In 1945 and 1946 it was possible to trace the dis-
mantling efforts by means of vast trails of abandoned, damaged 
or rusting equipment, all of which represented a loss to 
Germany, none of which could ever be useful to the Soviet Union. 
To the best of my knowledge, no effort has been made to system-
atically calculate the difference betwe en German losses and 
Soviet gains. Such a calculation would probably be impossible -
even the Soviets would have found it so, owing to the haphazard-
ness of the operation. But it is probable that the sight of 
worthless machinery, rusting on sidings throughout the Zone, 
was as painful to German eyes as the trainloads of equipment 
which actually did get shipped on to the Soviet Union. At 
any rate, the dismantling teams, which appeared to have certain 
definite instructions besides a large margin of discretion in 
what they removed, concent rated on specific Soviet needs such 
as: transport and postal equipment; machinery, vehicle, and 
ferrous metal industries; plywood industry; and hydrogen 
processing plants. Electrical, chemical, and rubber industries 
were also hard hit. But the incidence was by no means confined 
to these basic industries; there was s i mply nothing of value 
which was immune. The dismantling18 went on through 1946 
and 1947, although it was officially denied. As late as 
1948 the Buna plants at Schkopau were dismantled by 65-7o% 
of capacity. But this last was under the heading of SAG, of 
which mo r e will be said below, and after August 1947 it 
appears that removals were confined to SAG's considered more 
useful in Russia than in Germany. Nettl's estimate of total 
capacity loss through 1947, excluding SAGs dismantled, is 
ap _t; roximately $1,400,000,000 (based on 1936 prices). 
Reparations from current production provided the occasion 
for vigorous discussion between the Soviet Union and the 
Western Powers. The former contended that Yalta and Potsdam 
permitted such reparations, the latter that t he Level of 
Indust ry Agreement excluded them. Secretary Byrnes stressed 
this point at Stuttgart in a speech often regarded as a turning 
point in Western pol icy toward Germany and the Soviet Union19. 
The Western view was that they were pumping money into their 
zones to maintain a minimum living standard and that the 
Soviets were removing the equivalent in current production. 
If the German economy is considered asfsingle entity, this 
view is of cour9e valid. The Soviets contended that they 
were doing Germany a favor by providing employment in this 
manner; more persuasive however was the need for finished 
p roducts by the Soviet Union (both for consumption and for 
18. The details of this operation are covered by Nettl, 
££· cit., 200-207. 
19. Reprinted in International Conciliation, October 1946, 
469-80. 
profitable trade). A preliminary estimate of total re-
parations from this source, through the first half of 1948, 
is 4,385 million Reichsmark at 1936 prices, or 35% o~ total 
1 d t . 20 zona pro uc ~on • This total would have to be revised 
upward if allowance were made for changes in price levels 
in the post-war period, and still more if it were possible 
to calculate all food deliveries (expressly forbidden by 
~otsdam) and the extreme burdens imposed by Soviet needs on 
the transportation system. 
'rhe third category of reparations, German labor, 1:~ ermits 
of no monetary valuation. Labor was conscripted for work 
in the Soviet Zone, but most was sent on to the Soviet 
Union; and most involved specially qualified wor~ers or 
scientists. In addition to an estimated one million German 
.f- risoners in Russia at the end of -the war, some 300,000 
persons were said to have been removed on a more or less 
compulsory basis since the war. 21 The biggest drive came in 
May-June 1947 when over 1 00 , 000 workers, lar gely unskilled 
this time, were packed off to work in Russia. 'r his type of 
reparations was, in the i mmediate sense, of small economic 
importance to East Germany, although one would have to 
reckon in the long run the loss of valuable specialists and 
skilled workers. In human terms, however, we know enough 
of the Soviet forced labor system to realize that most of 
20 . Nettl, ££· cit., 211. 
21. Ibid, 141. 
these German conscripts had an unenviable lot. 22 
The last item that need be t .reated here is the erection 
of a Soviet economy within the Soviet Zone23. This imperiH.m 
in imperio, as Nettl calls it, consisted at first of some 
200 factories taken over by the Soviets in the characteristic 
mixed company form and a network of auxiliary economic 
institutions such as the Garantie- und Kreditbank, the 
Deutsch-Russische Transportgesellschaft, and an import-export 
firm, all of them producing in multifarious ways a magnificent 
~rofit for the Soviet Union. At the end of 1947 there were 
s t ill 134 SAGs, the remainder having been returned to the 
German economy, some of these partly dismantled. (The rest 
were turned back in January 1954.)24 The operation of the 
SAGs conforms to the general satellite pattern with control 
securely vested in Russian directors and production sub-
tracted from existing productive capacity of the Zone. In 
1947 the SAG percentage of capacity was between 15 and 17%, 
and the percentage of production, owing to priorities in 
materials and labor, 25%. But the impact on the economy was 
actually greater because of the crucial areas of East German 
industry dominated by these firms. This fact, combined with 
the banking and trading activities of Soviet-run instrumen-
talities (which had the incidental function of economic 
22. David Dallin and Boris _Ni~olaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet 
Russia, (Ne w fl .! v l."l; 'la.l(. u~\.V<- ... J•f:'l, · ' '~'t7 ). 
23. Nettl, ££· cit., 219-31· 
24. See p. 1o3 • Some had also been returned in 1950. 
warfare agains t the West), make s t he total loss to East 
Ger many incalculable. 
Several attempts have been made to estimat e the total 
losses of all kinds which the occupation inflicted on the 
Soviet Zone. It is doubtful that any known accounting methods 
woul d solve the p roblems presented by such a calculation, 
given the secrecy surrounding Soviet operations and the 
complexity of their f inancial manipulation. Price factors 
alone offer a staggering prospect since Soviet p ractice is 
to emp loy a favorable price scale on each transaction. For 
what they a r e wor th, here a r e three such estimates: Net t l 
places t he to t al value of reparation demands (other factors 
not counted) through July 1948, in t he Soviet Zone only, 
at 11,470,000,000 Reichsmark at 1936 value25; more meaningful 
to anyone unskilled in economics, one of the Bonner Berichte 
estimates a total loss of 12 billion (milliard) dollars . t o the 
end of 195226 ; and H. R. Kuelz, in 1951, saw adequate reasons 
for an estimated 16 billion dollar loss27. One may suspect 
t hat the last fi gure includes some duplicat ion, but I think 
it fairly evident t;hat t he initial goal of 10 billion dollars 
rep ar ations for the Soviet Union and Poland was surp assed 
long befo r e the Soviet exactions leveled off at a more usual 
standard of profit from a satellite. By that I mean that in 
25. Net tl, ££• cit., 23~ 
26. Die Reparationen der Sowj et ischen Besatzungszone in den 
Jahr en 1945 bis ~~de 1953, (Bonn: Bundesministerium fuer 
Gesamt deut s che Fragen, 1954 ). 
27. "'I'he Soviet Zone o:f Germany," Interna·cional Affairs, April 
1951, 163. 
all relations between Soviet Union and satellite the 
dominant partner arranges transactions in such a way as 
to bring him a profit. In some satel l ites it appears that 
aid from the Soviet Union offsets in l arge measure the profit-
ahie manipulations, but this is certainly not the case in 
~ 
East Germany. The exceptional position of Germany, accounted 
for by her reparation responsibilities, was largely absolved 
by 1949 and she has since received more standard satellite 
treatment'. For the earlier period, however, Nettl's summary 
comment was certainly valid: 
"If we see in all this economic activity, direct and 
indirect, the fundamental reason not only for the 
Soviet occupation itself but for much of .the German 
policy of the Soviet Union, we may have~discovered 
the plan of an otherwise incomprehensible series of 
mazes. "zl 
Certain other economic measures merit comment here, 
principally the land reform and nationalization of industrial 
enterprise. The more advanced economic elements of sovieti-
zation, though they may have their roots in this period, will 
be more a:J?propriate at a later point in the acc.ount. But 
first a short review of the general economic situation pre-
vailing in East Germany in the early years of occupation29. 
In area, the Zone had 30.5% of the total for Potsdam Germany; 
and more important, possessed 36.7% of the arable land. The 
population, 30.3% of the total, corresponded to 35% of post-war 
28. Nettl, ££• cit., 231. 
29. Follovving data from "Eastern Germany; a Survey of Soviet 
Policy, 1945-50," World Today, 297, 304. 
Germany's industrial productive capacity. The Soviet Zone's 
economic strength, industrial and agricultural, lay in 
production of brown coal, optical and related instruments, 
non-ferrous metals, and textiles, and in potato, rye, and 
sugar beet farm production. Its weaknesses were particularly 
in hard coal, steel, and machinery, and in dairy and meat 
~ reduction. The first two years of the occupation were marked 
by rapid strides in production and in 1946 the industrial 
output r eached a figur e slightly more than 50% of 1936 pro-
duction, comp a r ing very favorable wit~ progress in West 
Germany at this point. 'r he Soviets had ins tituted several 
vigorous and realistic, if sometimes harsh, measures to 
prevent unemp loyment , hoarding , and inflation. Af t er 1946, 
h owever, increases in p roduction dropped off and permitted 
the West ern recovery t o forge ahead. This was due 'in part to 
the effects of Soviet removals and reparations, in part to 
the assorted repressive step s taken in t he opening of t he 
sovietization p rocess. Beside s the general discouragement of 
p rivate initiative, there were the standard me t hods of raising 
p roduction in the Soviet spher e,including rationing and price 
. 30 p refe r ences, and the Hennecke brigades of outstandingly 
p roductive worke rs. By the end of 1949 p roduction had r eached 
a level about 76% of 193631 , and the diminished rate of 
increase may be relat ed di r ect ly to nationalizat i on, Soviet 
30. Hennecke is t he East German Stakhanov. 
31. "Eastern Germany .... , 11 loc. cit., 306. 
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profits, and the planning innovations which emphasized 
heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods. But fi r st 
the land reform. 
Appar ently the land refo rm had been planned in Moscow 
during the war; at any rate a special rep r e sentative, Hoernle, 
arrived in Germany f r om Moscow to car ry out the program. In 
1946 the r ef orm was completed t o the satisfaction of t he 
c ommunists and the SPD. ~ven the so-called bourgeois 
p arties, intere stingly enough, ob j ected only to the absence 
of compensat ion. ;J:he reform was, in itself, not p articularly 
communistic in nature; was in fact a needed improvement in 
the economic structure of East Germany. Its social effects 
were naturally considerable, representing the dest ruction of 
the Junker landholders and the cre ation of a new group of 
landowners with a s t ake in the regime. But it shoul d not be 
confused with collect ivization which was, at t his time, a 
forbidden subject and noticeable only in the monopoly of 
implements and machinery held by the Farmers' Mutual Aid 
Society (VdgB), antecedent of the MTS in t he DDR. In its 
actual details32 , the reform affected only about a third 
of total land area, nearer one quarter if one considers 
only agricultur al land. Of this land 18% went to people 
already owning land, and 67.5% went to individual owners. 
Principal beneficiaries were a gricultural laborers, although 
indust rial workers received a large number of very small 
32. Dat a from Nettl, ££• cit., 172-6. 
holdings. The upper limit for landholdings was fixed at 
250 acres (exceeded only by research and experimental 
stations; much of the land so allocated may, it has been 
suggested, have gone to enrich the SED and its functionaries), 
and the largest acreage is now held in units, of 12-50 acres. 
Befo r e the war the largest acreage had been in the 50-250 
acre class in the re gion now under Soviet control. Prov:j_s.ion 
for p ayment was made but not rigidly adhered to. Payment 
was supposed to equal one year's grain harvest -based on 
21anned rather than actual produc t ion - but less t han 75% of 
the pfayments were collected . Finally, the economic effects 
of the reform were less significant t han social and political 
results. In general, any lo s s in efficiency thr ough the 
bre aking up of large holdings was less important as deterrent 
to p roduction than stat e planning and assignment of agricul-
tural quotas. 
A program of socialization or nationalization was o r dered 
by the SMA in October 1945 (SMA Order 124) and provided for 
four basic types of industrial ownership: public (provincial 
governments ) , semi-public (e.g., trade unions and cooperatives), 
p rivate , and Soviet. By the end of 1946 the results were 
roughly as foll ows33: public and semi-public firms acc ounted 
fo r 40% of total Ge rman firms and 60% of total German 
p roduct ion ; some 7000 firms had changed owne r s in this 
process, 3000 having become public, 2000 semi-public, and 2000 
33. Ibid, 152. 
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p rivat e (in the hands of 11 democratically suitable" p e rsons); 
and in productive value of firms remaining under German owner-
s h i p , the public sector commanded 65%, semi-public 20%, and 
private only 15%. The p r ocess was, however, by no me ans 
complet ed, and the nationalized sector of the ec.onomy assumed 
ever greater proportions. When t he currency reform was 
p as s ed in June 1943 (a me a s ure so designed in diffe r entiated 
r a t ios of exchange that it was primarily a means of redistri-
buting wealth) , f irms owned by the Economic Commission or the 
provin&ial government s accounted for 85-90% of annual p roduction. 
In addition, there were by this time no crucial produc t ive 
areas lef t in private hands. Coal mining and power production, 
for instance, were totally nationalized and only 20% of 
heavy industrial capacity remained under private ownership. 
Economic planning in the East Zone had a rather confused 
beginning . At first of course the Soviet occupation had to 
deal with an economy suffering the effects of total war. 
While the reduction of productive capacity was p robably less 
as a result of the war than many observers have seemed to 
assume, the ancillary facilities which are necessqry to tie 
p roductive units together into a system, such facilities 
as transport, communication, and administ ration, had either 
been badly damaged or dispersed in the lat t er stages of the 
war. As ~~ttl describes the situation: 
"Before any planning for the future coul d take p lace, 
an attempt at economic stocktaking had to be made. Not 
only was an ac·cur ate survey essential in itself, but 
the resultant plans had also to suit the Russian 
rep aration demands; when the actual task of reconstruc-
tion began to be undertaken, both German and B.ussian 
interests always had to be taken into account, and re-
conciled as far as :possible. Since official four-po wer 
government still professed to advocate economic re-
strictions, a :programme of open industrial expansion in 
basic industries, even if it were possible, could not be 
undertaken. The reconciliation of conflic·tinst interests 
made the intrinsically difficult task of the Central 
Administrations almost insuperable.n34 
However, as soon as the initial problems had been overcome, 
p lanning was the obvious concomitant of industrial rebirth. 
Not only was it the natural response of the occup ation power, 
it was a virtual necessity in the face of wholesale disor-
gani zation of the economy. At first the planning was tri-
:plicated: detailed plans were p repared by the provincial 
governments, the Central Administration, and the S:MA., the 
latter of course taking :precedence. And t h is was accompanied 
by stringent measures limiting the mobility of labor. Although 
hampered by transport difficulties and by an inflation which 
placed the currency quite outside the reach of any planning 
technique, the Soviet methods started out to be effective. 
Had the position of the consumer improved as significantly 
as did the product ion curve, the results might have validated 
the comparatively harsh methods employed. The pace did not 
continue however, owing in no small measure to the declining 
morale of the populace. The cessation of reparations, 
announced by Marshall Sokolovsky in January 1947, would 
have helped had it actually come about but the p romise 
was an empty one. 
34. Ibid, 152. 
I 
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The first public announc ement of a comprehens ive 
plan occurred in June 1948 . Walter Ulbricht, Deputy Chair-
man of t he SED, at that time proclaimed a one-year p lan 
for 1948 and a two-year plan for 1949-50. The aims were 
relatively modest, a 10% increase in production over 1947 
being the target for the first plan. Even this was parti ally 
unf:i&J.filled. The t wo-year plan forecast, among ?ther t hings, 
i mprovement in distribution of consumer goods, although 
heavy industry was t he chief concern. This plan set four 
major goals: production was to be 135% 6f 1947; labor 
p roductivity was to rise 30% above 1947; the total wage bill 
was to be 15% higher than 1948 ; and produc·tion costs in 
nationalized enterprises was to drop by 7%. Despite the 
government announcement in January 1950 that the plan would 
be completed in 18 months, available information strongly 
suggests that the targets were not reached. The main effect 
was a substantial rest ructuring of the economy in favor of 
heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods. In the 
agricultural sector, p roduction did rise somewhat during 
1948 and 1949 , but the demands of the plan had in any case 
been modest35. 
Political develo~ments could , if treated in detail, 
take a grea t deal of space. The ob j ect he r e will be a 
35- The plan also called for nat;onalizat ion of 99% of 
mines, 54% of metallurgy, 41% of metal industry, 35% 
of chemicals, 32?b of textiles. Ul bricht's statement 
in Der deutsche Zweijahresplan (Berlin, 1948). 
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generalized summary of events and policie s through 1949 , and 
important details will be p resented out of temporal context 
in Chapter V in order to preserve continuity in the account 
of. the various aspects of DDR politics. 
The initial problem for the occupation, as in West 
Germany, was to find enough competent people to t ake over 
responsruble positions and to start the machinery of 
admi nistration functioning . It was even more dif ficult fo r 
vhe Rus s ians because of t he popular fear which prevented large 
numbers of people from coming forward and caused many more 
to flee westward. Actually t here was very little system in 
the beginning, except as mentioned before, in dismantling , 
and personnel were accept ed wi t h alacrity when they offered 
themselves. Denazification, while ultimately quite effective 
in the fields of education and the judiciary, was reserved 
for t he obvious Nazis. Underlings had an unexpectedly easy 
time of i t in the Soviet Zone and were often used in 
responsible posi tions, alth ough until a later period t his 
was probably unintentional. Demilitarization and destruction 
of war-making potential were quickly accomplished, largely · 
through removals to Soviet .rtussia. Decentralization was 
another matter, but was at first . adhered to. The S~A itself 
was rather loosely orgru1ized to begin with, and it took some 
while before t he regional c:o.mrnands could be close ly integrat ed 
and the whole s t ructur e brought under the usual police 
surveilance. Marshall Zhukov held the post of Military 
-48-
Gover nor only until June 1946 when he was succeeded by 
his deputy , Marshal Sokolovsky. In March 1949 General 
Chuikov, who had been :provincial MiL_tal--y Governor in 
~huringia, re~laced Sokolovsky. The various Land governors 
set up local units of administration first, and these were 
gradually absorbed by Laender governments. · As the lines 
of control crystallized the Laender and the local organs 
of administration became the final recipients of orders 
going out from the Central SW~ in Karlshorst. The I~ 
shortly established itself as an independent force and 
watchdog , eventually assuming a more tangible function in the 
development of the People's Police after 194736 • 
Soviet encouragement brought an early development .of 
political activity. ~.rwo p artie s appeared immediately, the 
SPD and KPD, to be joined shortly by the CDU and LDP, all 
counterparts of parties functioning in the West but all slightly 
more radical than their Western opposite numbers. The KPD 
was the best organized p arty and r eceived by far the most 
assistance from the SMA. But the SPD by force of numbers 
dominated the Zone at first. When the S~~ set about to form 
the Central Administrations a scant two months after formation 
of t he Laender administrations, the KPD was complet ely over-
shadowed by other p a r ties. This was, incidentally, the 
opening move in an ever-increasing trend toward centralized, 
,36. For details on SMA see Gregory Klimov, 'rhe 'I'error Machine 
(New York ; Praeger, 1953). 
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and thus more easily controlled, administration. Pers onnel 
was chosen mainly, however, on the basis of apparent com-
petence and many a ppointees had no political affiliat ion. 
A more definite di r ection was i mparted to East German 
politics early in 1946. The first stage was the forced 
amalgamation of SPD and K~D to form the Socialist Unity 
Party or SED . The initia l public p rop osal came from an SPD 
leader, Otto Grotewohl, who is still maintaining his political 
balance in s p ite of this questionable background. He had, 
with numerous other SPD leade:c·s, opposed the merger only 
a short time before. Many of the other opponents continued 
to object, but after 22 April when the merger was off icially 
.announced only the Berlin branch was able to maintain its 
indep endenc e . Th is ffi~ insp ired artifice, which h a d the 
incidental effect of giving trade union cont rol to the 
communist s, was engineered in time to alt er comp lete ly the 
political context for t h e autumn elections. The resulting 
voter confusion is displayed in the contrast between election 
totals in the Zone and in Berlin. This election was for 
seats in the Laender parliaments and, in Berlin, for the city 
assembly. In the Zone the SPD was outlawed but in Berlin it 
was po ssible to fight the ele ction in dir ect opposition to the 
new SED. The Zonal outcome was announced on 21 October 1946 
and gave the SED a plurality in each Land, but an absolute 
majority in none. In Saxony, Thuringia, and Mecklenburg the 
SED captur ed between 4 9 and 50% of the to t al vote ; Saxony-
-50- ~. 
Anhalt and Brandenburg averaged about 45%. The combined totals 
gave the SED 47.7%, the LDP 24.7%, the CDU 24.3%, and the 
SBD affiliates (the mass organizations which had already 
begun to function) 3.3%. Thus the opposition parties were 
in a position to outvote the SED popularly, but in the allot-. 
ment of seats in the parliaments the SED with its affiliates 
was generally able to dominate. Provincial ministries were 
allocated in rough proportion to this allocation of seats. 
But for the dominance of SED in ministries of inter ior, the 
even split was fairly reflected. Berlin ]Yp6.duced a quite 
diffe rent response from the electorate however. He r e the 
SPD emerged clearly the victor with 63 seats in the city 
assembly as against 29 for the CDU, 26 f or the SED , and 12 
for the LDP37. 
It would be inaccurate to acc ept t he election results 
in the Zone as particularly significant. At this s t a ge, the 
STh~ was still p redominant in all policy and planning matters 
and the Laender were merely the agencies for execution of the 
policies and plans. Moreover, the SED had one principal 
func t ion, to popularize and explain or sugar-coat the 
occupation decisions, which overshadowed any l atent tendency 
to become t he dominant el ement of the political structure. 
Elections a t this point we re in the nature of trial balloons 
37. Above figures · based on Nettl, 21?.· cit., 90-94; and Vera F. 
Eliasberg, "Political Party Developments, 11 i n Gabriel 
Almond (ed), Struggle for Democracy in German~ (Chapel 
Hill; University of North Caro lina Press, 194 ), 262-3. 
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to test _;iopular reaction_, , and it was only later that the 
party assumed the decisive role assigned to dominant satellite 
parties. 
Nevertheless, the SED received very significant aid 
from the occupation authorities. This took the form of 
newsprint allocations, for example, whereby the SED received 
•}n the first quarter of 1948 548 of the 585 tons of news-
print issued to all parties38 • In the final analysis, 
however, the SMA kept a tight rein on all parties through 
the so-called Anti-Fascist front to which all parties be-
longed. The term "fascist" early replaced t he initial term 
"nazi" as a broad category of disapprobation and denazification, 
which had provided the excuse for most of the policies pursued 
in the Soviet Zone during the first two years~ was tFeft~fermed 
~a~e Bt8Fi ~eaeral 8:!'J?18Hitii.e;a ~e uf8tecisd', The term was 
applied to anything of which the SMA disappr oved and also 
p rovided a framework, the ANTIFA, within which the parties 
could be kept in line. Thus, the CDU was deprived of several 
leaders at different times, among them Hermes, Schreiber, 
and Kaiser, because they allegedly did not cooperate with 
the anti-fascist orientation of the bloc. 
Af t er 1948 the SED was clearly the dominant Soviet 
Zone party, but its drive to secure popular su]Jport lagged 
badly. Not only was it forced to inter-pr et an unpopular 
occupation to an 11unreconstruc t ed " society, but it was still 
unable to proceed with the reordering of that society on the 
38. Net tl, 2.2.• cit._; · 10_1:. -
- ... - -
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satellite pat t ern. The Berlin Blockade was also not calculated 
to improve its popular standing . Nevertheless the stage 
was being set f'or developments of a diff'e:cent order. In 
June 1948 two new p arties were licensed in a move to attract 
additional support. The Bauernpartei was aimed at strengthen-
ing communist appeal in the rural sector$, and the National 
Democratic Party (NDP ) designed to appeal to former Nazis. 
The former was led by Ernst Goldenbaum who was detached f'rom 
-
the SED for the purpose; the latter by veteran communist 
Lot.har Bolz. ·rhe NDP represented the newest line on dena-
zif'icat ion, namely that former nazis were likely to be easily 
controllable on grounds of their past record and that they 
could contribute to the approaching tasks of the satellite 
regime. In the realm of administration, centralizing tenden-
cies received a large boost with the c r eat ion of the Economic 
Co ,T.mission, successor of the Central .Administrations and fore-
runner of a central government. The Economic Commission was 
divided into 17 department s which emphasized the economic 
functions of a c entral government, and, to the extent that it 
was not a rubber st;amp for the SN.iA, the Commission was directly 
under SED unfluence. .As the SED met in its first p arty con-
ference in January 1949 and chose its Folitbuero, it was be-
c oming steadily more apparent that the Soviet Zone was sch eduled 
for important changes, at leas t in outward form and probably 
also in direction. The propaganda line had switched f'rom 
the old anti-fascist concentration and was at this point 
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directed at the hostile West . In a positive sense, Ge iman 
unity became the slogan. The Blockade o£ Berlin had been 
in effect since June 1948 and the results of Western policy 
in Germany had already shown the extent to which the two 
parts of Ge r many were diverging . Clearly the unity demanded 
by the SED was int ended to be realized on Soviet terms, 
but the Soviets had accepted the obvious and were now con-
c entrating on full-scale sovietization. With the East-West 
deadlock at its height, a new satellite was being p repared 
in answer to the stiffened resi stance from west of .the Iron 
Curtain. 
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Chapter III 
A New Satellite: German Democratic Republic, 1949 
A society which is freely constituted, organized, and 
run is not the best training ground for understanding the 
practices of totalitarian societies. This is so plain as to 
require no elaboration. One of the r easons for frequent 
misapprehension of totalitarianism by the individual schooled 
in the open society is his tendency to misread events and 
their significance. The proclamation of a law, the founding 
of an institution, the expression of a policy, are all events 
which command a t tention in the free world - and rightly so. 
But in the enslaved world it often happens that such events 
are only pale reflections of decisions and manipulations 
carried out in secret and long past. A headline may then be 
nothing more than the belated acknowledgement of a fait accompli. 
Establishment of a government and promulgation of a consti-
tution are the sort of events which we would customarily re gard 
as opening a chapt er. They a r e usually a prelude to, and a 
keynote of, things to come. In the Soviet sphere such events 
may be almost the reverse in their significance. A new 
const;i tution may signal the end of a chapter and usher in a 
situation which bear s little relation to the promise of its 
terminology. A new government may properly belong to the 
preceeding series of events instead of initiating a new chain 
of its own; the correct response in such a case is to wonder 
what unannounced goals may dominat e the future, and, incidentally, 
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dominate the individuals .subject to t his government. 
The establishment of the Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik, and the proclamation of its constitution, in 
October 1949, are the sort of occurrences which we have been 
de s cribing. They had that artificial flavor which identified 
them as step s in a larger scheme. They were not accomplish-
ments in their own right, but merely symbols of a stage that 
had to be reached before sighting in a greater ob j ective. 
And contemplation of what t h is aim might be, given the nature 
of satellite status, can hardly have been an occasion for 
rejoicing on the part of the citizenry of this new "republic". 
The Constitution itself, as we shall see, was not new, 
but rathe r a rewo r king of an older document. And the govern-
ment did not embody a new set of institutions, but merely re-
furbished older ones and invoked a structure which had been 
in abeyance for many months awaiting the strategic moment. 
October 1949 did not, then, set up a milestone in the history 
of East Germany under the Soviet yoke. The government and the 
Constitution capped the events and policies reviewed in the 
last chapter; but they signified no transformation, no new 
direction - only a hardening of the Soviet mold into which 
East Germans must fit or perish. 
There is, however, still some basis for selecting the 
founding of the DDR for separate consideration, even though 
it isthereby tacitly accorded more importance than it had 
in actuality. The wording of the Constitution, and the 
..:._?6-
personnel and structure of the government, are tangible 
factors which submit to analysis. Whether they tell us 
more by intention or by indirection, they do provide fixed 
points from which both past and future receive a certain 
amount of illumination. And a constitution in particular 
may be helpful because, throughout the Soviet-dominated area, 
lip-service is still paid to legal forms ·. Constitutions are 
written to be followed so far as possible; hence they embody 
not only the unexceptionable verbiage, but also the devices 
for circumventing inconvenient provisions. Both the consti-
tution and the governmental structure also aid in making 
comparisons with other, better-known satellite states. And 
finally, although internal realities were not changed, the 
DDR assumed a formal equality with the other satellites which 
had been impossible for the Soviet Occupation Zone. This 
implied at least a nominal change in East Germany '.s external 
relations. 
Formation of the DDR 
The first faint harbinger of an "independent" East 
German government was the Volkskongres~ which convened in 
Berlin in December 1947. This body had quasi-official status, 
having been formed and dominated by the SED and its subsidiary 
popular organizations but never confirmed by an election. As 
one observer has not ed, its function was only "demonstrative 111 • 
l. H. R. Kuelz, 11 1rhe Soviet Zone of Germany, n International 
Affairs, April 1951, 159. From 1946 to 1948, Kuelz was 
Minister of Justice in Thuringia. He i s now Ministerial-
direktor der Verwalt ung fuer Wirtschaft in Bonn. 
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In March of the following year, however, this body named a 
four hundred member Volksrat or "People's Council". The 
latter group, as dubious from a legal standpoint as its 
parent, was also demonstrative in function, desi.gned to 
enunciate Russian policy on German unificat i on and a peace 
treaty as ostensible "grassroots" sentiment. In addition, 
it is probable that the Volksrat was instructed to prep are 
itself for a governing role as soon as the blockade had its 
expected effect2 • When the blockade faileilito fulfill Soviet 
expectations, the Volksrat's functions were markedly reduced: 
a constitutional committee of the Council was to draw up a 
document on which an East German gove rnment could be based, 
and the Volks r at was to direct elections to the Third Volks-
kongress. 
By October 1948 the constitutional committee of the 
Volksrat had reported out the dr aft oonstitution, drawn in 
accordance with principles laid down by the SED Politbuero. 
In March 1949 the draft received unanimous endorsement by the 
Volksrat, which body want on to supe rvize elect ions on 15 and 
16 May to the Volkskongress. The results of the balloting, 
during which the constitution was not mentioned, were reported 
as 66% in f·avor of, and 33% opposed to:; the single "unity 
list" offered the vot ers by the s:l!;D3. On 30 May 1949 the 
Congress convened, approved the Constitution for all of Germany, 
2. This is stated as fact by J.P. Nettl, fhe Eastern Zone and 
Soviet Policy in Ge rmany (London: Oxford University Press, 
1951), 109. 
3. These fi gures are quoted by Kuelz, Q£• c i t., 160. 
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and postponed . ove rdue provincial elections until 15 October 
1949. 
This process, carefully engineered and yet d r awn 
out over a considerable period , indicat es t hat the SMA. 
and the SED were unwilling to rely on the still-fallible 
electoral process any more than seemed absolutely necess ary. 
Relying inste ad upon t wo delegat ed bodies (only the 'I1h ird 
Volkskongress was elec t ed) and a distinc.ly extra-legal procedu r e, 
the S~D made certain that elections would be held to a minimum 
until cent r ali zat ion of control had p roceeded far enough to 
guarant ee r e sults on the People's Democracy pat t e rn. Further-
more, t he t iming of t he ope rat ion make s abundant ly clear 
that the establishment of the DDlt was held up to serve as 
the answer t o the format ion of the -;.Je st Ge r man government. 
The DDR could have c ome i nto being at any time afte r mid-1948 ; 
but by delaying i t s f ormation it was hoped that West Germany 
and t he West ern Powers could be c ast as villains in the 
splitt ing of Germany. 
In October 1949 , a few weeks af ter t he establishment 
of the Bonn government, the Volksrat acted on the mandate-
in-advance of the Volk skongress and p roclaimed the Consti-
t ution; on the same day, the 7th of October , the DDR was 
called into being , and three days later assumed the administra-
tive functions of the SMA , which turned itself into the 
S~viet Control Commission. 
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Just before placing East Germany in the hands of a 
new government on 7 October, the Volksrat provided one 
last twist in the serpentine procedure by transforming 
itself into the Volkskammer. The Constitution provided 
for this l egislative assembly to be popularly elected but, 
as a final safety measure, the Volksrat took a new title of 
Provisional People's Chamber and so preserved itself in a 
new guise. A few days after the Constitution took effect 
this same assembly again :postponed elections, for "economic 
reasons", until October 1950. Thus the SED acquired mo re 
time in which to perfect its electoral system; and the DDR 
began an exist ence which could hardly have been less 
legitimate. 
The Constitution4 
The Constitution adopted for East Germany had a p re-
cursor, a :p roposal for an all-German constitution put forth 
by the SED in November 1946. The document produced by t he 
Volksrat committee fol l ows the earlier proposal closely5. 
Thus it appears that the committee had a fairly easy task, 
merely rubber-stamping the SED 's const itutional ideas. 
The se ideas underwent little change, either in SED 
councils or in the SMA , f or the p rovincial constiutions 
4. Based on the text given in Office of the U.S. High Commissioner 
for Germany, Soviet Zone Constitution and Electoral Law 
(Washington: G.P.O., 1951). 
5. Nettl, ££· cit., ll2n. 
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conform to the same pattern and p resage the DDR Constitution. 
The constitutions of the five East German Laender were all 
proclaimed in late 1946 and early 1947; and are almost 
interchangeable6 • In essential provisions, to d~scribe 
one is to describe them all. Legislative authority is 
supreme, taking precedence over administrative and judicial 
authority, and is entrusted to a unicameral l egislature 
elected by unversal suffrage and p roportional representation. 
Judicial review of a modified sort rests with a special 
committee, but is prohibited to the courts. Finally, each 
constitution incorporated elaborate guarantees of individual 
rights. But as Nettl points out, the provincial constitutions 
were partly inoperative at the time of their adoption because 
responsibility to the occupying power took precedence over 
:party or constitutional obligations. n(The Ministers') task 
was primarily to carry out the reconst ruction of economic 
and administrat ive life in the Eastern zone according to the 
directions of the Russians. Party control over the activities 
of ministe r s at this time _was quite unthinkable and impracti-
cable."? A similar comment would be possible about the DDR 
Constitution but for certain decisive changes brought about 
by 194-9; by then the lines of' control had been disguised and 
were no longer exercised as the conqueror's prerogative, and 
the SED had become a fairly reliable instrument of Soviet policy. 
6. Texts given in OMGUS , Constitutions of the German Laender 
(Berlin, 1947). 
7. Ne t tl, ££· cit., 97. 
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The DDR Constitution is divided into three sections: 
A. Fundamentals of State Authority, B. Contents and 
Limits of State Authority, and C. Organization of Stat e 
Authority. Section A be gins with the assumption of autho-
rity over 11 the German people as a whole r• (Art. 1), and 
goes on to assert the "right and duty" of every citizen to 
participat e in t he political life of the state on all levels. 
(Art. 3) ~rhe rest of Section A. is devoted to the usual 
provisions about the Constitution, the welfare of the people, 
and international law. 
Sec t ion B. begins with Ri ghts of the Citizen where, 
among assurances as to equal rights for women (Art. 7), 
personal liberty (Art. 8), fre edom of expression and 
association (Art. 9 and 12), the right to organize and to 
work (Art. 14 and 15) , and others, the following revealing 
~aragraph suggests the r eal int ention as to civil rights: 
"Incitement to boycott of democrat ic institutions or 
organizat i ons, incitement to attempts on t he lif e of 
democratic politicians, the manifestation of religious 
and racial hatred and of hatred against other peoples, 
militarist ic p rop aganda and warmonger ing as well as 
any ot her discriminat ory acts are felonious crimes with-
in the meaning of the Penal Code. The exercise of 
democrat ic rights within the meaning of the Constitution 
is not an incitement to boycott." (Art. 6) 
The vague phraseology here seems made-to-order for inter-
pre t ation, the opening sent ence designed as broad p ro t ection 
for group s and p ersons i n favor, the second sentence a 
cloak for nearly any action aga i nst those out of favor. 
Similarly throughout, loophole s are carefully p rovided for 
any action by the regi me . 
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Articles 19 . to 29 deal with the Economic Order, These 
articles lay the basis for state supe rvision of the economy 
including the "public economic plan" (Art. 21), right of 
expropriation (Art. 23), nationalization of basic industry 
(Art. 25), land reform (Art. 24), and collectivization 
(Art. 27). In these elaborate and highly specific provisions, 
what is given at one point may be taken away again at the 
next. Article 22 says that "private property is guaranteed 
by the Constitution, 11 but Article 24 effectively cancels 
it with the phrase "misuse .of propertyn, which is punished 
by expropriation without compensation. Such express ions 
as "unless the law provides o-therwise'' occur repeatedly, 
making a mockery of the guarantees and of the Constitution 
itself. 
Four article s cover the subject of Family and Motherhood, 
followed by a detailed set of provisions on Education. The 
crux of this matter is t.O.at "Art, science, and their teaching 
are free", but that ''The stat e p articipates in their cul ti-
vation and grants ~hem protection, especially against their 
abuse for purposes which are contrary to the provisions or 
the spirit of the Constitution." (Art. 34) Artic-les 41 to 
48 deal with Religion and Religious Associations and in-
corporate surprisingly few reservations on the religious 
freedom they guarantee. The public contributions to the 
churches, traditional in Germany, are abrogated; otherwise, 
infringements of r eligious freedom are left to the extra-
constitutional sphere. Typical of the Constitution, the last 
-63-
article (49) of this section deserves mention. "A basic 
right may not be violated in its essential content, not 
even where this Constitution authorizes its restriction by 
law or makes its further development subject to legislation. 11 
One looks in vain, of course, for a definition of "essential 
content 11 or a listing of which are the "basic" rights. A 
more anachronistic provision has seldom appeared in a 
constitutional document. 
Section C. ( Organi zation of Sta t e Authority) delineates, 
in Articles 50 to 144, the stru cture and p owers of government. 
Highly detailed, the section includes many p rovisions which 
would normally be left for sim~le legislation. The resulting 
governmental organization conforms in large me asure to that 
of the Laender described above. For present p urposes it 
will suffice to mention only those p rovis i ons which are of 
s p ecial i mportance o r interest. 
Theoretically , the unicame ral p rincip le doe s not carry 
over to t he DDR Constitution. Alth ough Article 50 affirms 
that the popular ly elected Volkskammer is the sup reme autho-
rity, there is also provision for a Laende rkammer the membe r s 
of which are chosen by the provincial l egislatures in t h e 
same ratio of par ty strength . as p revails in the Landtage 
(Art. 72). Like the Volkskammer, the Laenderk~~er elects 
its own P r e sidium (Art. 57 and 73), but the Constitution 
is vague as t o the function and imp ortance of either 
P . d. 8 res1 1um • ·rhe relationship between the two chambers is 
shown most clearly in Article 63 which lists the b asic 
governmental .func t ions as belonging to the Vo lkskammer. 
Although the Laenderkammer may also initiate legislation 
(Art. 82), it is clear that the people's representat ives 
enjoy p reeminence both in l egislation and in supervision 
of admi nist ration policy. 'rhe Laenderkammer possesses a 
veto over l egislation, but the veto may be overridden simply 
by repassage in the Volkskammer (excep t when the veto is 
p assed by two-thirds majority, in which case two-thirds is 
also necessary to override) (Art. 84). Proyision is also 
made for initiative and referendum (Art. 87 ) . 
In practice, the Volkskammer predominates to an extent 
just short of unicameralism. It is therefo r e not surprising 
to find Ar t icle 53 stipulating t .hat "Nominations to the 
Volkskammer may be submitted only by associations which 
satisfy the provisions of Article 13, paragraph 2, u which 
reads: 
11 Nominations for the Volkskammer may be made only by 
those associations which, pursuant to their statutes, 
aim to bring about the democratic organization of 
public and social life in the entire Republic and 
which maintain an organization throughout the terri-
tory of the Republic." 
Such a stipulation makes it fairly clear what forces will 
be represented in the legislature. 
8. The importance of t he Presidium of t he Volkskammer, in the 
absence of constitutional specification, was predictable 
on the basis of experience elsewhere in the Soviet s phere 
where a Pr e sidium u sually outshines its parent assembly . 
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The Constitutional CoiD...mittee is an interesting feature 
of the legislative power. Including representatives (pro-
portionally) of all parliamentary parties, three members 
of the Supreme Court of the DDR, and three professors of 
cons t itutional law, the Committee is chosen by the Volkskammer 
and is responsible for the review of legislat ion as to 
constitutionality. This curious form of judicial review 
is vitiated, however, by the power of the Volkskammer to 
reverse the Committee•s report. (Art. 66). 
The Government consists of the Minister-President and 
the mini sters. The Cabinet is chosen in proportional re-
p r e sentation of p arty strength in the Volkskammer; the 
Minister-President by the strongest party (Art. 92). The 
legislature may repudiate the Government by a no-confidence 
vote, but only if a new Government and p rogr am is considered 
simultaneously and app roved. Ministers are also sub j ect to 
individual no-confidence votes by t he Volkskammer. (Art. 95 
and 96). 
·:rhe President of the Republic is vested with the 
ceremonial functions of government, but has virtually no 
independent power. He is elected by the Volkskammer and 
Laenderkammer in joint session for a f our ye a r term. (A~. 101 -
108). 
The provincial constitutions, although effective far 
in advanc e of the DDR Con stitution, fores aw the eventual 
centralization of governing power and left room for a central 
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government to be superimposed. 'l:he DDR Constitution con-
fi r ms this centralizing tendency by re quiring con stitutional 
confo rmity of the Laender (Art. 109), and by expressly 
setting the law of t he Republic above Land law (Art. 114). 
Also, Article 112 reserves t o the Republic exclusive legis-
lative power in a long li s t of areal, including forei gn 
trade and r elat i ons, ~ivil and criminal law, cour ts, immi-
gration and emi grat ion, labor law, t r ansport and c ommuni-
cat i ons, informat i onal se r vices, social insurance, occupa t ion 
cost s and reparat i on s, customs and movement of commodi cies, 
and others. 
The article s dealing with Administ ration of Justice 
set up what purports t o be an indep endent legal syst em 
(Art . 127), only to tea r it down a gain with ambiguous 
p rovisions f or recall as anothe r prerogative of the Volks-
kammer (Art. 132). And a very questionable practice is 
encou raged by Article 130 : ''Laymen are, as much as pos sible, 
to be used as judges. Laymen a r e elected, on t he proposal 
of democratic p arties and organizations, by the compe t ent 
popular rep resentat ive bodies . 11 
Perhap s t he first comment that would occur to anyone 
readi n g t he DDR Constitution is t hat it i s a poor job of 
constitution-making . Excess verbiage, redundancie s and 
contradictions, inclusion of inapprop riate detail, and 
omission of some imp ortant matters - such impressions 
combine t o render the document almost ridiculous. And this 
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is actually just as well, for it ne ed not be taken very 
seriously. Its terminology is such that nearly everything 
is possible, and what is not possible in constitutional 
terms can be accomplished, as we already know, by circum-
vention. It would seem that it is eas ier in Eastern Europe 
to pervert t he work "democraticn than the word "free 11 • The 
former is called upon heavily in the Constitution, and per-
mits, as we have learned in ne gotiation wi t h the Soviet Union, 
a variety of interpretat ions. On the other hand, "free" is 
consp icuous by its absence in t he string of adjectives em-
p loyed. to describe DDR elections. The ballot is "universal, 
equal, direct, and secret, 11 but not free.. We may say, by 
way of generalizat i on, that t he Constitution shows more 
~lainly the influence of Weimar than of the Soviet Consti-
tution which has been so widely copied in Eastern ~urope9. 
It even indicat es some attention to the UN Declarat ion of 
Basic Rights, even though t he rights so generously offered 
by the one hand a r e ·as readily withdrawn by the other hand • 
... The e s sential factor, howeve r , is not ~cestry; the fac t is 
t hat this document has been drawn to serve the interests of 
t he SED and the Soviet overseer, and t he necessary p rovisions 
have been incorporat ed to make it useful t o t hem. It 
establishes a highly centralized government with .power 
vested in an easily controlled legislature, and it makes 
9. ·E •. B.W., "Contrasting Constitutions in Germany," World 
Today, November 1949 , 487, 491-2. 
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the whole structure rest on the disciplined SED and its 
mass organizations. All of the satellite constitutions 
are characterized by certain essential provisions - elaborate 
declarations of civil liberty linked with limitations with-
holding them from persons out of sympathy with the regime, 
practical unicameralism for easier control, guarantees of 
private property joined with vitiating limitations, and 
centralization (except in Czechoslovakia which is federal) l O_ 
and in these critical features the DDR Constitution matches 
the "People's Democracies." If East Germany has not yet 
caught up wi th the other satellites in the process of sovieti-
zation, it is because of facto r s other t han t he Constitution. 
The Machinery of Government 
In considering the governmental situation as it existed 
in East Germany on 10 October 1949, it becomes evident how 
very limited were the change s which followed establishment of 
the DDR. At the constitutional fount of authority stood the 
11 hangover" Volksrat, now called the Volkskammer but lacking 
any semblance of popular mandate. And even that hand-p icked 
assembly rested at one remove from actual political power 
as its Presidium undertook the est ablishment of a government. 
J:he legislative p icture was compl eted when the five provincial 
le gislatures select ed and sent to Berlin the thirty-four 
members of the Laenderkammer11 • The provincial gover nments 
10. Cyril E. Black, "Constitutional r rends in Easte r n Europe, 
1945-194-8," in Soviet Satellites (Notre Dame: Review of 
Politics, 194-9), 29-33* 
11. In addition, East Berlin sent six de l egate s to the 
Laenderkammer as observers. 
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remained unchanged in form; in actuality they became a gents 
of the central government and the Landt age were thereby reduced 
to impotence. Thus, since t he Volkskammer repre s ented only 
the SED inner circle, t he people of Ea st Germany were repre-
sented in no organ of authority. 
The administrative authority placed by the SMA in German 
hands devolved upon the newly creat ed government ~d its 
ministries. But the only new element was t he nomenclature, 
for the Economic Commission had simply become the government, 
its departments the ministries. 
as fo1lows12 : 
Minister President 
Deputy Minist er Presidents 
Foreign Minister 
Minister of t he Interior 
Minister for Planning 
Minister for Industry 
Minister of :b' inance 
'I he government lineup was 
Grotewohl ( SED) 
Ulbricht ( SED ) 
Nuschke (C DU ) 
Kastner (LDP ) 
Minis·t;er of Labor and Health 
Dertin~er (CDU) 
Steinhoff ( SED) 
Rau ( SED) 
Selbmann (SED) 
Loch (LDE) 
Steidle (CDU) 
Wandel ( SED) Minist er of Culture 
Minister of Jus tice Fechner ( SED ) 
There was, to be sure, one new ministry which had not been 
present in the Economic Commission. The Minist~J of Foreign 
Affairs seems to have been added to gain prestige ove r the 
12. As list ed by Net·tl, 2£• cit., 112. 
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Bonn government, which was not permitted such a ministry 
at that s t age. But ±ts diplomat ic representatives were 
accepted in few countries outside the Soviet orbit; hence 
the ministry "fulfilled few valuable functions beyond 
establishing tentative lj_aison with Eastern Europe and re-
ceiving Soviet orders in a new form." 13 
Having emphas ized how little importance attaches to 
the terminologic.al changes of October 1949 and what slight 
alteration of volitical reality may be attributed to the 
Constitution, there remains one item of significance in 
this sequence of events. That is the coming of age of the 
SED. More important than the delegation of SMA powers to 
the new administration, this reco gnition of the SED as the 
reliable agency of local control raised East Germany to 
parity with its Eastern European neighbors. This is not 
to suggest that Soviet control was relinquished; the lines 
of authority were simply removed from public view. But 
that is the way any satellite is run. ·:rhe SED is still 
subject to Soviet dictation, but so are the native communist s 
of Poland and Hungary and Rumania. For the first time Stalin 
sent an official message to an East German official. Mean-
ingless as this may be in terms of Realpolitik, it is 
symbolic of the new status of the SED. 1.l:his change in 
status is the reason for regarding October 1949 as a con-
venient point of demarcation between occupied East Germany 
13. Ibid, 143. 
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and the satellite German Democratic Republic. And if the 
change seems too slight to warrant such an interpretation, 
a better way of viewing the issue is t hat this slight change 
is as good a measure as we have of the corresp ondingly small 
differ ence between a country under occupation and a sat ellite 
country. 
-72-
Chapter IV 
Moscow and Berlin: Pattern of Control, 1949-1953 
~e first three chapters have offered in turn, a 
general summary of satellitism, a survey of the initial 
Soviet aims and techniques in Germany, and a review of the 
first steps taken in establishing the DDR as a satellite. 
This chapter will describe the instruments and policies 
of Soviet control as they developed up to 1953. It should 
be understood that the manner in which the Soviet Union 
effectuates its authority in Eastern Europe applies equally 
to East Germany in this period. Diplomatic channels, units 
of Sovie~ secret police, and the Soviet Army provide the 
essential avenues of communication whereby Kremlin decisions 
are transmitted to the puppet rulers. The results, as exhibited 
by DDR institutions, S~D policy, and economic structure, will 
be described presently under the headings which have outstanding 
importance. But two conditioning factors, both of which con-
tribute to superficial appearances of difference between Bast 
Germany and the other satellites, should be borne in mind. 
The Soviet Army, despite its gradually diminishing role, 
has remai~ in the spotlight to a greater extent than in other 
satellites; it has been the most convenient agency at hand 
for exercise of Soviet control, but the degree of direct 
control is not greater, generally speaking , than in other 
lands where lines of authority have been better concealed. 
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The second factor is the continued existence of the All-
German concept. This has worked in two ways: as sustenance 
for a western orientation among the people, and as temptation 
for the Soviets to temporize, at least in outward appearance, 
on goals of sovietization in the hope of gaining the larger 
prize. This latter factor, in slightly altered f orm, continues 
to operate and is the best hope of the optimists re garding 
Wiedervereinigung. The reasoning is that the Soviets may be 
content to give up :East Germany in return for the assu r ance 
that a reunited Germany will play a certain type of role. 
w·hethe r this role be that of potential satellite or me,re 
neutral state in Central Europe remains unsettled, but this 
illustrates the prevalence of the All-German i dea as a factor 
in both Eastern and Western thinking about Germany. 
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Political Parties 
The political party in the communist state, in the 
words of Lenin, is"the highest form of organization" and is 
"authorized to lead all other workers' organizations". 1I'wo 
events are of outstanding importance in carrying the S~D to 
the point of fulfilling not only Lenin's recipe but also 
Soviet eX'_pectat ions. The SPD-KPD me.rger of 1946, already 
touched on in Chapter II, and the formation of the National 
Front between summer 1949 (when it was firs t mentioned) and 
February 1950 (when the Nationalrat of t he Front was set up) 
mark the milestones in the SED climb to absolute ascendancy. 
The first event gave the communis cs a mass basis and an 
institutional framework within which the chief opposition 
could be handled more easilyllthan would have been possible 
had the SPD retained its identity. And "wit h the organization 
of the national front-type political system the SED completed 
its course of movement from an old-line revolutionary 
communist party to the new version satellite managerial 
com_l:) lex" •1 The Na-cional Front was the accomJ;J lishment en-
abling the SED to manipulate all parties as it had previously 
manipulated the SPD. What was intended in 1949 as a descri_tion 
of front tactics in the Danubian satellites is thus pertinent 
also for the DDR in 1950: 
1. Hichard Scammon, "Political Parties", in Edward H. Litchfield 
and Associates, Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1953), 456. 
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"The fronts reflect a complex political, professional, 
and cultural mass organization under hegemony and 
leadership of the Communist party •••• One or two rump 
groups from the historic political parties of a previous 
era ar e given the chance of temporary survival if they 
are prepared to cooperate honestly, that is to say 
unconditionally."2 
Within the ~ational Front the semblance of diversity was 
soon dispelled by t he apparent SED control. Not only 
were the various mass organizations and the two new parties 
(the DBD, active since 1948 under leadership o:f communist 
Ernst Goldenbaum, and the NDFD, also founded in 1948 to 
appeal to sometime Nazis and National Bolsheviks like Ernst 
Niekisch, and led by Lothar Bolz, also a communist of long 
standing) tightly controlled by the SED, but the GDU and LDP 
also lost· their remnent o:f independence. The order establishing 
the Nationalrat or Council of the Front was signed on 
8 January 1950 by Dertinger for the CDU and Hamann for the 
LDP . But their subsequent mutual fate does not necessar ily 
label them opponents of the regime. By this time the real 
opponents like Kaiser and Lemmer of the GDU had already 
been driven out by the Soviets; and Kastner and Stempel 
of the LDP later suffered similar or worse fates at German 
hands. The bourgeois party leaders, like Dertinger and 
Nuschke, who survived longer did so only by displaying absolute 
obedience.. The Gleichschaltung under the National Front brought 
the SED into fa;Qonable satellite form whereby mere maj orities 
could be turned into unanimity. 
2. Andr ew Gyorgy~ Governments of Danubien Europ~ (New York: 
Rinehart, 1949)~ 40-l. 
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The SED itself is structured along the usual lines. 
lheoret ically the Party Congress, )omposed of dele gates 
from the primary units ( of which there were 44,192 in 
summer 1952, 49,132 in December 1953)~ is the highest 
SED authority. Thi s is of course a fiction since the Congress, 
when it is convened, automatically approves all p roposals 
by the party leadership . hven t he Central Committee ( ZK) , 
which provides continuity between Congresses, is only a 
rubber-stamp. Consi s ting of 51 member s and 30 candidat es, 
t he ZK assembled only t h ree times in 1950, four times in 1951. 
In 1952 the ZK met only three times and in 1953, due to the 
party crisis of that year , six times4 • What influence the 
ZK has is not its own but derives from the party and stat e 
functions of some of its member s. 
Real power rests in t wo bodies, t he Politbuero and the 
ZK Secretariat . The Politbue ro is the policy-making body, 
and the :r.:·ecipient of Soviet directives. It is within this 
body that disagreements can arise and its chang±n g composition 
show the gradual elimination by Ulbricht of his principal 
opponents within the p a r t y. The following line up exhibit s 
t h e main lines of alterat ion5: 
3. Carola Stern, Die SED ( Koeln: Verlag fuer Politik und 
Wirtschaft, 1954), 151. 
4. "'l'he SED; Constitution, Character, Situation", SBZ Archive 
( Special I s sue ), January 1954, 5. 
5. Adapted f rom Stern, op . ci t ., 63-4. 
e 
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1950-1953 1953-1954 
Pieck Pieck 
Grotewohl Grotewohl 
Ulbricht Ulbricht 
Dahlem Matern 
Matern Eb-ert Members 
E~ert Oelssner 
I 
Oelssner Hau 
Rau Schirdewan 
Zaisser 
.... 
3toph 4 
Ackermann Honecker 
Herrnstadt Ivlueckenbe rger 
Schmidt b Leuschner Candidates 
Jendretzky Warnke 
Honecker 
Mueckenberger 
The survivors i1eld positions as follows: Pieck - President 
of the DDR, Grotewohl - Premier, Ulbricht - Deputy Premier 
and SED General Secretary, Mate r n - chairman of tne SED 
Control Commission ( ZPKK), Ebert -mayor of East Berlin, 
Oelssner - SED theoretician and editor of SED organ Die 
Einheit , Rau - chairman of State Planning Commission (till 
1952) and Deputy Premier, Schirdewan - SED secretary for 
mass organizations, Stoph - Minister of t he Interior, 
Honecker - FDJ chairman, Mueckenberger - Secretary of the ZK, 
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Leuschner - chairman of Stat e Planning Commission (since 
\ 
May 1952), Warnke - chairman of FDGB. ·rhe remainder seem 
to have formed a group generally opposed to Ulbricht's 
policies, under the leadershi p of Zaisser, Minister of State 
Security, and Dahlem, SED functionary responsible for 
underground effo r ts in West Germany. Ackermann had been 
director of the Mar:x-Engels;01Lenin-Stalin Institute, Herrnstadt 
was editor of Neues Deutschland; Schmidt was chairman of the 
DFB; and Jendretzky chairman of the Berlin SED district 
executive. All we r e deprived of state and party functions. 
;rhe ZK Secretar iat is a sort of shadow government which 
car ries out t he day-to-day party functions within the frame work 
of Politbuero direction. Divided into departments and 
embodying a large burocratic s t aff, the Sekretariat works in 
two directions simultaneously. It sends its influence down-
ward through the party structure and laterally toward the 
stat e apparatus for t he operation of which it is responsible. 
In addition, within the SED structure are found the 
Cont rol Commission, concerned with party discipline, the 
Revisionskommission, responsible for finances, and finally 
the long list of propaganda instruments such as Dietz Verlag 
( official publi shing house), Neues Deutschland, Die Einheit 
(theoretical organ), Neuer Weg (ZK organ), and the various 
SED schools and institutes6 • 
6. For details see i bid, 84-128. 
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The composition of the SED has been subject to several 
significant fluctuations. Membersh i p reached its peak in 
mid 1948 when the party rolls included about two million 
members, the result of a steady climb from just over a million 
early in 19467. The drive to create a mass base for the 
"German way to socialism" had been abetted in large measure 
by the improved job pos s ibilities for party members. In 
July 1948, following the Tito crisis, a drive was inaugurated 
to bui ld a c adre-type party. The purge, which went on through 
1949 and 1950, was formally only an examination of yarty cards 
but it resulted in a member ship reduction to 1,773,689 by 
January 1949 and further to 1,550 ,831 (plus 122,474 candidates) 
by l · April 1950. A further screening p roc ess, aimed at 
indifferent elements and old Social Democrats, effected by 
late 1951 an additional reduction of about 250 ,0008 • Hardly 
had t his furge ended when conflict appeared within the SlED , 
and aft er the June revolts of 1953 another sifting of p arty 
membersh i p brought expulsion of about 20, 000 functi onaries, 
and 50 ,000 members, among them Ulbricht's opponents. 
At the end of 1953 the process was by no means over, 
but t he party :nad ruh head-on into the problem that .d:ast; Germany 
could not be governed by a smaller party apparatus, yet there 
was still more opposition to be wee ded from SED ranks. Saddled 
with this dilemma, Ulbricht led his party into 19 54~. placing 
7. "The SED ••• ", .2.£.· cit., 11. 
8. Ibid, 12-13. 
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his reliance on a policy of severity and unbending insistence 
upon eofttifttl:atiea. c.o\'\t i""'e.\ .sov.,e..t ·u .. ~t t 0 "· 
Mass Organizations. 
The development of mass support for the SED had an 
early inception in the Soviet Zone. Already in 1947 it was 
clear what func t ion had been assigned to them. ?hilip 
Selznick quotes from an unpublished manuscript, as evidence 
of the reliance on organizational weapons in addition to 
ideology, the following passage: 
11 ~hrough (the mass organizations) the SED can bring 
into action from four to five million individuals who 
are not members of the •••• Party. Taken together ••• (they) 
form almost an alternative governmental structure, and 
in some cases may be regarded as more effective than the 
governmental structure. A citizen of the Soviet Zone 
may refuse coope r ation with the SED on the grounds ·chat 
he does not a gree with the principles of that political 
party, but if he refuses cooperation with a body purporting 
to represent all organizations of the zone, or all workers, 
or all youths-;-or all women, he is in danger of being 
labelled an enemy of ·tJhe people and subject to severe 
social and economic sanctionsn9. 
It should be emphasiz~d that the mass organizations do not 
complement the SED only in a political sense, but are part of 
the apparatus for enforcing a monolithic society. All of the 
organizations have a political and social function, several 
an economic role as well. Two, the Kulturbund and the 
Society for German-Soviet Friendship, are largely cultural 
9. The Organizational Weapon (New York: McGraw Hill, 1952) 
162-3. Passage quo·tJed from W. P . Davison, "The Organization 
of Power in the Soviet Zone of Germanyn, 1947. 
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and will be mentioned -separately10. But even these are, like 
Lhe others, directly controlled by the SED and made to serve 
af political purpose. It might be added that all mass 
organizations have a mission outside the DDR as well, par-
ticularly in West Germany; though not all have West German 
affiliates. 
Two organizat i ons grew out of the resentment against 
nazism which the communists exploited so fully. 'rhe OdF 
(Opfer des Faschismus or Victims of Fascism)11 was founded 
in 1945 to he l p those who had suf fered under Hitler's regime . 
It was active both in East and \Nest Germany and was influenced 
by the communists though not specifically a communist organi-
zation. It faded out of the pictur e gradually and its role 
was a s sumed by VVN (Verband der Verfolgten des Nat i onalso-
zialismus or Society of Victims of Na t ional Socialism) after 
its founding in 1947. The penet ration of the VVN by the 
communists resulted in a general exo dus from its ranks in 
1950, after which it was plainly an SED affiliate. In the 
pre-election agreement of 1950, the vVN· received a 3.7% 
allocat ion of Volkskruruner seats. Its successor organization, 
Komitee der antifaschistischen Widerstandskaempfer, has 
inherited these seats12 • 
10. See below, rp .loc;L-1(). 
11. J. P . Nettl, r he Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 
(London: Oxford, 1951), 76. 
12. SBZ von A-Z (Bonn: Deutscher Bundes-Verlag , 1954), 191. 
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Be s t known of the mass organizations is the FDJ. In 
J une 1945 the SMA or dered the format ion of an ant i-fascist 
youth gr oup ; and in March 1946 t he FDJ was founded as the 
successor to the original group. Wi t h the help of enormous 
financial support the FDJ grew rap idly and soon quite over-
sh&dowed the poo·re.n and persecuted church youth groups. In 
1947 the membe r ship had risen to ne~rly 800, 000 and t wo years 
later, as membership became an economic and s ocial asset, 
the fi gure had doubled13. In 1953 the membership totalled 
approximately three million (including the affiliate for 
younger children, the Junge Pioniere)14• Both organization s 
have now taken on a para-military char acter, in addition to 
their original ideological functions. The most important 
mission remains, however, contr ol ove r the educat ional syst em. 
Further, the FDJ coope r ates wi th other organizations in all 
of these functions, p articularly with Dienst fuer Deutschland, 
which supplies "volunteer" reconst ruction labor from among 
graduating students, and with the Gesellschaft fuer Sport und 
Technik, which has been active since 1952 in pre-military 
t raining . 1rhe FDJ is also represented in the Volkskammer (5%), 
but t he unce r tain upper a ge limit permits these seats to go to 
SJi:D func t ionaries. In any case, SED control is rigidly main·t~ined 
through an organizational scheme paralleling t hat of the party. 
13. Ne t tl, ££· 6it., 104. 
14. SBZ von A-Z, ££• cit., 53. 
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In addition, Ulbricht himself is Deputy Premier for Youth 
Quest i ons. Even the lack of success attending the August 
1951 FDJ rally in East Berlin15 had no apparent effect on 
the advance of the FDJ , although i ndividuals were doubtless 
swayed by the well-planned reception by Wester n officials 
in Berlin. 
A similar hist ory belongs to the DFD (Demokrat ischer 
Frauenbund Deutschlands), which was also established in 1947 on 
the basis of m.JIA-ordered an-cifascist women 1 s committees. 
1r h e two principal aims of the DFD, to win women for the 
"fight for freedom and unity" and to win for women economic 
and social rights, scarcely .conceal the victimization of 
women. Not only a r e they controlled in this organizat ion 
by the SED , but they are made available for the highly un-
feminine work of reconstruction. The membership , one and 
a half million in early 1952, i s 80% non- party, but of the 
DFD functionaries over 90% belong to the SED16• 
Four of the mass organizations, in addition to their 
political functions, play special roles in the DDR economy. 
Most important of these is the FDGB, the centralized trade 
union organization which conveys SED demands to the workers. 
It was not always so, since the FDGB was among the last 
groups to submit to SED dictation. As late as 1947 it was 
15. U. S .. Department of State, "Two Weeks in August", Background, 
September 1951. 
16. SBZ von A-Z, ££• cit., 39. 
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courageous enough to regis t er an official protest against 
S~D terrorism17. However the organizational techniques, 
reinforced by SW~ assistance, which the communist s employed 
from 1945 on, enabled t hem to take over FDGB in the c ourse 
of 1946/7. Since that time it has been organized along 
the usual communist lines with a Kongress meeting every 
four years t o accept SED proposals and the slate of function-
aries who rule between congresses. The chief economic 
significance of the FDGB is its task of raising labor pro-
ductivity as an aid to industrial goals of the official plan18 • 
A parallel function is performed in the agricultural 
sector by the VdgB (Vereinigung der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe 
or Farmers' Mutual Aid Society), founded on a Laender basis 
in 1946, and for the enti r e · zone in Novembe r 1947. Gradually 
taken over by the SED as · a tool for influencing the country 
side, the VdgB gained its inf luence as a result of the land 
reform, which created an inexperience d class of farmers, 
and through the allocation of scarce machinery to the VdgB19. 
·rhe M'rS, which were erected to aid in agricultural production, 
were kept under VdgB control, and this helped immensely in 
keeping the farmers t hemselves under control. Its political 
purposes have not been forgotten, but the existence of a 
17. Nettl, £12.• cit., 139. · 
18. For organizational details see Gerhard Haas, Der FDGB 
1954 (Bonn: Deutscher Bundes-Verlag , 1954). 
19. See Table XVII, Nettl, ££· cit., 177. 
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farmers part y has given t he SED anothe r a gency f or direct 
polit ical influence. Nevertheless, the VdgB has its allo-
cat i on of 1.3% in t he Volkskammer, as does the LPG ( Land-
wirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossensschaft or Agricu l t ural 
Production Cooperative). Relatively new as a mass organi-
zat ion, i t was founded in 1952 f'ollowing a suggestion from 
Ulbricht a t t he second SED Confer ence. Quite simply, its 
purp ose is to est ablish the int ermediate forms of c ooperativas 
which l ead up to collectivizat ion. 4800 separate units were 
in existence in September 195320 , but the June revolts 
and New Course interrupted, in fact set back , the development. 
In the futu:ce it is c ert ain that t h is organi zation will 
recover its importance, however. 
Finally, in 1949 the VDK ( ¥erband Deutscher Konsum-
genossenschaft en or Society of German Consumer Coop erat ives) 
entered t he mass organization p icture. By 1953 the VDK 
had over t wo and a half million members and about 18 , 000 
store s of various sorts21 • That it is anothe r lever whereby 
t he p opulac e can be pressured by the SED through s t ick and 
carrot methods s eems f ai r ly clear, but it has yet to assume 
a decisive political role. 
20 . SBZ von A-Z, .2.12.• cit., 124-5. 
21. Ibid, 84-5. 
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Elections 
Bear ing in mind the highly equivocal success of the 
SED in earlier East German elections, the :period 1949-1953 
is significant for the relative :perfection attained by 
the p arty in manipulating the electoral process. What had 
been at first a merely unfair weighing of advantages in 
favor of the SED and i t s auxiliary organizations, became 
the characteristic single-list farce adopted in all of the 
People's Democracies. 
'I'he first attemf t at consolidating the ·electorate under 
a Unity List typ e of election occurred in May 1949. It will 
be remembe :ced that the first and second meetings of the 
Volkskongress had been gatherings of delegates from approved 
parties and or ganizations. 'rhe election of May 1949 was 
the os~ensible legalization of the Volkskongress. The 
vo t ers were presented with a list of officially selec"ced 
and sponsored candidates from the app roved parties in the 
front. The SED itself had 450 of the 2000 candidat es 
p roposed; and its strength was inflated by the two newe r 
parties, the NDP and DBP which were participating in an 
election for the first time. But the machinery wasjtill 
far from perfect, as t he results demonstrate: 22 
22. Adapted from Litchfield and Associates, ££· cit., 639. 
Eligible Electors • • • 
Voters Participating. • . 
Invalid Votes Cast •• 
Votes Cast "Yes". . . . 
Vote s Cast "No 11 • • • 
. . 13,533,071 
. 12,887,234 
863, 013 
7,943,949 
4, 080 ,272 
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95.2% 
6.7% 
66.1% 
33-9% 
This substantial victory in normal voting terms obviously 
tell far short of the unanimity required in sat ellite 
elect ions. In view of this c onsiderable shortcoming , 
it was no surp rise that the elections due in October 1949 
we r e postponed, "for economic reasons" as Neues Deutschland 
explained. 
Before this election was finally scheduled for 
Octobe r 1950, an Electoral Law23 was endorsed by the 
Volkskammer and p romulgated 10 August 19502~, pursuant 
to articles 51 and 109 of t he constitution. This revealing 
law validat es the final stage of electoral eff iciency, 
providing officially for the National Front technique of 
bpJ;Jorti6ning seats in advance and for nomination p rocedure, 
voter qualifications, and pollin g p rocedure. The election 
i t self was for zonal representatives in the Volk skam.m.er, 
for the separate Landtage, and for local Kreis and Gemeinde 
representation; and the Soviet Sector of Berlin, in contrast 
to the May 1949 election, was excluded from the voting. 
23. Office of U. S . High Commissioner for Germany, Soviet Zone 
Constitution and Electoral Law ( Washington: GPO, 1951), 
57-79. 
24. There is some confusion as to this date; the DDR Gesetzblatt 
has been followed here. 
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As before, only "yes 11 or "no" votes were possible, but 
a "ye s 11 vote required no mar king whatever , whereas a "no" 
vote had to be re gist ered publicly at the polling place 25. 
El~gible Electors • • • 
Vo t e r s Participat ing 
• 12,325,168 
12,144,597 . . . 
I nvalid Votes Cast . . . . 
For t he Nat ional Front 
13,432 
• 12,097,105 
Against the Nat ional Front ••• 34.060 
98.5% 
.1% 
99-7% 
. 3% 
This near-unanimity represented the triumph of People's 
Democracy and its elector al t echnique26 • Bundeskanzler 
Adenauer wa s moved to comment: 11 The SED authorities are 
even bet ter at it than the Nazis". 
Government and Administration 
It woul d be a bit of a simplificat i on, but still not 
far from the mar k, to say that t he gove r nment of t he DDR 
has no independent significance. As erect ed in 1949 on the 
base s of the pre-DDR Economic Co~illllission, the new const itut ion, 
and t h e election of delegates t o t he Third Volksrat ( which 
became the provis ional Volkskammer till the 1950 elections ) , 
the DDR gove r nment was really noth ing more t han a reflection 
of Sii:D domi nance in t he National Front. And in pu rsuance of 
25. Statist ics f rom Der Grosse Wahlbe·t ru am 1 • Oktobe r 19 0 
(Bonn: Bundesministerium fuer gesamt deutsche Fragen, n .d. , 
61. 
26. The performance wa s repeated with similar success in 
Octobe r 1954. "Volksvahlen" ( Bonn: Bundesministerium 
:fuer ge s amtdeut sche Fragen, n.d.), 63T4. 
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SED c entralization aims, the provincial governments became 
increasingly mere adjuncts of the central government. In 
1948 the first major step in centralization had been taken 
when two-thirds of nationalized industry was transferred 
from provincial governments to the Ec·onomic Administration. 27 
The latter body embraced by this time all the Central 
Administrations except Education, Justice, and Police. 
And the role of the .provinces became largely decorative. 
The trend was completed in July 1952, as the DDR officially 
entered the process of 11 transition to socialism 11 , by the 
replacement of the five Laender. Fourteen distric t s (Bezirke ) 
were c r eat ed instead, under direct cont rol of the central 
government. The new arrangement eliminated any units of 
government large enough to become separate power factors and 
c entralization was c.omplete. 
The establishment of the DDR proceeded in orderly fashion 
through the remainder of 194 9 . The provisional Volkskammer 
const ituted itself on 7 October, passed the basic laws for 
the establishment of government, and elected i ts Presidium. 
'rhe SED prop osad Grotewohl for Premier, and he was duly 
ent rusted with forma t ion of a government. On 11 October, the 
Lande skammer was formed and the two chamber s assembled to 
elect Wilhelm J?i eck, unanimously of course , President of the 
27. Nettl, ££· cit., 134. 
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DDR. On 8 December, t he Volkskammer resolved to e s tablish 
t he Supreme Court and the Public Persecutor-General, to 
which post Ernst Melsheimer (SED ) was appointed. 
·r he gove :;::·nment, which settled itself in the sometime 
Air Ministry of Hermann Goering at the end of 1949, re-
mained largely t he same af t e r the 1950 elections. Among 
t he changes,the number of ministrie s rose from 14 to 17, 
t he number of deputy :premiers from three t o f ive, and t wo 
members of t he original Cabinet ( Kast:P.~·r - LDP and Goldenbaum -
DBD) were dropped. Pr emier Grotewohl's Cabinet then was 
as follows: 28 
Deputy Premier: ilal ter Ulbricht ( SED ) 
Otto Nuschke (CDU) 
Heinrich Rau ( SED ) (Chairman of State 
Planning Commission) 
Hans Loch (LDP ) (Minist er of Finance) 
Lothar Bolz (NDP) (Mini ster of Heconst ructi 
on) 
Foreign lVIiniste r: Geo rg Dert inger ( CDU) 
Mini s ter of Interior: Karl Ste i nhoff ( SED ) 
Minist er of State Security: Wilhelm Zaisser ( SED ) 
Minist er for Heavy Indus t ry: Fritz Selbmann ( SED ) 
Mini ster for Li ght I ndustry: Wilhelm Feldmann ( NDP) 
Minister for Machine Const ruction: Gerhard Ziller ( SZD) 
Minister of Agriculture and Torestry: Paul Scholz (DBD) 
Minister of External and Internal Trade: GeorJ Handke ( SED ) 
1vli nister of Tracie and Supply: Ka r l Hamann (LBP ) 
28 . The Soviet Occu ation Zone of German 1')4 -195 
Bonn: Bunciesministe r ium fuer gesamtdeutsche Fragen),39-40 . 
The Cabinet is sometimes called Council of Mi n isters. 
Minister of Labor: Roman Chwalek (SED) 
Minister of Health: Luitpold Steidle (CDU) 
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Minister of 'l'ransport: Hans Reingruber (non-party ) 
Ministe r of Postal Affairs: Fritz Burmeister (CDU) 
Minister of Education: Paul Wandel ( SI0D) 
Minist er of Justice: Max Fechner (SED) 
In the course of developments b efore June 1953, certain 
changes accurred in this roster. In May 1952 Steinhoff 
retired because of ill health and was replaced by Willi 
StoJ:Jh ( 8ED ). And later in that month the Volkskammer passed 
a law on the Government of t he DDR which added one ministry 
and one more deput y p remie r. Handke asked to be relieved 
of his duties in September and was replaced by Kurt Gregor 
(S~D) . And in De cember, Hamann lost his gove r nment and p arty 
positions, and was arrested. '11he nex t month Dertinger 
followed in Hamann's footstep s, his p lace being taken by 
Anton Ackermann (SED) . Subse quently, Curt Wach ( SED) succeeded 
to Hamann's vacancy . 'l'he fastest turnover was in Agricultur e 
and Forestry where V~ilhelm Schroeder ( DBD) and Hans lZeiche l t (DB.D ) 
followed Scholz who had be come Deputy P:eemier. O-cher changes 
occurred but had no gr eat signif icance as compar ed with events 
afte r the June revolts. 
In the r ealm of policy, the government was merely the 
rubbe r s t amp for SbD decisions, emphasized by the above-shown 
duplicat ion of key pe rsonnel. Political policy h a s been 
"t>ol~t -t.u\ Pdt-fie.t 
t here:Core treated under the s ection on ;gapisy ~f:engtnn., and 
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economic. policy is described below. In such a totalitarian 
system the government takes on independent significance 
f i rs t when a bur eaucracy develops with a special class of 
interests29. There can be no doubt that such a development 
is taking place in the DDR, but there is as yet no evidence 
as to what effect it is having or is likely t o have. 
The Mechanism of Terror 
One aspect of government, the embodiment of terrorism 
as a system, warrants separate consideration. The fear-
inspiring t e am of police and courts acting as dual agents 
of state and party has become a familiar pattern in totali-
tarianism, and the DDR has shown no tendency to alter t h e 
pattern. Although t he roots of p resent judicial and police 
practice of ten extend back to earl i er years, the sto r y of 
developments in this sphere has its beginning in October 1949 
when the DDR took over from Soviet aut horiti e s the administrat ion 
of justice. 
The Central Administ ration for J ustice had begun to 
function already in 1945, as one of the non-economic cent ral 
authorities. But the SMA retained control over j udicial 
practice, and part i cul arly ove r political off'enses, until 
the founding of the DDR. Hence, t he Central Administration's 
func t ion was largely preparatory, in the sense of formulating 
29. Comp are Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled ( Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Unive r sity Press, 1953), Part III. 
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a new le gal system. This process involved the training of 
j udicial personnel and the evolution of a body of civil 
and criminal law. The first task was carried out by 
sett ing up training courses for laymen, which would augment 
the small corps of non-Nazi judicial personnel. The 
People 1 s Judges so produced had behind them a rudimentar~ 
training in jurisprudence and a six.-month apprenticeship 
to a working judge. At the time there were objective 
commentators who saw genuine possibilities in this scheme3°, 
but we can s ee today that it cont a:imed seeds of easy per-
version. By careful selection of trainees it was guarant eed 
that the courts woul d in future be dominated by SED lackeys; 
in 1952 Dr. Friedemann of t he Freie Juristen stated t hat only 
28% of t he DDR judges had formal legal training , and t hat 
only 35% of public p~~secutors were jurists in t h e usual 
sense31 ~ Other fi gures f or the same time paint a still 
blacker pict .ure, to the ef fect that only 7% of public 
"A 2 p ersecutor s were barri s ters..; •. The same source notes t hat 
all important positi ons are s t affed wit h SED members; f or 
example, only one of the Chief and Land Public Prosecutors 
is non-SED . Hilde Benjamin, then Vicepresident of the 
30 . As noted by Nettl, ££• cit., ll9n. 
31. I~justice fhe Regime (Bonn: Bundesmi nisterium f uer 
gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1952), viii. 
32. 'r his discrepancy is not explained although the s econd 
fi gure occurs on page ~ of i bid. 
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Su.J:.l reme Court, cautioned every "j udge of the new type" 
to replace 11 object ivity" by "Party principles" in his 
application of the law. The ranks of DDT?. judicial per-
sonne l a r e, of c ourse, still swelled by graduates of l aw 
schools, but the law c~rriculum has been substantially 
shortened and the examination standards eased3 3 . 
The develo~ment of law in the DDR could be divided 
into the t wo conve~ional categories, c i vil and criminal. 
However, the heavy empha~is on criminal law has r educed 
civil law to an i ncidental classificat ion. Unt il 1949 there 
were many cases of rank inj ust ice no doubt, but the corruption 
of le gal ~ractice did not become sensational because criminal 
p roceedings were c onduc t ed in secret by the occup ation 
power. The Russians continue to :play a major part in 
police terror and . judicial perversion through the agency of 
t he MVD , but the results examined here presently will concern 
onl y the p ractices of the East Germans. It was only wi t h the 
assumption of responsibilit y f or criminal p roceedings by 
t he East German Ministry of Justice in 1949 t hat the e~ent 
of legal perversion became apparent, p recisely because civil 
law is so unimportant in comparison with cri minal law. The 
narrowing of civil law "is accounted for by t he principles 
which a r e deeisive for the legal order in the countries 
of ·the Soviet bloc. The basis here is the conce.pt of the 
33 . Rosent hal, Lange, and Blomeyer, Die Justiz in der sow-jetischen Zone \Bonn: Bunde sminist erium fuer gesamt-
deutsche Fragen (Bonner Qericht), 1952, 14-19. 
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human being as worker, not to say as working power, for 
society. The value of a human being is judged by his 
social usefulness. And this valuation effects both 
property and personal ~ rights. n34 
The essential principle of law in .the DDR is the 
subordination of all legal judgment to the interest of the 
stat e as de-c ermined by the party. l'he result is · that not 
only criminal law in its usual sense , but labor and economic 
law as well as administrative law are reflections of the 
struggle by the state to instrumentalize the citizenry. 
It is then no surp rise that such non-political crimes as 
; 
larceny or murder are of a distinctly secondary character 
so long as the state is not involved. Moreove r , the 
constitutional and positive law of the DDB. itself is 
systematically violated whenever state interest demands it. 
All legal issu~s, in short, must be decided in terms of 
state interest if they fall within the greatly expanded 
borders of of ficial conc e rn. The results for t he DDR citi-
zenry will be summarized after examining the second a gency 
of terr or, the police. 
The Volkspolizei was formed officially in December 1947 
and fell into the organizational scheme, under Kurt Fischer 
( S~D ), as part of the Department of Int ernal Affairs, which 
at this time i ncluded secret police as well. In 1949 this 
34. Ibid, 75. 
-96-
Department became the Ministry of Interior under the 
direction of former Premier of Land Brandenburg, Dr. Karl 
Steinhoff (SED). In February 1950 the Volkskammer accepted 
a government proposal to create a separate Ministry of 
State Security, which took over the secret police functions 
of the Ministry of Interior. Wilhelm Zaisser ( SED ) became 
head of this new creation on 18 February, and until after 
the June revolts in 1953 held the r e sponsibility for 
counter-intelligence work, general police terr or, and the 
kasernierte Volkspolizei. The normal police functions re-
mained in the Ministry of Int erior, under Karl Ma r on ( SED ) 
after Kurt Fischer's deat h in 1950. 
'I'he Staatssicherhe itsdienst (SSD) under Zaisser (later 
under Wollweber) has been the chief DDR a gency of terror. 
'I'b.is organizat ion has its headquar ters in East Ber lin and 
in 19 52 furnishe d employment for some 6000 individuals, 
and t wo years later was reported to employ more than 11000 . 
Under the supervision of the central headquarters are 
separat e units for each administrative regi on down to Kreis 
level. I t s functional division is rep or ted to be as follows: 
Section 1 - the militarized police, Section 2 - counter-
espionage, Section 3 - counter-espionage in the economic 
sector, Section 4 esp i onage in West Germany (now combined 
with Section 2), Section 5 -underground organizations (with 
special ref e r ence to such problems as Trotskyites, West 
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German and emigrant organizations, illegal sects like the 
Jehovah's Witnesse s, and others), Section 6 - forme r ly 
watched DDR mass organizations, now part of Section 5, 
Section 7 - watches the re gular police~ Section 8 - spying 
and arrests, Section 9 - interrogation, Section 10 -
searches, Section 11 and 12 - cryptography and registry, 
Section 13 - railroad control, Section 14- postal control35. 
This listing suffices to show the scope of SSD activity, but 
does not include the vast network of s~ ies and informers 
which reinforces the myth of omnipresence. It should be 
added that t h e Soviet MVD, which sup e rvised the establishment 
of this police system, r e tains a very direct contact with 
and control over the SSE. 
The result for the DDR populace can be quickly indi-
cated wi t h a few fi gures. The t otals of arrests and con-
victions can never be altoge t he r accurate because of t he 
sec r ecy surrounding police ac t ivitie s in t he DDR, but the 
foll owing statist i cs provide at leas t a general est imat e. 
I t should of cou r se be remembe red t hat all manner of 
"crimes" account for the total s , including alle ged sabotage, 
economic failures, opposition of all kinds, and c om~letely 
mist aken arr ests by the police. 1I'he f i gures36 available 
f or 1950 show 78 ,293 sent ences met e d out by DDR .courts, 
35. The foregoing information base d on an article by Rainer 
Hildebrandt , "Die sowjetzonale Geheimpolizei," Die Neue 
Zeitung , 21 December 1954. 
36. Rosenthal et al, ££· cit., 31. 
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15 of them ~eath sentences, and 18 life imprisonment. The 
sent ences combined to inflict 15,712 years penal servitude 
and 4 2 ,461 years imprisonment37. In 1951 the number of 
p ersons sentenced rose to 112,382 and the combined penalties 
to over 30, 000 years penal servitude and over 50 ,000 years 
imprisonment;. ·r he above statistics do not include the many 
sentences imposed by Soviet military tribunals or the so-
called "war-crime" .trial held secretly at Waldheim in 
April-July 1950. This trial involved some 3,500 persons 
and produced 38 death sentences. Mor e meaningful perhap s 
are the statistics released by Die Neue Zeitung38 _ in late 
1953. At that time it was estimated that there were 66,000 
political prisoners in the DDR . 'rhis included both imprison-
ment and servitude or hard labor. The following prisons 
wi th their inmates, exemplify the general situation in that 
roughly 80% were sentenced for political reasons: 
Brandenburg •.••..•••.••••. 4500 prisoners 
Luckau •••.•...•.••.....••• 2200 p risoners 
Untermassfeld •..•..•.•.••• llOO prisoners 
Halle (3 prisons) ••••••••• 3000 p risoners 
Berlin-Rurrunelsburg .••••••. 2500 p risoners 
Ma gdeburg-Sudenburg ••...•• l600 prisoners 
Hoheneck (women) ••••••.••• 1300 prisoners 
37. The difference between Gefaengnis and Zuchthaus is 
difficult to convey in Snglish. Zuchthaus usually i mplies 
hard labor and has been rendered "penal servit ude" here. 
38. 20 November 1953. 
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1
.I:he wave of a r rests following the June revolts aside, 
the evidence points to a general increase of police terror 
and s harpening of judicial penalties. 
Ivlil·i tarization 
For several years there has been no room for doubt 
that the Soviet sat ellites ar e rearming . Contrary to the 
respective p eace treaties, 'Hungary is . reported to have 
developed an army more than twice i t s permitted st r enth; 
Bulgaria's armed forces a re said to be three times the size 
specified; and Rumania has roughly 75% more military strength 
than was envisioned39. Poland, where the conventional Soviet 
military mission device is r eplaced by direct contro l by 
Sovie t personne l , is not yet highly develop ed militarily; 
but Czec.ho slovakia 1 s army is well-trained and equipped . 
The quality question is still doubtful and certainly the 
satellite armies vary widely among themselves in quality. 
But it is obvious that militarization has been systematically 
encouraged. Soviet tutelage and standardized equipment (with 
ever increasing mechanization) have combined in an e f fort 
to supp lement the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe. 
In this respect, East Germany has not been laggard. 
Although restricted at the recent military conferences of 
the Soviet bloc to a junior role, the DDR has undergone a 
39. As reported by C. L. Sulzberger in New York Times, 
12 January 1955. 
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continuous military build-up which shows no signs of 
abatin~s · The process began in July 1948 with a p roposal 
from the S:MA t hat the Volkspo l izei develop Bereitschaften, 
or "kase r nierte" units. ·rhus t h e program was based on the 
exist ing p olice system, which ser ved as a convenient cloak, 
while the prop aganda line continued to belabor the alle ged 
remilitarization of West Germany. By the b~nning of 1 9 51 
the princip le of organization had become clear 40 .. ·r he D1YR 
was to be equipped wi t h a cadre army, in ot her words, a 
struct ure of officers and non-commissioned officers wh ich 
would bec ome the f ramework for an army whenever mobilizat ion 
and full-scale training should be c a lled for. By this time 
the mi l itarized police had been organized in so-called 
Dienstst e llen, each Dienst stelle being the cadr e organization 
of a futre divi s ion. Already in June 1950, the government 
had announced f ormation of a Se a Police s ection to p rot e ct 
t h e Bal t ic Coast. And in March 1951, the Luf'tpolizei was 
established, completing the basis for an all-round military 
p rogram. In January 1952 another significant event occurred. 
the equipment of Volkspolizei with s t andard Soviet weap ons, 
including not only small arms but also light and heavy 
machine guns, anti-tank guns, and mortars (50 mm., .88 mm, and 
122 mm)~ At this time, there were rep orted to be 15,000 
officers attending spe cial schools of all the usual army 
40. See Die kasernie rte Volks- olizei in der sow'etischen 
Besatzung szone Deutschlands Bonn: Bundesministerium 
fue r gesamtdeutsche Fragen, n.d.). 
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b.ranches. By May 1952, 110 000 men were reported under 
arms, and tanks were being delivered by the Soviets. Some 
of the latter were obsolete types, but the Stalin II was 
1 . l J d . th - 1' . 41 a so 1nc uue 1n e de 1ver1es • 
'I'urning to personnel, Major General Vincenz Mueller 
had command of the military forces from January 1949 to 
the end of 1953. He had been a Wehrmacht officer on the 
Russian front and belonged to the NDP. In a move ap~arently 
toward greater consolidation after the June revolts, Mueller 
was replaced by Major General Bernhard Bechler, an SED 
member. The Kampf gruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit re~orted at 
the same time that Field Marshal Paulus was acting in an 
advisory capacity to the southern section of the army42 • 
Political reliability was being insured by the Soviet system 
of political officers who share authority with troop com.-
_manders in each unit. And as an index of the relative 
scope of military prepar ations, the total costs of the 
military build-up were repo rted in 1954 as one-sixth of the 
DDR budget, or app r oximately 5 milliards DM ( Ost). 4 3 ' 
Est imates of s t rength, as of 1954/5 range from 100 to 120 
thous and men under arms, five to seven thousand of these in 
the air forces (euphemistically called 11Ae ro-Clubs"), and 
roughly nine thousand in the naval arm. 
41._ Ibid, 6. 
42. Christian Science Monitor, 8 December 1953. 
43. Die kasernierte Volkspolizei, ££· cit., 9. 
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~~ile conscription has been threatened, or rathe r 
defended, in t he government barrage of propaganda, t h is 
step of filling in the cadre framework has not been taken 
yet. 'J::he t hreat has suf:ficed to s timulat e defections from 
the susceptible age group ; and at this writing many young 
men are fac ed with loss of opportunity to c0ntinue studying 
unle ss they agr ee to join the mili t arized police. This has 
become the price of education in the DDR. We may well 
doubt the effectiveness of an army so organized, but on the 
other hand the economic advantages are attractive enough to 
persuade some of the benefits of military life. 
Cultural and Social Policy 
Since totalitarianism recognizes not rights of pri~acy, 
but rather the duty of extending its authority to eve r y area 
and activit y of s ociety , it should come us no surprise that 
the Soviet instruments in East Germany have brought all such 
a r eas and activities to heel. It would be hard to say where 
the greatest emphasis has been p laced; at first glance the 
school system seems to have had priority, but organs of 
public informat ion a r e certainly not :far behind. The review 
which follows will endeavor to show in summary from both 
the scope and intensity of the communist drive on soviety. 
Wal-t;er Li ppmann once wrote that , "They (the dictators) 
have seen truly that the religious e~perience must forever 
raise up new enemies of the totalitarian state. For in 
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that experience t he convictions which the dictators must 
crush are bred and continually renewed. 1144 The best 
confirmat ion of this ~~ophetic description has c ome in 
Eastern Euro _c) e. The ultimate aim of eli minating religion 
from t he life of the people has been replaced, even in the 
Sovie t Union, by the intermediate goal of making all 
religio us institutions subservient a gencies of the state. 
The p rocess divides roughly into three stages: 1. pre-
liminary weakening of the church's position throug,h terror.;: 
confiscation of prop erty, anti-religious p~opaganda, and 
imposition of heavy taxes, 2. intensificat ion of these 
techniques, along with expropriation of the clerical p ress 
and c ensorship of clerical utt erances, designed to further 
separate clergy and communicants and to weaken t he inte r nal 
organization of the church, and 3. final transfo rmation of 
the churches into stat e or gans subordinate to party and 
state45. Generally one may say that Eastern Europe has 
entered stage three, with t he Soviet Union of course 
leading the way. 
East Germany is, in this connection, a singularly 
re t a r ded example of People's Democracy . The East German 
churches have be en seriously undermined financially, through 
confiscation of church lands and elimination of public 
44. The Good Society (Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1937), 383. 
45. The Red and the Black; the Church in the Communist State 
( New York : Nat ional Committee for a Free Europe, 1953 ), 
7-8. 
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tax support; theological training has been curtailed 
creating a severe shortage of clergy ; and the FDJ led a 
drive in 1953 a gainst the youth groups of the church, the 
Junge Gemeinden. Also, church publications have been sub-
jected to severe restric-tion and many pastors have been 
arrest ed. Yet, on balance, East Germany is only in stage 
two of the p rocess, and in 1953 the go vernment appeared to 
reverse itself by making concessions to the churches. This 
was a ssuredly only a tac t ical slow-down, but i t reflected the 
continuing strength of religion in the DDR . Part of the 
c r edit must go to the a ccidental circumst ance that the 
territorial organization of both the st rong Evangelical 
Cl,l.urch and t he much smaller Homan Catholic Church46 does 
not coincide with zonal and secto r boundaries. Thus, Bishop 
Dibeliu s and the late Cardinal Preysing both had headquarters 
in free Ber lin but act ed for a large surrounding region of· the 
DDR . Both have been outspoken critics of the DDH , and it i s 
evid·2nc e of c.hurch strength (and of the desire to avoid 
offending West Germans too radically ) t hat both .major churches 
continue to operate along t r aditional lines of re gional 
o.t.0 ganization. However, Bishop Dibelius suggested the 
intensity of the church ~ s problem in his address to the 
World Council of Churches in August 1954-. 47 He observed that 
46. US Senate CorrJD.i tte e on Fo r eign Relations, Tensions within 
the Soviet Ca· tive Countries· Soviet Zone of Ge rmany 
Washington: G. P . O., 19 54- , 81. The Evangelical Church 
includes about 80, .. of t he p opulation, the Roman Catholic 
about 15%. 
47. New York 'J:limes , 30 August 1954. 
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a religious teacher with three children receives about 
250 mark monthly, equivalent to the price of five p airs 
of cheap shoes. 1.£1he resulting temptation to leave religious 
work is thus a "daily battle " for the church . By the time 
of Dibelius' sp eech, the lull_in anti-religious campaigning 
was at an end. Symptomatic of t he resumption of hostilities 
we re the opening of an FDJ c.ampaign a gainst religious 
activity48 and the effort to secure clerical support for 
SED aims in the 1954 elections. 49 Simultaneous attempts to 
oppose and to instrumentalize are thus characterist ic for 
the DDR as for the other satellites. 
Probably no communist ha s ever underestimat ed the 
importance of the printed word. At l east, no communi s t re gime 
has ever allowed the press or the arts in general to support 
any but the official line. 1fhe press in East Germany -vvas 
no exception. From the very beginning it was determined 
that news shoul d be disseninated only b~ "reliable 11 a gancies. 
And to that end , all newspape rs - including the organs of 
bourgeois parties - were r equired to toe the mark. 
·:rhe press service (ADN'), radio , and all periodical literature 
faithfully reflect the SED policy. Activity in the creative 
arts has, however, presented greate r problems. All of the 
I 
arts receive i mmense off icial support - as a means of in-
r 
suring conformity and as a sign that art is valued for its 
"civilized" significance. The re i'~ ime seeks to obtain the 
48. Die Neue Zeitung, 15 August 1954. 
49 . Die Neue Ze i t ung, 13 October 1954. 
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best in artistic accomplishment, p rovided always that this 
"best 11 mirr or the communist view of life and society. 
Musical activity in ~ast Berlin is an example of the un-
limited resources available for cul·IJural life. No expense 
is spa r ed to secure outstanding interpreters. But even in 
music, where one would suppose that politics should be of 
minimal importance, the totalitarian reg ime has had its 
difficulties, witness the recent withdrawal of the able 
conduct or, ~rich Kleiber. Nevertheless, t he East German 
re gime has enjoyed considerable success in fostering a 
superior musical and theatrical life. The latter realm is 
of course dominated by approved works, most spectacularly 
no doubt by the fertile, if slightly warped, talent of 
Berthold Brecht. Desp ite the politically restricted repertoire, 
however, it has to be acknowledged that East Ge rman theatre 
has real quality (which makes it just that much better 
p ropaganda of course). 
Motion picture production is a good illustration of both 
int entions and achievements in the cultural realm. In keeping 
with the realization, shared incidentally by Lenin, Stalin, 
and Hitler, that films are valuable totalitarian instruments. 
'J:lhe SMA. encouraged formation of a film monopoly, DEFA, in 1945. 
'l~his organization has been gene r ally behind in fulfilling 
p lanned production schedules, but its accomplishments, while 
rar ely of outstanding quality, provide an index to cultural 
npro gress 11 in the DDR. Conside r ing only feature films produced 
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from 1946 to 1954, Heinz Kerst en5° has detected sioc standard 
themes: anti-fascist, anti-capitalist, anti-Western, re-
construction (in both physical and spiritual sense), the 
role of the working class, and social criticism. Of the 58 
films produced by DEFA in this period, only five were so 
frivolous as to totally ignore these themes, and most embodied 
more than one of them. Reconstruction has been the most 
frequent and consistent motiv, foll owed by social criticism 
and ant i-capitalist , also consistent throughout t he period. 
Anti-fascism was most important in the earlier years, and 
after 1951 is not represented at all. On the other hand, 
anti-West ern themes began to appear first in 1950 and since 
then have been found in eleven of the 33 films shown. Intensity 
has also been estimated, and 18 of the total number of films 
merit the descriJ? tion 11 agitatorisch", of t hese, nine in-
corporated the anti-Western theme, among others. And in 1953, 
five of the seven films produced earned this p ropaganda 
distinc t ion. 
Literature and the plastic arts have also been assigned 
important roles in DDR cultural life. ~1he literary keynote 
was sounded at the East German Writers Confe r ence in Jul y 1950, 
wher e the speeches included such gems as: 
"It doesn•t matter at all whether one of our young 
writers happens to make mistakes of grammar ••.• so long 
as his work shows a progressive ideology." 
50 . Das Filmwesen in der sow;) etischen B:esatzungszone (Bonn: 
Bundesministerium fuer gesamtdeut sche Fragen, 19 54), 67-70. 
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"'rhe literary artist is a dangerous man who usually 
loves the words and hates the peop le, as shown from 
Goethe and Sartre." 
Th e Coni erence was climaxed by a resolution acclaiming 
0talin the greatest writer of all ages.51 
In view of such :policy it is not strange that the DDR 
has quality :problems in its lit er1ature (and the same holds 
true for the plastic arts). Not even the adoption of Schiller 
and Cranach, as forerunners of "democ r atic" reconstruction, 
could conceal the shortcomings of artistic output. The New 
Course in art, like the New Course in general, was the result 
of "a need to get something and a Communist unwillingness to 
:pay the tariff". 'rhe brief flurry of self-assertion by 
Soviet a r tist s was reflected in all satellites by ex-.Qressions 
of frustration at the creat ive straitjacket imposed by the 
regime. But the re gimes were unable to reconcile their 
mutually incompatible goals. 
"As they want ed increased productivity and initiative in 
industry and agriculture without being willing to give 
workers and farmers sufficient freedom and material 
reward, as they want greater political involvement in 
the gove rnment by the masses without giving the people 
sufficient freedom and power, so also they want a richer 
and mo r e living literature Nithout being willing to give 
t he artist sufficient freedom to follow his insight and 
insp iration. n52 
The transition from "critical reali sm" to ''socialis t realism", 
that is, from ne gative attitudes toward Western traditions 
to positive adulation of People's Democracy, was made about 
51. Citations from Norbert Muhlen, "The New Nazis of Germany," 
Commentary, January 1951, 8 . 
52. "Art Under The New Course, 11 News from Behind The Iron 
Curtain, January 1955, 30. 
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1950 in the Soviet bloc53, but it has yet to p roduce a 
wo·rthy literature or art. 
Two institutional supports for communist cultural 
polic.y merit mention in passing . The Kulturbund54 , which 
had a long p re-war histo ry as representative of communist 
views on art, reappeared in 1945 and grew up alongside the 
SED as agent in art and literature . This organization has 
a ttracted the partici~at ion of such leading fi gures as 
Johannes R. Becher, Arnold Zweig, Anna Seghers, Be rtolt 
Brecht, and Renee Sintenis, as well as many purely political 
members. ·rhe Kul turbund has consistently reflected the 
party line and endeavo~s to foster socialist realism as 
ideological content for artistic output in the DDR.. Of still 
greater importance, the Society for Ge rman-Soviet Friendship 
(DSF)55 also enjoys a p re-war tradition. Afte r the Revolution 
the Bolshevik s endeavored to foster cultur al rel ations by 
est ablishing such organizations in most countries of 
imJ?ortance. But the purely cultural and persuasive charact er 
of t hese organizations has disappeared in the satellites. The 
range of activity has been broadened greatly and the persuasion 
employed is of a different order. Stepping into the Eastern 
b'uropean cultural vacuums after the war, these societies were 
abili~ to gain a foothold for Soviet cultural exports which has 
53. Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Knopf, 1953),17. 
54. See Gerd Friedrich, Der Kulturbund (Koeln: Rote Weiss-
buecher, 1952). 
55. See "Soviet Cultural Collaboration, 11 The World Today, 
May 1954, 197-209 . 
·e 
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neve r been r elinquished. In the DDR , as in t he other 
satellites, the concerns of DSF range from encouragement of 
the stQdy of Rus sian language and literature, through support 
for peculiar ly Soviet scientific views, to the selli-'ng of 
....... 
Soviet work techniques. It i s a "vast undertaking of long-
~ 
term reeducation 11 designed to secur e TiFf Soviet cultural 
monopoly in the sat ellit es. Or ganized along conventional 
top -to-botteom lines of authorit y, the DSF had three million 
membe r s in the DDR in May 195356 • Its eff icacy may be 
restricted by the natur e of i t s methods, but where local 
cult ur e is weak or limited by decree the magnetism of Tolstoy 
or Chaikovsky is considerable. 
'lhe most important weapon in the Soviet armory r emains 
howeve r the cont rol exercised ove r educat i on and, hence, 
ove r each new generation. :l'his syst em can be briefly 
summarized as total control over ins t i t utions, subject-matter, 
and admissions by the s t a t e . It develop ed in ;two principal 
phase s, the pr eparatory stage till 1948, and the c onsolidat i on 
and erect ion of t he "new ty-_p e 11 of school plan since 1948 . 
·rhe t echnic ali tie s of t he system need not detain us here, 
excep t to note t he obvious , t hat all change s brought about 
by t he SE D were designed t o further communist; aims. The result 
has been that only t wo limit ed .r.J Ossibilities for non-communist 
educat ion remain: the teaching t hat can still take plac e in 
t he home as a countervailing inf luence t o official i deology , 
56 . Ibid, 200 . 
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and the private, secretive "t~s 11 which clever instruct ors 
can pass on to r e celJtive students. Against these p itiful 
possibilities stands the entire power of the s t ate, which 
works in the following manner. Youth is impressed into 
off icial communist organizations, FDJ. and Pioneers, and 
trained so far as possible to re gard the state and party 
as p rior loyalties. Even parents should be denounced if 
they endeavor to hinder "progress". More effective still, 
denunciation in the schools, of instructors and fellow 
students, is encouraged. In addition, r eliable a gents are 
systematically placed throughout the system to ensure fidelity 
to official ; olicy. Admission to universities is based on 
s e.rvice -t:; o the party and se r ves, along with the gene rous 
stj_J)endia granted to reliable young people, as the crux 
of the stick and carrot (Zuckerbrot und Pe itsche) method of 
persecution. Once admitted to a school or university, the 
s t udent may remain only so long as he stay s in the good 
graces of the authorities. This means that he must serve, 
or appear to serve, as loyal member of FDJ and eventually also as 
committed soldier in the DD1~ military formations. ':Vhile 
h e is in school, he is ex-p o sed to systematic indoctrination 
which p enet r ates to all parts of the curriculum. He is 
com.velled to take political courses in comi"llunist ideolo gy, 
and must use the s p ecially prepared books, the only ones 
available. His time and h is study progra.tu. a r e so arranged 
as to give minimum opportunity for s p eculative or questioning 
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reflection and to maximiz e the mere lear ning p rocess which 
is heavily weighted on the t echnical side. Inst ructors 
are even mo re car efully screened for reliability, and while 
many are doubtless anti-collimunist, there is little chance 
t o ac t ivat e such convict ions. 
I t should be emphasized that communist pedagogical 
methods are not conf ined to the higher levels. Syst ematic 
indoctrination begins on the lowest legels in sugar-coated 
form, and it is accompanied by organi zational and even pre-
military training while the children a r e still young and 
unformed. 
11'he final phase of pena l t y and reward is reached 
when the student finishes his education, or even before. At 
t hat point the exceptional op~o rtunities for young p eople to 
acquire responsible, well-paid positions constitute t he 
ultimat e incentive to acce~t t he status guo57. Stories of 
19 ye ar old mayors and 22 year old f acto r y directors exempl;ify 
this emphasis on youth. 
The char acter of this sy stem ex-_plains why the churches, 
for example, have been so ada.ant in opposition. If the 
childr en are lost t o the caus e of fre edom, it will be the 
decisive trium_b)h for the communist s. It is still too ear ly 
to call the youth o r educational p ro gram 11 the one outst anding 
su c cess of the postwar communist r e gime in East Ge rmany,"5S 
57. See article by Albion Hoss, "East Ge r mans Place Heliance 
on Youth," New York I'imes, 9 February 19 55. 
58 . Ibid. 
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for ·the resistance of youth to indoct rination is usually 
unde r estimated. But the ve r y comple t eness of the program 
is nearly ove rwhe lming and it is certainly <ln the way to 
succ.ess unless counter methods can be effect uated. 
Economic :Folicy59 
The period 1949 t o 1953 shows, to a certain ·extent, 
the int ended overthrow of the old economic order; but variou s 
fac l; ors have limited t he emergence of new economic accom-
p lishments, and consequently this review can only indicate 
the tendencies which seem likely to a f fect the c oming years 
of DDR existence. Whatever failures there may have been, 
b.oweve r , the planned economy was adopted with a vengeance • 
. Planning in Eastern Europe means generally that the state, in 
r e sponse to party demands, sets up production plans, broken 
down on a yearly and monthly basis, for every phase of the 
economy. This covers not only s t rictly economic activity, 
i.e., industrial and agricultural production, mining and 
bui lding , etc., but also artist ic production. Not only does 
the f armer have a p roduction obligation, the factory a 
production quota, and the worker a norm, but the state also 
p lans i t s accomplishments in literary and artistic output, 
in education and in sport. Nothing is overlooked. 
59. For detailed s t udies see the Bonner Berichte listed in 
the bibliography. 
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But beyond the details of planning , there a r e certain 
broad emphases which govern the alloca·tion of materials and 
labor and determine what direction the economy will take 
within its recognized limj_tations. 1J:he Five Year Plan for 
the DDR, drawn for the years 1951 to 1955, thus set the 
follo wing goals: The raising of industrial p roduction to 
192% of 1950 , with special emphasis on cons~ruction, steel 
output, machine building, tuel and power p roduction, and 
chemical output. Most of the stre ssed items received p er-
centage quotas over 200% of 1950, "in order to insure 
economic independence of the cap i t alistic forei gn countries". 
~1lrther, the Plan demanded improvement of labor productivity 
in the nat ionalized industries and SAGs by 172% over 1950 . 
Consequently, the Aktivist or Hennecke movement was en-
couraged and Soviet work meth ods introduced60 • In a gri-
culture, t oo, the planners demanded substantial increases 
and imp osed quotas according ly. However, owing to uncalculated 
facto r s such as poor harvests, and to factors which should 
have been reckoned with, such as faulty trading and t r ansport 
functioning and disaffection amo~g the po~ulace, the goals 
were seldom reach ed during the first years of the p lan. 
Significantly, the armament production quotas were general l y 
fulfilled, in 1 9 52 at least61 , thus pointing up one of the 
outstanding emphases of the DDR economy since 1950. And even 
60. SBZ von A-Z, ££• cit., 59. 
61. Bericht ueber die Ruestun s · roduktion in der sow'e t ischen 
Besatzung szone Bonn: Bunde ~.:,ministerium fuer g esamtdeutsche 
Fragen, 1953), 25-6. 
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where the Plan was unfulfilled, achie vement s were often 
substantial. St ructural changes followed automatically of 
course . Among the more crQcial ones, priv~te enterprise 
was virtually killed, and where it survived (e.g., in consilllle r 
go ods production) it became comp le te l y dependent on agencies 
of the sta-ce; independent farmers were also driven to the 
wall by means of discrimination in allocations of fert ilizes-..s 
. r. 
and machinery and by exo1bitant taxes. 
It would be diff icult to say what element of the 
p opulace suffered most. ·:Vhe worke rs were sweated unmercifully 
by un:favorable conditions "agreed to" by the FDGB. The 
farmers we r e forced to choose be tween fli ght and joining the 
intermediate forms of collectives. And the consumers were 
contronted with s hortages and defective goods, even when 
t hey had sufficient money to buy. Inequality, as between 
favored and unf avored sectors of the p opulation , develop ed 
on scale undre amed of by the forerunners of sociali§m. And as 
one observer no t ed, "in a society with low living standards, 
p rivileges enjoyed by virtue of office-holding or party 
membership a r e mo r e bitte r ly resent ed than the differentiationsA 
in a s ociety where basic consumer goods are within the reach 
of almost every:_body. u62 
In recognition of the nearly imp o s sible economic tasks 
confronting the DDR, t he :L·e was a softening of policy in 1953. 
62. Otto Kirchheimer, 1111'he Government of Eas t Germany," in Hans 
Morgenthau ( ed), Germany and t he :Fut u r e of Europe (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1950 ), 138-9. 
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The New Course, which has been exaggerated into a sort 
of NEP by some observers, was only a pause in t he economic 
p ro gram, but it bore wit ness to the crisis conditions 
facing the East German economy. Despite the fairly 
imp r e ssive achievements in certain sectors of the economy , 
the capital of popular coope r ation had been used up and 
t he future would depend on the effect iveness of centr al 
cont rol and totalitarian persuasion. 
East Ge rmany and the Soviet Bloc 
The relations between :&ast Germany and the rest of 
the Soviet sphere have undergone an almost unbelievable 
p rocess of change since 1945. In t hat year Germany was 
the de f eated and cordially hated · enemy, the oppressor 
of Eastern Europ e since 1938. One of the i mmediate .results 
was the expalsion of the German population from t he Eastern 
Zuropean lands, notably from the Polish administered territory 
east of the Oder -Neisse Line and from the SuQentenland. In 
1939 there were 9,600;000 Germans east of the Oder-Neisse, 
and 3,500 , 000 in the Sudetenland. Of t hese, it was estimated 
in 1952, 1,400 , 000 remained in their native lands, 2 ,300 , 000 
were missing , and t he rest had been resettled in Germany. 
3 ,100,000 had r emained in East Germany,. and slightly more t han 
6,000,000 had relocated in Nest Germany and Berlin. Anothe r 
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~h million had been sent to Germany from Hungary, Yugos-
lavia, Rumania, and Bulgaria63. Moreover, much of the 
p olitical activity in Eastern Europe directly after the 
war, rested on hatred of Germany. This was one point on 
which all factions seemed a greed, and the communists did 
not fail to make use of it. 
In East Germany itself, we have seen that the initial 
political revival, as well as most of Soviet~olicy, was 
based allegedly on anti-Nazi reasoning. By 1949, when the 
DDR came into existence officially, the anti-Nazi camp aign 
had been rep laced by the more manipulable anti-Fascist 
r<:\Pf ro~ ·e. h'\-c..-T 
slogans; and it had become necessary to develop a l?SiPJ:' J!Iiil ch: 
aBftt between the DDR and the other satellites. This was 
comparatively easy with the remoter lands whose only contact, 
practically sp eaking , was in the realm of trade. The DDR 
was worked gradually into the trading network of the Soviet 
bloc and be gan to make substantial contributions to the 
industrial develo~ment of the region. Beyond that, there 
were the rounds o f cultural contacts and the presence 
eventually of East German observers or re.i! resentatives 
at Cominform headquarters and at various bloc conferences. 
Poland, and t;o a lesser de gree Czechoslovakia, remaiili. 
a ~roblem of greater dimensions. The neighbors of Germany 
to 
were understandably reluctant ~ believe, as they were told 
63. Figures from Some Facts about E ellees in German 
Federal Ministry for Expellees, 1952 . 
(Bonn: 
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by the Soviets, that East Germany had been so quickly 
transformed by the introduction of a communist re g ime. The 
difficulty was two-sided, for the Soviets had to camp aign 
in Poland for a policy of friendship toward the DDR, and in 
the DDR for acceptance of the Oder-Neisse Line as a permanent 
frontier. Officially, the culmination of the friendsh i p 
camp aign occurred 6 June 19 50 when an Ulbricht-led East 
German delegation in Warsaw signed a joint declaration 
declaring the frontier pe rmanent and inviolable. This was 
confirmed by a treaty on 6 July 1950 , and has been reiterated 
ever since by Grotewohl, Pieck, and Ulbricht by way of 
neighborly reassurance. West German sentiment tends to be 
quite the reve rse, however, and probably rep resents more 
accurately the ~nexpressed op inions of East Germans. This 
irredentist sentiment is a disquieting factor from many p oints 
of view, but p a r ticularly from the Polish side. And t h e 
frequent expressions of friendship emanating from Warsaw 
h ave not concealed t he real Polish feelings. Hamilton Fish 
Armstrong suggests, on the basis of his inte rview with ~e~~·~ 
t h a t even a tt Muscovite Pole 11 may ent ertain doubts about 
' l't f t' . G 64 A d f th p ara-m1 1 ary orma 1ons 1n ermany • n one o e 
i s sues which l e d to f.o,_ ..... \k~'s downfall seems to h ave been 
his rc.c.~lC:~\- ... ~""''"' concerning a revived German stat e, even under 
64. Tito and Goliath (New York: Macmillan, 1951), 160. 
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Soviet auspices65. The fact remains that the 40,000 square 
miles of the 11 recovered territories" have been largely 
integrated into Poland and represent a great economic boon. 
Some 6 million Poles have been settled there, collectivization 
is comparatively advanced (although :Poland's collectivization 
has proceeded slowly in general), and industrial capacity 
has been enormously enhanced66 • Even with their practically 
unlimited power, the Soviets could scarcely relish the task 
of pe r suading Poland to give up this region. 'l'o date it has 
been much easier to pressure the DDH regime into renunciation. 
'rhe durability of the problem is stressed by one observer 
who calls the Polish-German alliance 11 a forced embrace ••• 
under the vigilant eye of the Kremlin ••• For even if in time 
the Poles come to forget the terr ors of the Nazi occupacion, 
it is hardly likely that the Germans will forget that they 
have lost all of Silesia."67 
* * * * * * 
65. 11 Helations Between Poland and East Germany," The World 
Today, September 1951, 371. 
66. Samuel Sharp, Poland, Red Eagle on a White Field (Cambridge 
Mass: Harvar d University Press, 1953), 230-3. 
67. "Relat ions ••• ", loc. cit., 376. 
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To conclude the description of this vital p eriod in 
DD.R development, May and June 1953 brought sovieti~ation 
~and its counterpart, popular opposition, to an op en conf lict. 
This matter of opposition, which occupies the next two 
chapters, can only be understood in terms of events pre-
ceeding 16 June 1953. 
' Popular hof e for a change in the direction of leniency 
was aroused in Mar ch 1953 by Stalin's death based lar gely on 
suppos ition, It was thought that Stalin had been the p rincipal 
advocate of stringency in. dealing with the sat ellites and 
that his successors, even if they succeeded in maintaining 
the Soviet re gime on an even heel, would allow greater local 
expression and autonomy among the sat ellite bloc states. 
':rhat this was not alto gether a vain hope is shown by the 
fluctuations of Soviet policy since Stalin, and specifically 
by the ~ew Course. Yet the hope was ba sed, in the main, 
on wishful thinking . Oppression has continued and funda-
mental aims have never been given up. Nevertheless, this 
hopeful frame of mind, best illustrated by redJction in 
the flow of refugees to the West, played a cruc:ital role in 
subsequent events. Superficial substance was added to the 
brighter outlook by the announcement on 28 May that the 
Soviet Control Commj_ssion was dissolved. Former SKK political 
advisor, V.S. Semyonov, was appointed Soviet Hi gh Commissioner 
in the new a r rangement, with General Chuikov retaining 
only the military command. 
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On the~ame day, however, the g ove r nment p roclaimed 
a 10% increase in wo rk norms to be effective 30 June68 • 
This was offset on 9 and 10 June by announcement of the 
New Course which p romised discontinuation of collectivizat ion, 
lowering of work norms, amnesty of political prisoners, 
incre a se in food stocks, return of confiscated c hurch lands, 
and the restoration of confiscated holding s to any escapees 
who might choose to return. Such general features of the 
new p rog ram were p roclaimed by the SED Politbuero, and 
t h e Soviet organ, 'r aeg liche Rundschau, even seemed willing 
to let some of the guilt for "past mistakes" rest with t h e 
Soviet administration. The government rap idly endeavored to 
give reality to the proposals, mostly in the form of re duc e d 
p rices. 'rhe question of the norms remaine d in doubt , however, 
while the work ers found many op~ortunities to make their 
prote s t vocal69. And it was not until the morning of 16 June 
that the t r ade union organ, Tribu ene,certified t h at norms 
would actually be raised. The three elements in the situation, 
the proclama t i on of concessions, the disturbing insist enc e 
on rai s ing norms, and t h e h opeful frame of mind upon which 
t h e other t wo eleme nt s were sup eri mp osed , c ombined to p roduc e 
the sen sat ional outburst of 16 and 17 June 19 53. 'J.:hat s t ory 
will be resumed in Ch ap ter VI. 
68. r his would have meant a wa ge reduction, for examp l e , of 
30% for b r icklayers, 42% for carp e n ters. 
69. At least six strikes occurred between l and 15 June in 
p rotest a gain st the rise in norms. An Observer, 11 IV1ili t ary 
Control in East Germany, 11 Cur rent Hist ory, June 1954, 357. 
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Chapter V 
Seeds of Revolt: Opposition to Sovie t Policy, 1949-1953 
Our acquaintance wi t h totalitarianism in recent years 
has unfortunat ely been sufficiently extensive that we have, 
as an incidental ben·9fit, largely rid ourselves of certain 
fallacious no t i ons about t he rel ationship betwe en government 
and governed. With our present knowledge of the National-
Socialis t period in Germany, and still more emphatically, 
with our develop ing understanding of the unrelenting per-
vasiveness of the Soviet-style system, we a r e no longer 
very prone to take refuge in such question-begging dicta 
as: 11A p eop l e gets t he government it deserves," or "A 
p eople must ove r thr ow native t y ranny by its own courage 
and deter minat ion.'' It would be mo s t convenient , bo th 
-r for scholars and diy lomats, to substitute such thoughQess 
epigrams for s t renuous, much-needed grappling with the 
p roblems which t he ri se of t otalitarianism has p resented 
po us. We know however that absolutism may sneak up on 
an unsuspecting and unwary populat ion, and that it is during 
the o:pening stages that prevention mus t occur. I f a 
p eople is no t successful, or do e s not see the ne ed to be 
successful, in preventing a totalitarian putsch , then it 
is virtually a fore gone conclusion t hat a well-organized 
and well-led movement will realize its goal of absolute 
-123-
power. And as soon as this goal is reached, t he re gime 
has all of the advantage s over t hose interested in unse at-
ing it. But if such a regime is imposed from without, as 
it was in several Eastern European lands, by the decisive 
p ower of an army backed by specially p repared admini s trative 
and cont rol apparatus, even the most alert populace would 
have no opportunity to defend its freedom. 
\'li thout going deep er at this point int o the natur e of 
total itarianism, a corollary of the above observation may 
be simply stated: Once an absolut e re gime has been est ablished, 
whether a native p roduct or an uninvited importat ion, the 
overwhelming control apparatus supplied by t wentieth century 
technolo gy, polic e efficiency, and party organization makes 
opposition or revolt or revolution an unrealistic er~ecta­
tion1. ·rhis coroll a r y rest s on t wo bases: t he nature of 
totalit a r ianism, of which we have brief l y spoken, and what 
has been call ed the "doctrine of man." 'Jlhe latter viewpoint, 
as developed by the school of "Crisis Theolo gy 112 , advises 
1. Two ill uminating works may be mentioned here. Both supply 
a "feel" for the effects of totalitarianism on individual 
human beings: Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (Hew York: 
Kno pf, 1953) and Jan Stransky, Bast Wind over Prague 
( New York: Random House, 1950). 
2. Rep resented by such theologians as Paul Tillich and 
Reinhold Niebuhr. 
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us to accept and thereby reckon with the weaknesses of 
our fellow men, to exp ect something less than heroism, 
self~sacrifice, and moral strength from man-in-the-mass. 
This is obviously not a limiting concept in the sense of 
l e aving us unprepared for the e x cep tion. We know that there 
are human being s who c.an and do sacrifice themselves for 
ideas and convictions , and it follows that we are in fact 
not surp rised to note the signs of resistance from within 
an opp ressed populace. But to accept such behavior as a 
hop eful and healthy factor over and above eTpectations when 
it appears, is· quite different from expecting it as a matter 
of course. 'l'he former is then the only sati sfactory found-
ation for policy formulation since an underst atement of 
possibilities is always less hazardous and less deceptive 
than overestimate. We thus realize in advance that revolt 
is unlikely, and, from the nature of the totalitarian state, 
p ropably doomed to failure if it does occur. 
And as for ethical judgment, this vie"lv should indicate 
in turn that t he docile are not necessarily to be c on d emned, 
not, that is, unles s one is prep are d to condemn all but the 
very he r oic.3 It is frequently quite enou gh of a strain 
f or t h e human personality to avoid active partici:pation in 
a system of which it disapproves, without the a dded burden 
3. In this connection, George F. Kennan's realistic app raisal: 
11 If individual life is to go on at all within the totali-
tarian framework i t must go on by arrangement with the 
regime, and to some extent in connivance with its purpose. 11 
Am~~e~r~i~c~a~n~D~'=i~- =l~o=m~a~c~~l~9~0+.0~-~1~9~0 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, l 51 , 140 . 
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of resistance. We may f eel our hopes amply r ewar ded if 
t here a r e a f ew who resist, and we should reciprocate with 
an understanding of the immensit y of that achievement. Our 
appreciation must be a measure of the diff iculties involved 
r a t her than a judgment a gainst those who have stopped some-
where short of r e sist anc e . 
* * * * * 
At t h e same time , we should be unfai r to ourselve s 
as deeply c.once r ned out siders and to t he minority with 
which this ch apte r on opposit i on deals, if we failed to 
make the necessary distinctions within t h e general c oncept 
'op J!osition'. As we e xa:m:ilne the history of opposition in 
Eastern Germany, it wil l be necess ary to so r t out - and 
even to measure so far as t hat is a t all poss ible - the 
variou s forms which such opposition has taken. 
when t he victorious Soviet Army swept into Germany, 
established its occupation mechanism, and introduced its 
first occupation policies, the populace divided itself into 
several camp s. First there were those who welcomed the 
Soviet admi nistration, the convinced communists who wished 
to see Germany become the seat of a communi s t re gime. Within 
this group we r e some who understood Soviet methods and 
aims, and who r emained true to their convictions; but t here 
were others who h ad been victims of prop aganda, whose con-
victions r e sted on the shifting sands of illusion, and who 
in the process of bitter disillusionment became in many 
cases opponents of t he regime. Another larger group 
consisted of- persons who were relieved a-t; the lii'ting of 
-126-
Nazi persecution and hop ed to profit by the chang e of regime. 
Of these, some were doubtless sincere anti-Nazis who under-
stood 11profit 11 as an increase of spiritual and social wel-
fare; others just as surely thought in terms of personal 
monetary p rofit. In the middle, probably by far the largest 
segment, stood those whose attitude was 11 wait and s ee 11 • 
These peop le withheld judgment as long as p ossible in the 
hope of substantial improvement over the Nazi regimen and, 
particularly, over the rigors of war. On the othe r side 
of the picture were the anti-communists, by which I mean 
those with some definite r eason for fearing or opp osing 
t he Soviet and Soviet-sponsored authority. i.rhese included 
many with experience during the wa r to in<iicate the un-
favorable outlook for Soviet-occup ied Germany, and many with 
ideological reasons - not all of Nazi d e rivation, it should 
be added - for the ir skep tical attitudes toward Soviet power. 
And this latter g roup was augment ed considerably and immediate-
ly by the behavior of Soviet troops in their heavY-footed 
mar ch across Germany. 
But thi s all too simplified p icture of Eastern Germany 
at war's end contains no indication of opposition potential 
already existing. Unless one believe s the nonsense con-
tained in some ficti onalized accounts of these t imes, to the 
sorry bulk of which some Americans have prof'i tably contributed, 
eve n the p illage and rap e by Russian soldiers provoked 
little active opposition although it of course inc r eased the 
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fund of ill-will which is still a part of the Soviet 
harvest in East ern Ge rmany. Still less significant was 
the at that time much discussed "Wettfwolf" resistance 
movement sup~osedly developed under Bormann's ausp ices 
as an unpleasant greeting for the occupation armies~. 
What we know of this decidedly ephemeral movement indicates 
that it was aimed largely at the Western armies with the 
intention of forcing a mutual understanding between Germany 
and t he West a gainst the Soviet Union. There is no record 
t ha·t; t he so-called Wel'!:fwolves :played any significant role 
in Western occupa t ion history, and they certainly did not 
affect the Sovie t occupation . 
What is actually decisive in this connection, however, 
is the stat e of East German society at t hat time. Utterly 
devast ated by war, the social order destroyed, the populace 
uprooted, and the system of :property practically in abeyance, 
Eastern Germany was not the setting for observable mobili-
zation or direction of sentiment. The struggle for survival 
apart, almost t he only visible direction amidst disorder 
was a general movement westward, apparently in the belief 
that conditions would be bet t er under western occupation. 
To search for opposition in such a situation is fruitless, 
if only because an act of apparent resistance may with equal 
justification be labelled mere lawlessness. 
4. J. P . Net tl, The Eawtern Zone and Soviet Folic in 
Germany (London: Oxford, 1951 , 3,4. 
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The destruction of the social order, and the sub-
sequent imposition from above of a revolution, did however 
develop certain potentials of importance. For one thing , 
the loss of ~roperty, goods, and frequently alsotamily 
created a significant measure of rootlessness, one might 
almost say a declasse group, which had among others two 
effects of interest here: many were b ereft of the personal 
and property responsibilities making for conservatism and 
conformity, thereby becoming reckless enough to undertake 
reprisals against the oppressor; but the same process, 
combined with dire necessity, released many from traditional 
values, making them into available instruments for the 
re gime as they cynically accep ted any offer which included 
betterment of their social and financial situation. Most 
imp ortant, however, wa s the sense of dependence on the 
regime, of powerlessness in the face of authority, which 
also grew from or was at least reinforced by, the total 
dissolution of organized social forms in 1945. This is 
a condition of utmost value for the process of sovietization, 
for the ubiquitous power of party and police depends in 
t he first instance on recognition by the people that such 
power exists. We may conclude then that Eastern Germany in 
1945 was not an ideal breeding gr ound for opposition, that 
it was in fact the reverse, an excellent setting for totali-
tarian revolution from above. 
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Since opp osition was not r e ady-made and lying in 
wait for the Soviets, it must have g rown in response to 
later occurrenc e s. This cataly tic func t ion was of c ourse 
p erformed by Soviet policy, t h e sequence of events, deci s ions, 
and p ro grams dealt with in previous chap te r s. It is p ossible 
to argue that the Soviet ove r see rs were not very clever 
in this connection, t h at it was unnecessary to generate 
so much opposition in reaching the stipulated goals. But 
this argument overlooks several important fac t ors. It 
imp lies, for one thing , that t h e Russians did not e xpect 
opposition t o their p olicies, and this seems to me a singularly 
nai ve viewpoint. I t is not necess ary to endorse the "master-
plan" idea of Soviet omniscience to realize that t he Soviet 
Russian authorities a r e a ware of the limited app eal of 
the ir pro gram. ':Chey certain ly foresaw opposition; and i t 
is only a slight exagge r ation to s ay also, the y welcomed it. 
~fuile Kremlin strategy may not dictate t h e artificial 
stimulat i on of op l:'osition, t he above argument ignores t h e 
r ole assigned t o p opul a r resistance in any soviet izat i on 
p ro gram. It is in fact one of the goals of such a prog ram 
to elicit and then destroy opposition, with the a ppropriate 
fanf are, a s a means of impressing and terrorizing the 
po ..c:Julace. Fur ther, it is an as sumption underly ing Sovie t 
methods t hat any society will contain disrup tive elements, 
and it serves t heir ends if such leaders are called into t h e 
op en early in the game to be identified and dealt with -
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just at the time, i ncidentally when scapegoats may be needed 
to excuse failures. ( 'I'his Soviet assumption ofopposition is 
valid for them in much the same way that it is valid for 
V:Testern nations to formulate policy on the assumption of no 
opposition in the areas of Soviet rule.) 
My argument he re does not of course i mp ly that the 
Soviets have made no mistakes in their treatment of Eastern 
Ge rmany, but simply t hat opposition as such is not neces sarily 
a sign of Soviet error. Nor should it be taken as a suggestion 
that the Hussians cannot be surprised by resist ance. They 
can and have been. Moreover, since the ultimate goal is 
to silence opposition it would be silly to suppose that all 
op~osition is welcomed, However, on the strength of their 
experience at home they surely expect it, and know how to 
turn it to their own advantage. Finally, by naming those 
policies which have been most important in stimulating 
resistance: land reform and th+eginnings of collectivization, 
repa r ations and confiscations, emphasis on heavy industry 
at the expense of consumer goods, perversion of education, 
denial of civil and political right s, and exp~oitation of 
v. 
labor, one can s ee the inevitable u~opularity of sovietization. 
Not one of these goals coul d, from the Kremlin point of view, 
have been s acrificed in order to minimize opposition. 
* * * * * 
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Befo r e p roceeding to a detailed treatment of opposition, 
I must outline a somewhat more precise terminolo gy. Until 
now I have u s ed 'opp o s ition' and 'resistance' synonymously 
and have avoided such t e rms as 'active' and 'passive' opposi-
tion. Sinc e 'resist ance'. has a rat her tangible or definite 
connotat ion, 'opposition' is the generic and inclusive term. 
It is illustrated by the often-heard, p robably justified , 
but not very meaningful e xpression that 75 - 90% of the 
East Ge rman population is opp osed to the re gime. This is 
not a measur e, but rathe r an elabo r ate exclamation point. 
It means in effect tha t a large majority of the populace is 
dis s atisfied, does not believe in the government and party, 
and , g iven a choice, v ould p refer some othe r sort of govern-
ment.5 Such a general observat i on could conceivably have 
significance for the p lanning staff or the intelligenc e 
s ervice of an army contemplating invasion and vvishing to know 
to what extent the p eople of the re g ion would opp ose them. 
Such fi gures may also have their p lac e in psycholo g ical war-
fare and p rop aganda, but a r e in general not very use ful. 
I shall continue to use the te r m 'resist ance' synonymous-
l y wi t h 'opposition', mainly for the sake of variet y, but 
as far as possible in the more definite contexts where it 
will mean more t han a vague sentiment. The terms 'active' 
and ' p assive' form the usual breakdown of opposition into 
5. See below, p. • s-2... 
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classes, and they are acceptable so long as t h e reader 
knows what is being described. There is of course a 
valu e judgment implicit in these two words, 'active' 
suggesting courage and 'passive' seeming to signify a due 
regard for one's own safety; and this l e ads me to add a 
t h ird term, 'quiet opposition• 6 , wh ich falls between the 
other two. 
'Active opJ)OSi tion' means then, for present pur-p oses 
at l e ast, the typ e of resistance aimed at weakening, or 
openly exp ressing sentiments agains t, the re gime. This 
usually takes t h e form of strike or sabotage, althou gh it 
woul d certainly include an organized underground whether 
eng a ge d in sabotage or n ot ( this because any organization 
not under state control t ends to weaken t h e monolithic 
structure of society- and is punished accordingly), and 
also any att em_p t from within the party to transform or re-
direct the goals and methods of the satellite state. Sa-
botage is here the widest category and we may accept the 
viewpoint of the regime as to what types of activity are 
to be so regarded, though it would be patently absurd to 
follow the regime as to what specific acts constitute 
sabotage. For examp le, if the police announce that passing 
on certain items of information is sabotage, this we may 
6. This expression, I am told, has been used by P rofessor 
Hans Kaehler to describe much the same sort of phenomenon. 
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accept; but if Hans G. is charged by the police with 
committing sabotage by passing on information, it is by 
no means certain that this specific act was ever committed 
at all. As for ac t ivity within the party, t _;:lis refers 
obviously to what has been known since 1948 as Titoism. 
Although such opposition does not fi gure prominently in SED 
history, it is clearly possible for such opposition to be 
carried on by a convinced communist. He ne ~ d only be 
opposed to the specific form of satellitism or People's 
Democracy. 
' Qu iet opposition' has, on the other hand, little or 
nothing to do with tangible demonstrations of resistance 
such as strikes. It is a highly indefinite category en-
compass ing mainly spiritual resistance of an enduring ty~e, 
di r ected toward an uncertain future - decades perh~p s, 
generations if necessary - and intended to overbridge the 
totalitarian present whatever its duration. It does not 
we aken the system appreciably in any outward sense, but it 
fi ghts the inner uniformity and commitment of a peop le, in 
other words, the 1984 sort of ultimate totalitarianism. 
Quiet opposition is ha rd to isolate and examine, but is best 
seen l:'rogably in the family where syst ·ematic indoctrination 
is opposed by parental training of children in values such 
as freedom and individualism which are anathema to the regime. 
The churches also participate in t his type of opposition, in 
addition to their cont ribution to the active form of 
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resistance. And just as quiet opposition presen-ts serious 
p roblems for such research .as this, it is particularly 
difficult f or t h e p olice state to counteract. :Not only 
is detection a problem, but preventive measures are harde r 
to find when the 'crime ' is so intangible. But 'crime' 
it is, and penalt ies are no less h arsh than for sabotage. 
The · last of ' the ty_~es of oppo sition is "passive'' and 
p r ovides a catch-all for everything which falls within the 
"75 - 90%" but is not the active resistance of the small 
minority nor the quiet opposition of an uncertain port ion 
of the populace. As such it comp l e tes the classification 
but will receive here only incidental c onsideration. 
* * * * 
The informat i on now available is still too far from 
complete to p e rmit anything as ambitious as a histo r y of 
opp osit ion within the DDR. The rest of this chapte r will 
t herefore a t temp t only, throu gh selection of significant 
detail, to illuminat e the character of opposition with in 
the East Ge rman satellite and to s u pp ly the backg round for 
the June (. 1953) rev olts. The upri s ing of t he workers in 
East Berlin, and subsequently throu ghout t he DDR, i s too 
often examined in isolat ion, underst andably perhap s in view 
of its sensational nature ; but I b e lie ve i t possible to fit 
the June revolts into a scheme which has some r e lation to t h e 
wh ole course of development in Eastern Germany. But first 
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the revolt itself, and t he background of opposi-tion. 
In r eading the signs of resist ance t he r e are two out-
standing development s which suggest t hemselves as me a suring 
devices: the incidence of judicial or administrative-j u dicial 
:penalties for pol i t ica l offenses; and t he wave of refugees 
which has been flowing steadily we s t ward since 1945. Both 
have a certain surface :plaus ibility as indices of opposition, 
and about both t here is some r e liable informat ion to b e found. 
But at tractive as they seem, both typ e s of data have weak-
ne s se s. The first, the police-judicial system of t he DDrt 
and its relation to the :populace in general, has been treated 
elsewhere and woul d be inappropriat e here. 1.I:o be sure, 
p risons full of political offende r s i ndicat e in a general 
way that t he r e is opp ositi on t o the re gime. But having said 
that such, the evidential :possibilities of this question are 
exhaus t ed. Because of the nature of t he totalitarian judicial 
syst em, wherein generally objective and consistent criteria 
are replaced by the momentary interest s of the stat e or the 
party, dat~ concerning arre s ts , convictions, and sentences are 
not useful in measuring opposition. Such data do :portray the 
operation of the :police state and its employment of t err or 
against t h e citizenry, but bear at most a tangential relation 
to opposition. 
The s econd phenonenon, t he exodus of .J.;ast German es-
cap ees, also ha~eaknesse s in this connect i on . Those who 
have worked with the r efuge e p roblem know t hat t h e s tat ist ics, 
-e 
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in themselves most impressive, are by no means a reliable 
measure of opposition to the DDH regime 7. 'l'hey know how 
often the escapees have departed the DDR out of simple 
desire to better their economic situation, or perhaps to 
join relatives in the West, or not unusual, to escape 
punishment for crimes having nothing t o do with politics. 
Such reasons for escape lead to no conclusions about 
opposition except, perhaps, in the widest, passive sense. 
r .here are, on the other hand, abundant cases of escapees 
who le :c. t only when their resistance acts had brou ,ght them 
into very re~l dange r. Also significant here are the c ase s 
of· p -_ople 1 s Pol icemen who h ave de serted, and the escapes by 
youths of military age. Such instances as these are damaging 
·t; o the r egime, or at least the escape route i s com_p lement-
ary to p revious acts of resistance. Doubtless, t;oo, the 
very existence of such an escape route offe r s some~couragement 
to the East Ge rman which is not available to the Pole or 
Rumanian. ~'urthe rmore, the total exodus has a significance 
of its own in that it has had weakening consequences in the 
realm of economic and military planning . ;I'he efforts of 
the DDR to hinder escape8 , and more recently to urge the 
return of escapees9, certainly eflect a genuine anxiety, 
7. Certain illustrative oases are to be found in the pamphlet , 
Sow·etzonenfluechtlin e· Rechtslage und Hilfsmoeglichkeiten 
dargestellt an Einzelfaellen Zentralbuero des Hilfswerks 
der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland, n.d.). 
8 . For some of t he details on this p rocess, Die Sperrmass-
nahmen der Sow 4 etzonenre - · ierun-~ an der Zonen -renze und um 
West Berlin Bonn: Bunde sministerium fuer gesam·t;deutsche 
Fragen, 195.?). 
9 . The latest de velopment along this line was repo rted by 
Anse l E. ·Talbert under the he adline, "Flights to West 
Worry Russia". I n this column Talbert ment ions an organi-
zation called "Com.mi ttee for Return t o the Homeland rr under 
ft~to~ian leadership and b a sed in Eastern Germany. New York 
ld ·I'ribune, Int. Ed., 3 June 1955~ 
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apart from the c onsiderable information which flows with 
the refugees to the ;Nest. 
In balanc~, the~, the re f u gee question is being considered 
in this context for the above reasons. Total fi gures should, 
however, be read with the appropriate qualifications i n mind 
and with reference to the advice rep eatedly given the East 
Germans by the West to the effect that, unless escape is 
absolutely necessary, they would bet t er serve the anti-
Soviet cause by remaining a t h ome and devot ing themselves to 
e ither ac t ive or quiet opposition . For as suredly, even if 
it were feasible, gradual de p opulat ion of the DDR would not 
answer the challenge of totalitarianism. 
Between 1945 and 194 '7 t he word refugee meant mainly 
the e xpel l ees from east of t h e Oder-Neisse Line and from the 
Su det.enland, with comparatively minor contingent s coming 
into Germany from ~umania, Hungar-.r, and Yugoslavia. As late 
as Septembe r 1950, the totals for such expellees living in 
the Federal Hepublic still dwa rfed the slightly over one 
mil l ion escapees from the Soviet Occupation Zone10 • But while 
t n e expellees we r e still coming from outside Germany, East 
Germans , at t h is time mostly the a ged or tho se unfit for t he 
hard work expecxed of Soviet Zone dwellers , began t o t rickle 
into West Berlin and West Germany . Thi s trickle grew gradually 
10. Germany Reports (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the 
Federal Republic, 1953), 110. 
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until 1949 when 69,800 refugees were re gistered. After 
that, partly in response to an ap~eal by West German 
officials, joined by East German resistance leaders, the 
influx tapered off to 60,300 in 1950 and to 55,000 in 195111 • 
1952 brought a decisive change in this picutre, however, 
for in May the SED leaders began to speak of compulsory 
military service, and in June the Soviet and East Ge rman 
authorities started to clear a tract of land five miles 
wide along the zonal houndary to prevent wholesale escape. 
Meanwhile the cumulative effect of DDR policies had added to 
the disaffection. The escapees in and after 1952 included 
farmers reacting against collectivization, teachers dis-
contented with the c.ontrol measures imposed on the schools, 
and workers disillusioned by the economic situation. The 
tables12 show the resuits: 
Monthly Registration 
January . ................... 4, 262 
February .................... 4,179 
lVIarch • •••.•.•.•••...••••.•• 4, 58 3 
April . .................... . 4, 221 
May· • •••••..•.•.•....•••.•.•• 5, 109 
June •......•.•••..••...•••• 8 ,219 
July . .................... . 13, 182# 
August ••.••..• ~ ...•••.•••• l5,396 
.September ••..•.•..••.••..• 14,145 
October ••••..•••.••...•••.• 15, 595 
November •......••••••••.•• 14, 049 
December •..........••....• l5,787 
!2..22. 
25,340 
39,962 
48,726 
35,652 
40,000* 
~otals 118,727 189,680+ 
* Approximate 
# Marks the sealing of zonal boundaries 
+ Five-month total 
11. U. S. Separtment of State, "Flight from Paradise; the East 
German Exodus, 11 Background, June 1953, 2. 
12. Taken from ibid, 6. 
Professional Stat us 
Viorkm.en •...••••.•...••••••.. 16,018 
Clerks ........................ 11, 287 
Public Officials ••...• , ••••••••• 715 
Doctors, Teachers, Chemi sts •• l,943 
Farmers .................... -~ ~.4,417 
Me rchants & Businessmen •••••• 3,691 
Housewives •••••.•.•.••..•••• 17,370 
Pensioners ••....••..•••...•.. l,769 
Students over 14 years ••..•.• 2,014 
Total 59,224* 
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% 
27. 05 
19.06 
1.20 
3.28 
7.46 
6.23 
29.33 
2. 99 
3.40 
100 . 00 
* Includes only those who finished processing . 
':Co c.om:pletie the picture for 1953, the total numbe r of 
escapees in that year was approximately 350,00013. Among 
the more significant statistical details are the following: 
between 1945 and 1953 more than 80 ,000 teachers fled the 
Soviet Zone, as compared with some 81, 000 teachers left in 
t he DDR in 195314 ; and between 1949 and 1953 approximately 
6, 000 members of the DDR police forces asked for asy lum in 
the West15. Their reasons for defection included: realization 
that their training was more that of an army than that of a 
police force, financial disappointment, dislike of the 
political indoctrination program, elimination of their 
personal freedom, and forced participation in political 
activities. 
13. Christian .Science Monitor, 30 Dec. 1953. 
14. Ibid, 9 Feb. 1954. 
15. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Tensions 
within the Soviet C~ tive Countires· Soviet Zone of 
Germany 83d Congress, lst Session; Doc. 70, Part 3) 
(Washington: GPO, 1954), 65. By the end of 1954 t he 
fi gure had risen to 11,813 of which 711 were officers. 
New York Herald Tribune, 6 Dec. 1954. 
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One further noteworthy episode in the East German 
exodus concerns the Jewish population of the DDH. Julius 
Meyer, as titular leader of the East German Jewish community 
and member of the Volkskammer, was in a position to note 
the rising tide of seemingly anti-Jewish occurrences in 
Eastern Ge rmany. Culminating with the purge trials in 
Pra gue in November 1952, the evidence had become overwhelm-
ing that Jews in the Soviet orbit were not safe. On 5 January 
1953 Meyer was himself interrogated by SED officials and again 
on 7 January. Further, a meeting had been scheduled for 
17 January at which the Jewish leader s would be asked to 
sign a strongly-worded anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli, and anti-
American statement. Taking the broad hint, IVIeyer and the 
other more prominent Jewish leaders left with their families 
f ·or West Berlin, a r riving on 15 January. And for some time 
after t hat , J ewish ref uge es continued to reach \Nest Berlin 
at a rate of 25 or 30 per day16 • 
The statistical evidence on the total proportions of 
the exodus from Eastern Germany is slightly confused. Some 
reports are based only on registrations, while others 
at tempt to estimate the number of escapees who did not r egister. 
Some fi gures include only West Berlin arrivals, which until 
June 1952 (the sealing of the zonal border) were only slightly 
more t han half of the total. But if we can accept as reliable 
the German Federal Republic fi gures of two million17 Soviet 
16. U.S. Department of State, 11 Flight ••• ", 5,6. 
17. Germany Reports, ££• cit., 126. 
-14-1-
Zone refugees who had rea.:ched the West by March 1953, and 
then add the roughly 300,000 arrivals during the rest of 
1953, we shall have what is doubtless a fairly ac curate 
estimate. Defection of such wholesale dimensions cannot 
have failed to make a deep impression on the DDR. Small 
wonder that the attitude of the regime changed by early 1953. 
Since then, right up to the present (early 1955), the DDR 
has made clear that it would welcome returning defectors. 
It should not be supposed that, only because of reassurances, 
there was no danger involved for those who chose to return. 
But the fact is t hat some have been going back18 , and have 
undoubtedly found abundant openings where skill in almost 
any field could benefit the DDR economy. 
Turning now to opposition of a less ambi guously active 
nature, the shortage and distortion of informat ion are 
serious problems. 11he extent of distortion is well-illustrated 
by an account19 of a fantastic escape which occurred in 
October 1953. Five Czechs, led by the two sons of a Czech 
underground hero of World War II, set out toward Berlin from 
Prague a r med with three revolvers and 52 bullets. Crossing 
into East Germany these five fugitives lite r ally fo ught their 
18. Figures are not available, but the mere fact that s ome 
refugees have returned raises questions about t he programs 
of t he Fede r al Republic and the \.¥estern Fowers for the 
care of r efugees. Granting the great strain imposed upon 
·:Jest Ge rmany, and also that improvement is noticeable, 
there is stil l a n eed for greate r effort to integrate 
the Fluechtlinge. This criticism applies particularly to 
the allies, who have ne glec t ed the p roblem too long . 
19. 11 Freedom Route, 11 New From Behind the Iron Curtain, 
January 1954, ll-13. 
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way north to Berlin, engaging in five diffe r ent gun battles 
with Volkspolizei and losing two of their numbe r along the 
28 day-long e s cape route. After their arrival in free 
Berlin, "refugees told them how they had put the entire 
East German r gime and the resident Soviet High Commission 
in an uproar. Vopos and Russian forces, estimated at 
be tween 12, 000 and 25, 000 men, had joined in a gi gantic 
20 
manhunt ••. , giving rise to widespread rumors •••• that 
organized partisan bands were staging armed uprisings in 
East Germany." This s t ory illustrates far more of course 
than just distortion; it also shows how sensitive the DDH 
r e gime is to insurrection and how much effort it is prepared 
to expend to put down any outbreaks, whether/mal or only 
apparent. But such is the sensat ionalism, in response to 
the i mperfectly known or understood satellite occurrences, 
which plagues research in this field. It should be a 
warning a gainst overly ent husiastic grasping at seemingly 
hopeful si gns. 
During the first years of Soviet occupation there 
appeared many signs of widespre~d opposition. And at this 
time it was compara t ively easy to re gister directly such 
opposition. The election results, until electoral processes 
became so perfect under t he SED regime, told quite cle arly 
where popular sentiments lay21 • It was actually not until 
20. Illustrated by the United Press releases headlined "Red 
Hevol t '.l:old" and "East German Rift," which appeared in the 
Christian Science Monitor, 28 and 29 October 1953 . 
21. See above, p . '{'i .. 'S'o. 
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1948 or even 1949 t hat the polic e state became so pervasive 
that opposition be gan to be particularly noteworthy. ·r he 
Soviet Military Administration and its puppet Ge rman 
governments were, to be sure, never lenient with resistance, 
but during the .ear ly years the apparatus of repression had 
not yet won its reputation for omniscience. Also, there were 
apparently exceptions made for a time, as in the case of 
Le i pzig and the University in that city, both of which seemed 
to have special status. At any rate, the Leipzig Gity 
Council re f used, on 21 July 1948, by a vo t e of 41-40 , to 
condemn the Marshall Plan. And at the University, elections 
to the Student Council, supposedly insured by the preponderance 
of students supported by SED or othe r communist scholarship s, 
we r e allowed to go against the SED after somewhat half-
hearted attempt s at intimidation22 • 
Such a situation was of course not allowed to endure 
and gradually the reins were tightened, the · loopholes p lugged, 
until, by the time the DDR was officially established, all 
forms of active opposition were dangerous in the extreme. On 
the other hand, by this time it had become alarmingly apparent 
to the populace that they were besieged. This knowledge may 
have stiffened the resolve of the more convinced opponents 
of the regime; at least there were signs that a resistance 
organization was functioning on the assumption of a long 
22. As recounted by ·werner Knop, Prowling Russia's Forbidden 
Zone (New YorK: Knopf, 1949), 61,66. 
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siege. This underground originated in the :problem of 
movement, both of :people and information, :particularly 
after 1947 when border-crossing became increasingly diffi-
cult23. There was in fact a new :profession, that of border-
buide, which flourished between 1947 and 1952 and greatly 
facilitated movement in these years. 
It is to be doubted that even those with access to 
classified information on this subject can say exactly at 
any given moment what is the state of the underground move-
ment. And for one not so privileged it is :patently impossible 
to know how many organizati ons there are, how widespread 
are their activities, or to what extent they deserve credit 
for the instances of active resistance of which we have 
some knowledge. It is highly probable that there has been 
continuity in resistance organization from the outset to 
the :p resent, t hat some sort of underground has managed to 
stay alive in spite of the best efforts of the :police to 
stamp it out, in sp ite of occasional betrayal and significant 
losses of :personnel. It is no secret that many organizat ions 
in the West - such as the West German SPD, the West German 
government, allied intelligence group s, and :private groups 
like the· Freie Juristen - maintain excellent contacts within 
the DDR and receive a steady flow of valuable information. 
;rhe favorable o:p:portuni ty for such exchange of information -
for it is a two-way traffic - is unquestionably one of the 
23. See ibid, 7-12. 
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weaker points in Eastern Germany's status as a satellite. 
And this intelligence function may be the largest contribution 
of an underground organization. Another part of this 
function is of course the printing and distribution of 
pamphlets which, as some writers have observed24 , is a 
typical outlet for underground energies in a police state. 
One should be careful, however, not to r ead every 
instance of overt opposition as evidence of resistance 
organization. ~.rhere are other forms of active opposit i on, 
also character:Lstic of the police state, to which organized 
opposition unquestionably makes a notable contribution. 
Sabotage , actuallymre but highly noticeable, in the form 
of blowing bridges, dynamiting trains, and scuttling ships, 
may be evidence of organization or may be the work of 
individuals come together fo r the one task. Factory slow-
downs are similar; they may be the work of an underground 
or they may simp i.y reflect the dissatisfaction of those 
workers immediately involved. And the very frequent diversion 
of produce, either a griculture or industrial, is oftener 
the reflection of individual discontent than of organized 
resistance. ( The last phenomenon is also frequently a mere 
matter of economic necess ity in the face of unrealistic 
government p lanning , many times carried out with the conni-
vance of party and government officials.) It is, in any 
24. E . g ., Drew Middleton, The Struggle for Germany ( Indiana-
polis: Bobbs-Me r rill, 1949), 84-5. 
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case, cert ain that the scope of organized resistance may 
be and often is exaggerated. Newspaper articles25 which 
spe ak of an 11 army without guns" and lists, on the basis 
of East German news releases, act s of sabotage as if they 
were all part of an organized and directed effort are 
certainly guilty of distortion. It should not be forgotten 
that the myth of "Western agentsu and the sabotage they 
allegedly inspire plays a crucial role in Soviet bloc 
propa ganda and may be neither totally discounted nor taken 
at face value. 
Many of the overt signs of discontent, including the 
most dramatic of all as the next chapter will show, are 
purely private expressions of opposition to the re gi me. 
What may be called "consumer demonst rat i ons 11 which occurred 
in Rostock and Leipzig in 1952 and in Dresden in M:arch 1953, 
industrial strikes in IVlagdaburg in the same period, as well 
a s the tearing down of poster s (sometimes with anti-communist 
r ep lacements) and individual acts of violence against the 
re gi me, c an all be re garded as characterist ic expres s ions of 
vigo'hus hatred of the system by unorganized citizens of the DDH. 
'r his individual resistance tends to concentrate itself 
in such centers of opposition as the church and the educational 
system, both objects of special interest for the re gime. The 
churches and their related groups have succeeded in mainta:i.:n-
ing their religious life more or less intact. And while mu ch 
25. Such as the Associated Press story in Chris t ian Science 
Monitor, 17 February 1954. 
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of their activity falls in the realm of quiet opposition, 
namely t he offering of s p iritual sustenance to their members, 
there have also been occasions when p a stors, priests, and 
laymen have outspokenly uph eld the p osition of the church 
a gainst the re g ime. Such a case was the mammoth Catholic 
congre s s in Rerlin in August 1952 when no less than 100,000 
East German Catholics took the risk of attending despite 
exp licit discouragement by the SED and the gove r nment. 
Still more striking , leaders of the Brandenburg Evangelical 
Church in 1 9 50 denounced the dishonesty of DDR electoral 
practices26 , thereby evidencing the moral role of t he 
church in the community. Similar exp ression s of opposition 
have c ome frosn the educ.ational community in which the 
proper function of schools and universities is contrasted 
with the p ractice s of the SED27. Needless to add , many 
student s and p rofessors - like the many workers, ·farmers, and 
chu rch leaders - have suffered ext reme punishment for their 
overt opposition to the re gime28 • 
Under the heading , quiet opposition, it is probably 
necessary t o acknowledge absenteeism by workers, withhold-
ing p roduce on the farms, and generally uncooperative 
26. Both c a ses cited in u . S ~ Senate Committee on Fo r eign 
Re l at i ons, ':Censions ••• , QE• cit., 81. 
27. E . g . t he ~rote st reg istered by 58 p rofe s sors and instYuct-
ors of Rostock University a gainst t h e SED reform measures. 
For this and other examp les, Marianne and Egon ~rwin 
Mueller, 11 ••• stuermt die li'estung Wissenschaft"; die Sow-
~et isi e rung der mitteldeutschen Universitaeten seit 1945 
Berlin: Colloquium Ve r lag , 1953), 282-3, 
28. See list of p rofessors and students arrest ed in Ea stern 
Germany since 1945, ibid, 363-79 . 
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attitudes by consume J_'s, who are so well schooled in evasion 
of re gulations. Yet these a :.ce strictly negative activities 
and are therefore overshadowe d by three areas of po sitive 
ac tion: family, school , and church. In each of these 
three occur some of the most important features of the 
op.t;os ition picture , very often far outdistancing the isolated 
acts of sabotage in terms of ultimat e significance. For 
it is in these areas t ha t the people rec e ive the ins Gruction 
and spiritual sustenance which enables them to hold out 
against adversity , to reject immediate opportunities, and to 
~reserve the be liefs on which the future reconstruction of 
society will depend. No less important, these are precise-
ly those a reas wn ich most affec t youti..l , the special target of 
.Soviet and .SED indoctrination. 'I'he builders of a sovietized 
social order are fully aware that t he ir effort s depend in 
the last analysis on making youth into a p liable instrument 
of their aims. And unless we endorse these aims - as some 
do, doubtless in all sincerity, on grounds of futuristic 
Bolshevik claims - we must welc ome those contributions to 
the quiet opposition which tend to preserve tra4itional 
values and ideals. Even a radical critic of ·rvestern society, 
who may believe that our historical salvation dep ends on a 
profound alteration of the social order, would probably a gree 
that traditional values, even though wrong i n his eyes, 
provide a better starting point for his program than the 
totalitarian doctrine s of Bolshevism or Stalinism. 'I'he 
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p roponent of tra$dition, or of "piecemeal social e n g ineering", 
would of course not hesitate to embrace those influenc e s 
which help to keep family, school, and church out of 
totalitarian g rasp . 
It is, however, p ractically i mpossible to describe just 
what is being done and how ext ensive the effort is"" Our 
information c omes in large part from refugees, although 
contact across the border is still sufficient to serve as 
some basis for judgment. Such s p ecial O.Q:portunities as 
were aff orded by the FDJ Rally in East Berlin in August 1951 
also offer a c h ance to observe. One individual source 
should be mentione d too, namely Professor Hans Koehler, a 
theologian on the faculty of the Freie Universitaet in Berlin. 
Professor Ko ehler has lived under t h e DDR reg ime and, j udg -
ing from t wo rel e vant p amph lets29, is both C'onvinced that 
s~iritual resources a r e holding fast in Eastern Germany and 
.i?rofoundly moved by the need for support from the West. 
It would be unfair to his meaningful contributions t o this 
s u b j ect to attempt a short synop sis; yet certain items are 
most pertinent h ere. He not es, f or examp le, that all of the 
SBD efforts have so far failed to bre ak the decisive family 
ties wh ereby c h ildren can be protected a gainst indoc t rination; 
also that what he calls t he "healthy nature of t h e youthf ul 11 
h as been overlooked by the party (in which connec t i on he 
29. Hans Koehler, Das Glueck von Mor en· das Erziehun~s-S stem 
der DDR (Berlin: Ve r lag Entsch eidung , n.d. and Zur 
eisti en und seelischen Situation der Menschen in~r 
Sowjetzone Bonner Ber icht Bonn: BundesministeriQ~ fuer 
gesamtdeutsche Fragen, 1952). The material used here 
has been drawn largely from the second pamphlet. 
• 
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mentions Gregory Klimov who, without the helping influence 
of family and church in h is Soviet-sup ervised childhood, 
still had the successful impulse to break with the system)3°, 
and that t h is factor has been strong , esp ecially where 
reinforced by family and church, in withstanding the :party 
inducements. 
On this basis we may be hopeful that significant 
numbers of the East German p opulation have been able to 
avoid the c ommunist mental and spiritual straitjacket. It 
is of course no t; known what :perce nt age of families has 
p rese r ved the necessary morale for this task, but it is 
certain that the number will gradually dwindle if they h ave 
t o continue their lives without spiritual n ourishment. The 
c hu r ches and church grouy s can and do make a contribution 
in this sense, and as long as they hold out a gainst the 
demands of the party for conformit y, t h e populace will be 
thereby s t rength ened. The schools and universit ies, althou gh 
a t this :poin t mo r e thorough l y subdued to stat e de s i gn s t h an 
t h e churches, also have a role in this contest for h uman 
commitment s. Here it is appropria te to men tion Dr. Marek 
Korowicz, t h e Polish p rofes s or of law who defected while 
i n t h e United Stat es wi t h t h e Polish UN d e l egation. In his 
comments31 on t eaching in a sat e llite university, he ind icat e d 
t hat few of h is colleagu e s we r e communist s, yet t h at they h ad 
30 . Gregory Klimov, The r.rerror Machine· the Inside Sto 
of Soviet Rule in Germany New York : P rae ge r, 1953 • 
31. "Korowicz Chose Freedom," Ne w From Beh ind the Iron Curtain, 
November 1 9 53, 20-23 · 
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to incorporate the party line in their lectures. At the 
same time, he made it clear that the non-communist p rofessors 
stayed at their posts in order to have the op.l:-' ortuni-tiy, 
often by tricks of intonation and sometimes thr ough p rivat e 
contact, of offsetting the official influence on studen ts. 
We may be sure that this happens in other satellites as well. 
Such positive influences from within the satellites 
are, however, small indeed as compared with the need for 
spiritual and intellectual nourishment. And here we return 
t o Professor Koehler's second point, the desperate need 
:for outside support. He is referring not only to the youth, 
but also to -intelligentsia and artists, scholars and 
scienti s ts, in this connection. And he urges the greatest 
effort in t he West to make the East Germans feel a sense 
of solidarity, to prese;Pve every possible point of contact 
in the spiritual and intell ec t ual spheres. Without the inner 
ce r tainty, and t h e outward manifestation wherever poss ible, 
of solidarity between people of West and :East and of common 
devotion to freedom and j us t ic e , the quiet opposition in 
Eastern Ger-many is doomed to gradual diminution . 
Inasmuch as intra-part y difficul ties have so far re-
fl ected ve ry little actual opposition, this pr oblem has been 
considered along with my account of the p arty ' s char acter 
and growth. :rhus t h e r e remains only t he last of the cate-
gorie s, passive opposition. One final example, which fits 
t his type, will suffic e t o bring this phase of the story 
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to an end. Afte r the election of 15 October 1950 , in which 
the returns mirrored the newly perfected SED electoral 
machinery, with 99 .7% approval of the National Front 
Unity List, t h e :~v-est Berlin Magistrat in vi t ed all East 
Berlin voters opp osed to the election results to send in 
useless stubs of t he ir ration books. Although the S-ED 
tried to discourage comp liance and the government offe red 
a s pecial clothing ration for this s t ub, 400 , 000 of the 600 , 000 
-,2 
East Berlin voters resp onded with stubs or lette r s? • If 
this is not a very practical manifestation of opposition, 
it is a t least very convincing evidence of the extent of 
disaffection. 
32. Kurt Glaser, "Governments of Soviet Germany," in 
Litchfield, Edward H. and Associates, Governin~ Postwar 
Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953 , 182. 
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Chapter VI 
The Harvest: 17 June 1953 
The Setting 
Since 1945 Berlin has been the most exciting city 
in Europe. It has been a focal point for the clash of 
opposed Soviet and Western policies from the time at war's 
end when Colonel (later General) Howley had great difficulty 
even reaching Berlin to set up the American military ad.mini-
stration.1 The Allied Control Council, both in operation 
and in co l lapse, the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the c ounter-
blockade and airlift, the flow of refugees from Ea$t Germany, 
and finally the revolt of June 1953; these and many other 
incidents have ca~tured world-wide attention.2 
'I'he political character of the city and its location 
provide the explanation for Berlin's frequent appearance 
in headlines and new s stories throughout the world. Not 
only is the city divided among the four occupying powers, 
it has also a more profound division along the boundary 
which separates East and West Berlin. On either side of 
this border is a city administration, to the east a re g ime 
1. FrankL. Howley, Berlin Command (New York: Putnam, 
1950). 
2. The standard account of this p eriod is still Lucius D. 
Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y.: Double-
day, 1950). 
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dominated by Soviet policy through the occupation forces 
and through the satellite gove rnment of the DDR (Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik), and to the west a city government 
voluntarily oriented to the policies of the Western Powers . 
East Berlin is also the headquarte r s of the government of 
all East Ge r many; West Berlin is the residence of a power-
ful mobilization of popular sentiment for Western ideals 
and a gainst Soviet ideology, the West Berlin led in past 
years by the lat e Oberbuerge r meister Ernst Reuter, who 
is still its inspiration. 
Tnis border also cuts across all of Berlin's. public 
utili ti es, its t r ansportation and com..'D.unication networks. 
But t he border does not p revent a constant flo w, in both 
directions, of intelligence; r eady access to inf ormation 
has made Berlin one of t he world centers for t he collection 
of intelligenc e data. Nor has the borde·r prevented a great 
stream of refugees from the East, alqng with the occasional, 
much-publicized instances of Westerners seeking asylum in 
the East. It has not prevented wholesale dis seminat ion of 
propaganda by both sides in an a t t;emp t to capitalize on 
Berl i n 's posit ion by winning adherents from the opposing 
camp . 
The location of t h e city has much to do with its 
importance to the Cold War O.f:.l.fJOnents. Si t uated less than 
half as far from Frankf urt-an-der-Oder at the Polish border 
as it is from Helmstedt on the zonal boundary between the 
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Eastern and w·estern Zones of Germany, Be rlin is notably 
vulnerable to Sovie t -sty le p ressure tactics. 'Ehese tactics 
have run the gamut from brutality to delicate persuasion, 
with t he former t y-p e, however , predominating . Berlin has 
withstood the blockade at·tem:pt to capture the city by 
starvation, and has witnessed such other inhuman practices 
a s the frequent kidnapp ings of prominent anti-Soviet 
p ersons; at the same time, Berlin has rejected more temperate 
blandishments calculated to persuade Berliners of the superior 
conditions alleged to prevail outside the Western sector 
boundaries. All of the tactics have contributed to the 
generation of tension, a nervous stat e of awareness that, at 
any moment, s omething catastro_vhic could happen. All in 
all, it is remarkable how well the Berlin po~ulation has 
borne itself unde r such conditions, for each propagandistic 
dart and each cannonade of Soviet p ressure serve s to remind 
the Berliner that ·:·. he .:is deep inside hostile terri tory and 
surrounded by powerful unfriendly forces. There can be no 
mistaking Soviet and German "Democratic" intentions re ga r ding 
Berlin. They have tried every measure short of war to obtain 
its capitulation. 
On the positive side also, Berlin has been of out-
standing importance to the West in the Cold War. Frequently 
one hears t he city spoken of as. an outp ost of t he West; and 
this military manner of description - which seems to have 
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a strong hold on the language of international politics 
in our time - is given a literal meaning in the instruction 
given each newly arrived American soldier in Berlin, that 
he must be prepar ed "to fight, if necessary, for a free 
Berlin. 11 'l1his co.mmi tment has not been in question since 
the dramatic airlift and since General Clay, in a notable 
morale-building move, resisted Washington pressure for 
the evacuation of dependents at the time of the blockade.3 
And it has been matched by local civilian solidarity a gainst 
the Soviet menace. 'J:lhus, Berlin has become a symbol and 
a morale factor for the West. 
Overshadowing the city's function as a symbol of 
resistance, however, is its value as a source of embarrassment 
to the Soviets and to the DD.i.i. . It would be difficult, of 
course to measure Berlin's catalytic effect on the satellite 
which surrounds it, but its example of freedom and compar ative 
economic well-being may certainly be likened to an island 
of hope amidst a sea of trouble. West Berlin has unquestion-
ably represented hope for the thousands of refugees who have 
flocked to its sanctuary in the years since the war, as well 
as to the thousands more who braved the retaliation threat-
ened by their government to come from all over East Germany 
for the food parcels offe r ed them after the June revolt. And 
RIAS (Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektori,to mention another 
3. Ibid, p • 211.. • 
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outstanding instance, has been described as the most listened 
to station in East Berlin and ~ast Germany. Its broadcasts 
disp lay a keen understanding of the needs of a :people l i ving 
under tyranny, and constitute a strong antidote to Communist 
propaganda . Finally , one may p oint to the impatience 
frequently manifested by the DDR leaders and their Sovie t 
overseers to bring Berlin under the Communist banner - con-
clusive evidence of Berlin 's p rofound symbolic value. 
It would not be altogethe r correct to suggest that 
Berlin is singular in its isolat ion and division, for Vienna 
is in a similar situation. The range of dif f e r ence between 
the t wo would b e another subject for investigation, but the 
essential difference, the basic reason for Berlin 's more 
dramatic role in the interp lay of Co ld War forces and 
strat e gy, l ies in its direct relat ion to the status of 
Germany, one of t h e highest stakes in postwar East-Vlest 
competition. Had Austria been chosen a s a target for Soviet 
ideolog ical offensive s, and h ad Austria oc cup ied a position 
so crucial in s t rate gic c onside rations, Vienna would probably 
have challenged Berlin for world attention. As events 
develop ed, however, it was Berlin which witnessed the drama 
of dire ct East-West clash while Vienna remained relatively 
calm. And it was Berlin which was chosen as the site for the 
long-await ed resump tion of negotiations early in 1 9 54 between 
the Soviet Union and the We stern Powers. 
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I t is somehow fitting , then, that Berlin should have 
been the locus of t he J une 1953 revolt, the place where 
the fuse was i gnit ed which brought a widespread explosion 
of :popul ar resistance and open opposition. Not only did 
the East Germans make known their own demands and release 
their Ol}!ll stored up feelings, they al so electrif'ied world 
opinion by their courage and, incidentally, struck a blow 
in behalf of the i r often-harassed brethren in West Berlin. 
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Hevolt in East Berlin4 
Another in the series of discus sions, which had 
greeted the government move to raise norms, occurred on 
the morning of June 16th at the building pro ject in Stalin-
allee. '.l:his,: however, was to assume far greate r proi:)ortions 
than any of the previous protes·cs by the worlanen. The 
i mmediate cause of the unrest among the Stalinallee con-
s truction workers on this particular morning was an article 
in the trade union newspaper, Tribuene, several copies of 
which were circulating among the men before they began work. 
The somewhat uncertain attitude of the government in 
the face of vigorous p rotest from workers had led to a hope-
ful fe eling among the men that the . norm raising would be 
abandoned. But this article confirmed the government 
policy , justifying it in the familiar phrases which said in 
effect that the standard of living depended upon increased: 
p roductivity and rigorous saving . 'l'he article f urther announced 
that this p ro gram, with its implied depression of the workers' 
level of subsistence to a still lower point, would be in 
operation by June 30th. 
'rhe Stalinallee construction project is divided into 
sectors (Baustellen) and Blocks. To a block belong the 
workers of all trades who work in that particular portion 
4. This account is based, e xcept where otherwise noted, on 
"Der Aufstand im Juni; ein kokumentarischer Bericht," 
Der Monat, September and October, 1953; since published in 
pamphlet form (Berlin: Grunewal d- Verlag , 1954). '.I:he best 
interpretive account of the revolt is Stefan Brant, De r 
Aufstand; Vorgeschichte, Geschich·te und Deutung des 17. Juni 
1953 ( S~tgart: Steingruber, 1954). 
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of t h e p ro j ect. On this vital morning Block 40 was to be 
t he trans lator of mere v e rbal p ro t est into action. ·11he 
workers here had delayed starting work as they milled 
. about discussing the 'l1ribuene article. At aboi.lt 8 :30 a 
union representative - an a gent of the re gime, of course, 
and not of t h e workers - read to the already indignant 
workers the a r ticle which smashed their hope s. Forced to 
defend the announced p olicy, he fell back on the slo gan, 
11 First more work, than better living , 11 5 wh ich only incensed 
the listeners wh o resp onded with loud objections. The 
workers decide d , at this point, to send t wo d e legates to 
Ulbrich t and Grotewoh l with their com~laints; but one 
fo r eman e xpressed the real mood of the moment when he 
proclaimed, "Now is the time for action! 11 • Anot her worker 
took t h e lead and called for a division of t h e g roup , those 
who want ed to go as a bo dy we r e t o step to t he right, those 
who would stay were to step t o t he left. Every worker 
stepped to the right. An d so it was decided in a s p on-
t ane ous reaction that all members of Block 40 woul d march to 
make the ir protest to gether. 
As soon as the carpenters and painters had constructed 
a crude sign stating their rejection of the raise in 
norms (on the back of the sign, up side down, could be 
seen the original purp ose of the sign: to p roclaim the 
5. ~ranslations of this and following slogans by the 
autho r . 
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voluntary acceptance by Block 40 of a 10% raise in norms), 
the mar ch began. Joined by the workers from a school p roj.ect 
nearby, the column started t h r ough Stalinallee to collect 
others of like mind. Workers of Baustelle C Sued had not 
begun work, but were standing about in uncertainty when 
they saw the column coming toward them with its sign. 
Immediately their indecision evaporated and t hey joined 
the column. 
Now about 300 strong , the marchers passed the building 
of the Communist newspaper Neues Deutschland where some 
workers were standing . A few men detached themselves from 
the c·olumn to t est the minds of these workers; as soon 
as t he purpose of the march had been explained another 
hundred strikers a t tached themselves to the group. Singing 
and formulating slogans as t hey went, the marching workers 
virtually emptied the construction projects. One g r oup 
of workers at Baustelle G Sued chose to remain at work and 
they were razzed by the strikers. In some sectors union 
leaders tried to hold back their workers, but were brushed 
aside. The column then r eturned to its starting p lace after 
marching through the enti r e Stalinallee vicinity; it was now 
2000 workers strong . 
As they resumed their march; the workers had as their 
obj ective the FDGB (Freie Deut sche Gewe rkssc:naftsbund, the 
East German trade union organization) headquarte rs in Wall-
strasse. Watching them as they marched, onlookers were at 
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first amazed and then cheered the column on its way, the 
first such event they had seen in t wenty years in this 
~art of Berlin. Oddly enough , the VOPO 's (People's Police) 
encountered at this stage were either friendly or cautiou s 
enough to withdraw quietly. 
The first incident occurred when a functionary of 
the SED (3ro 1 Wliw 1 !IA:.tj' ''X 6Ait!iililil 1 WL Par 1:rj tried to hold 
up the marchers. He and a VOPO who came to assist him were 
beaten up by the workmen. And a man standing nearby tried 
to take a picture of the column; but the workers, familiar 
with the methods of their government, were u.nders2tandably 
skeptical ahout pictures. They removed the film from the 
offending camera without struggle and the march continued. 
As they left, a VOPO officer who had watched the little 
scene ex~lained to the frustrated photographer why this had 
been neces s ary. 
When they reached their objective, the workers found 
the FDGB headquarte r s closed; there was nobody present to 
whom they could voice their protests and the indignation 
of the crowd rose accordingly. However, the discipline that 
was to characterize the whole day was already in evidence 
despite the lack of leaders and there was no recourse to 
violence. After a brief discussion it was decided that they 
should go to the DDR headquarters in Leipzigerstrasse, but 
by a roundabout route which woul d allow them to add to 
their ranks. As they passed other work projects they were 
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greeted by astonished coll eagues who stopped work to discuss 
this most unexpected occurrence. Almost all of the workers 
along the way joined the march. When Party or union re-
present atives tried to interfere, they we r e quickly dis-
patched and beaten if they offered serious r esist ance. On 
t he rout e of march the column passed the Soviet Embassy. 
Slogans, singing , and shouting stopped and t hey trooped 
by in stony silence. 
I t was noon befor e t he workers met with any serious 
interference. But as they near ed the government quarter, 
in Wilhelmstrasse, a red automobile swung across the head 
of t he column. From within came Party officials who climbed 
to t he roof of the c ar and tried to calm the crowd. They 
were answer ed wi t h laughter and unceremoniously hauled 
down. 
At the corner of Wilhelmstrasse and Lei pzigerstrasse 
is the huge, gray building which had been Goering 's Luftwaffe 
ministry. By some i r ony of fat e the wartime bombing left 
this particular building intact, and it was taken over by 
t he DDR government. As the column of worke r s drew near to 
t his, t heir destination , t he guards retired and closed the 
gate behind them. By t his time the crowd had grown and 
included many sympathetic non-workers. The area before the 
gove rnment building was flooded with people shouting for 
Ulbricht and Grotewohl. Getting no response their shouts 
grew loude r and more insulting . Finally t wo men appeared 
at a window and were i dentified as Rau and Selbmann, two 
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officials, but they did not accept the ;c,-; elr;: '15 in vi tat ion 
to descend. The crowd, tired from the long march, began 
to sit down in the square, indicating that they had plenty 
of time. Then a microphone was lowered, a table brought 
out, and three officials prepared to address the throng . 
One mounted the table and, his words drowned by the shouting 
and whistling (in Germany, a sign of' disapproval), tried to 
introduce State Secretary ~alther. The latter was greeted 
in similar fashi on , as was Selbmann who finally came down to 
speak. Selbmann attempted to convince the crowd that he 
was a worker, that he was one of t hem, and was heckled 
unmercifully. Another official, identified as Professor 
Havemann, had no better luck, and was follwed by a woman 
from the crowd who repeated the demand to see Ulbricht or 
Grotewohl. She added, "Here are nat only the workers; here 
is all Berlin, the whole people!" 
At this point, as the action subsided for a time, there 
was a noticeable indecision in the crowd. As yet no leader 
had appeared and it was clear that the next move was in doubt. 
irhen a worker sprang to the table and proclaimed his willing-
ness to go again to a concentration camp for freedom's sake. 
He, for the fi r st time that day, put into words the demands 
which everyone had been feeling: lowering of norms and HO 
(Handelsorganization, the state retail store) prices, and 
guarantees of safety for the speakers at the demonstration. 
J~""'" He was followed by a girl in FDJ (Freie Deutsche Juae;iiR!, 
the Communist youth organization) uniform who was greated 
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as an enemy until she removed and threw away her blue 
jacket. In the ensuing silence she was able to warn the 
demonstrators of spies in their midst. Everyone looked 
about, and several spies were then noticed. They were 
promptly p itched out of the crowd. The next speaker was 
a middle-aged worker who thrust t he still hopeful Selbmann 
aside and addressed his comrades: 11 Colleagues, there is more 
at stake here than norms and prices •••• The government must 
ac~ept the consequences of its mistakes. We demand free 
elections!" 
The response of the crowd was electric - the speaker had 
struck a chord of profound hope and agreement, and the applause 
was deafening . The government officials retired as the 
demonstrators underwent another. moment of indecisi on. A 
young worker s t epped forward, however, and suggested a half-
hour wait. Then if Ulbricht and Gr ot ewohl still refused to 
appear , he propos ed that they march a gain and call all the 
workers to a general strike. With this, the demonstrators 
were again moved to action. Af ter t he p roposed wait, to the 
sound of more slogans and singing , they resumed the march 
across Unter den Linden and t hrough Friedrichstrasse toward 
Oranienburger Tor. 
As the column left the gove rnment quart e r it was followed 
by loudsp eaker vehicles which tried t o assuage t he crowd 
yo~c..o....J;J.'<.r 
with reassurances that the Politbuero would r~se&~ier the 
raise in norms. In Wilhelm Pieckstrasse one of the vehicles 
ventured too near the demonstrator s who, failing to overturn 
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the truck, contented themse lves with smashing the windows. 
Another of the loudspeaker trucks was surrounded, the six 
occupants forced out and beaten. The driver was told to 
tun along behind, that he would get his vehicle back when 
the demonstrato r s were finished with it. (It is not 
vvithout signif icance that he did get it back later.) The 
louds~eaker was then turned to other uses as the demonstrators 
vied with each other to see who could broadc ast the best 
slogans to the crowd. 
As the column neared Alexanderplatz it had swelled to 
about 10,000 demonstrat ors. Passing police headquarters, the 
VOPOs were invited to join in the general strike. A few 
moments later word circulated that two of the crowd had been 
arrested and the whole group streamed back to demand release 
of the prisoners, who were p romptly returned. AI few 
VOPOs were roughly handled, and there was another camera 
incident, but no further inte r ference as the demonstrators 
filed back into Stalinallee from whence they had started• In 
the windows above them there were red flags waving as gestures 
of loyalty on the part of the ap artment dwellers. ( Stalin-
allee apartments a r e usually granted as rewards to the 
faithful.) The marchers loudly asked that the flags be 
taken in, but the crowd was still orderly and there was no 
violence. At five o'clock the thousands of demonstrators 
dispersed. 
Vfuile the column was wending its way back to Stalin-
allee, a delegation from the demonstration made its way to 
• 
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the RIAS offices in West Berlin t o ask assistance in voicing 
their demands. The strikers' representatives declared that 
the protest would not have reached this stage had Ulbricht 
and Grotewohl consented to speak with the demonstrators. 
But having failed to reach their government, they needed 
help in publicizing their cause. RIAS, which had broadcast 
the report of the demonstration at 4:30, was of course r eady 
to hely the strikers and, at 7:30 that evening , the RIAS 
broadc ast included a full report of the day's events in East 
Berlin and the demands of the strikers: 
1. That the government return to the old norms, 
2. That prices be lowered, 
3. ~rhat fre e and secret elections be held, and 
4. That the strikers should not be punished. 
lvleanwhile, the F'oli tbuero announced over the East Berlin 
radio that the norm raising p roposal would be reconsidered, 
that it should be voluntary in any case , and that the p lans 
for a strike should be dropped. 
The evening of June 16th was one of intense excitement 
in East Berlin. Having sens ed that their long-suppressed 
hope s might not be far out of r each, the people prepared 
for the general strike. In addition to the RIAS broadcast, 
the news was circulated by word of mouth (mostly whispered), 
by telephone, and by notes. Workers of t he night shift were 
notified by messenger, and bicyclists went into the East 
Zone to enlist additional support for the strike. From 
residents of the Zone came a pledge of participation and an 
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added demand, that the bo r der between Soviet Zone and 
Soviet Sector of Berlin be opened. 
In a city that was literally papered with signs, with 
propaganda of every sort, the East Berliner s were having a 
gala housecleaning , tearing down all of the hated Communist 
slogans and reminders within reach. And a group of SED 
p ropagandists was caught and trounced by the ebullient 
Berliners. 
At the same time, the VOPO officer shool in 1rrep tow 
was alerted for action. As they received weapons and 
ammunition they were told by the commandant, Major General 
Dickel, that western agents had entered, and were operating 
in, the DDR. 1r heir task, he said , was to prevent these 
provocatory actions, but to treat the East German people 
caref ully in so doing. He ended his peptalk with the 
stirring slogan: "Comrades, one day we shall be at the 
Mississippi!" 
* * * * * 
As the news of the previous day's events in Berlin 
was spreading to the whole East Zone, a bleak and rainy 
day was dawning in Berlin. At 4: 00 AM of the 17th of June 
workers and farmers had joined forces at Klein-Kreuz south-
west of Berlin and were on their way to support the Berlin 
strike. VOPO units were moving simultaneously toward the 
city from several points outside . (These were the kasernierte 
Volkspolizei or Bereitschaften.) Soviet armored units had 
also been alerted and we re moving towar d the city. From 
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other directions came more columns of workers, one group 
almost 1500 strong . A mass of workers from Hennigsdorf 
began their march with a small group going ahe ad to 
destroy barriers. At Beeskow building project 500 workers 
elected to strike, 500 more decided to remain at work. 
~hese strikers encountered police opposition on the way 
and never reached Berlin. 
In Berlin the trans~ort facilities were still running 
on time early in the morning, but the streets were filling 
with demonstrators. Strike votes were being taken, com-
mittees chosen, and messengers were hurrying from group 
to group urging them to start; SED and FDJ propagandists were, 
on the other hand, trying in vain to dissuade people from 
demonstrating. 
At 7:45 a column of demonstrators left Straussberger-
Platz in pouring rain and began the march to Alexanderplatz 
and to Lei.J:)zige r strass e. At 8:00 only VOPO s were to be 
seen in t he government quarter; but at 8:30 the first column 
swung out of Friedrichstrasse into Le i p zigerstrasse. ~here 
they met the cordon of VOPOs which was protecting the seat 
of government. As they met several spies scurried out of 
the ranks of the demonstrators and directed the VOPOs' 
attention to the leaders of the strikers. These were, in a 
matte r of seconds, singled out, beaten, and arrested. As 
this mass of demonstrators moved forward., others were moving 
in other sectors, in Potsdamer Platz and in Unter den Linden. 
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At AJ.exander-_platz the police formed a cordon and the column 
~imply split and walked around them. At another point an 
FDJ agitator was tossed into the River Spree. Back in 
Leipzigerstrasse the VOPOs were beating at the front ranks 
of the strikers. Women fought back with umbrellas; and the 
demonstrators moved back to find stones for a counterattack. 
In general, the streets of East Berlin belonged at this 
point to the workers. All were filled with marchers going 
toward Leipzigerstrasse. Columns were en-tering Berlin 
from the Zone. One column passed three VOPOs and invited 
them to join; refusing at first, they then decided to join, 
took off their jackets, and were thrust into the center of 
the throng for protection. On another street there were 
two columns marching beside each other: one column was 
composed of workers coming to demonstrate, the other of 
Soviet tanks coming to control the demonstration. 
At the Zonal border to the north of 'Vest Berlin, 12,000 
workers appeared on their way to join the demonstration. 
The West Berliners gave them a rousing welcome and sent them 
on their way with gifts of candy, cigarets, and hot coffee. 
At 9:00 the first Soviet vehicles appeared within Berlin, 
pushing through the crowd in Alexanderplatz as others 
cruised through the government quarter. Police radio cars 
were also about, but to no effect. Soviet rec onnaissance 
vehicles drove through a column of 3000 demonstrators in 
Stalinallee to the tune of catcalls and insults. Near the 
Stalin statue in Stalinallee the marchers met a barrier 
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reenforced with Soviet tanks, guns trained on the demonstra-
tors. The column simply turned and proceeded through 
another street. 
Another column of 5000 , followed closely by one of 
20 ,000 displaying West German flags, encountered a police 
barrier in Stalinallee. People on t he balconies above 
cheered the strikers, threw things at the VOPOs, and 
mounted their radios on windowsill·s that the BIAS broadcast 
could be heard. And the front ranks of the column op ened 
to allow a battering r am t o force t he police cordon. 
1r housands streamed through the gap. 
In St;alinallee and Alexanderplatz the police were aided 
by Sovie t tanks which spread the demonstrators allowing the 
VOPOs to arrest many, beating them severely in the process. 
Meanw·hile , in the cente r of Wast Berlin signs were being 
burned along with police buildings; windows were broken in 
the RO building and in the government headquarters. And 
Soviet tanks took up positions on the sector bounda ry to 
prevent escape to the West. The demonstrators broke into the 
office of Me rchandise Control and one worker tried to steal 
a typewriter; his colle agues beat him for the attempt. 
Discipline was still holding strong. 
It was not yet noon but the worke r s were in almost 
complete cont rol. A Soviet mechanized division was on its 
way toward Berlin from Doeberitz; and more columns of 
strikers were joining the revolt all the time. Also at 
this time an SED spokesman, Hermann Axen, was giving out the 
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official "line": that enemy agents from Viest Berlin were 
responsible for the revolt. He informed his audience of 
editors and radio commentators that it was the work of 
fascist provocateurs and that the Americans were guilty 
above all. 
It was just after noon when several Soviet T-34 tanks 
we re driven into a crowd of 50,000 in Marx- Engels-Platz to 
break it up. In Unter den Linden a unit of motorized 
infantry appeared in full combat dress. And in front of the 
government headquarters, Soviet General :Dibrova was ordering 
the VOPO s to attack the demonstrators. Threatening punish-
ment he was finally successful in starting the police 
forwe rd, but a hail of stones drove them back again with 
several wounded. The tanks fired over the heads of t he 
demonstrators and the crowd then attacked the tanks with 
I 
stone s , forcing t hem to close their hatches. The VOPOs 
started shooting in earnest and the workers, arm in arm 
against t he police, sustained many losses. The West 
Berlin rted Cross, by no means i mmune to the shooting , carried 
out many of the wounded. 
A loudspeaker then announced that the Soviet commander 
had ordered a stop to the revolt as of 1300 hours. He also 
forb ade gatherings of more than three persons and p roclaimed 
martial law for all of East Berlin. By evening , in pursua.n.oe 
of t h is or der, Soviet troop s we r e directing aimed fire at 
any violators. But the orde r did nothing to slacken the pace 
of revolt at the moment. Courage and desperation, plus the 
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momentum of the demonstration, kept t h e revolt alive most 
of t h e afte r no on. Shooting continued, and the Red Cross 
rescued over 100 wounded, eight of whom died. S~D officials 
were taken to s afety by the Soviet forces. But Minister -
f r #esident Otto Nuschke was reco gnize d in his car and 
forced over the sector bounda ry into West Berlin where t h e 
po l ice took him into custody. This was t o lea d to dis-
~utation days later - after he had bee n allowed to return -
when the Soviets lodged an official prot e st a gainst t h e 
"kidnapp ing " of Nuschke by the West. 
Although no moves were made against the Soviets -
older heads restraining the younger at times - the demonstra-
tors r efused to retire from dange r for some time. Even in 
the late afternoon, when the revolt had begun to break up, 
the famous r estaurant "Haus Vater land" at Potsdamer Platz 
was burned. But gradually the sound of gunfir e grew less 
frequent as the demonstrators dispersed. At 9:00 PM the 
curfew went into effect and the stillness of the evening 
was broken only occasionally by a lone shot. 
The 18th of June p resented an incredible contrast 
with t h e Berlin of the previou s day. Soviet troop s and 
tanks were patrolling a dead city. There was no traffic, 
the streets were empty of p eop le for the most part - and 
when people app eared they were careful to avoid g roup ing 
to gether - and the transportation s y stem was still not in 
operation. 'rhe entire borde r of the city was sealed and, 
although the strike continued, t h e Soviet de clar ation of 
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a s -tate of eme rgency had taken its effect. The revolt was 
broken. 
Police were already seeking the strike l eaders and 
the first executions t ook place. Among those executed 
afte r a summary procedure was Willi Goettling who faced 
the firing squad because of purely fortuitous cirumstances. 
An unemp loyed West Berliner, h e had taken a short-cut through 
t he East Sector the p revious day on his way to get his 
unemployment check and was apprehended as a "provocateur" 
from the West. 
The Western powers protested on the l dth to the Soviets 
for their actions of the 17th; and President Eisenhower 
announced -chat $50,000,000 in aid funds would be available 
for assis t ance or relief. 'l'he Soviets in ,; turn demanded the 
return of Otto Nuschke, the "kidnapp ed" DDR official. And 
rtadio Berlin acknowledged for the first time the widespread 
nature of the r evolt. 
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Revolt in East Germany 
Having related t he events of t he East Berlin revolt 
in s ome detail, a more general survey of the Soviet Zone 
will suffice to show the magnitude attained by the popular 
outburst. Not only did the revolt sp r ead t o every major 
city of East Germany and many to\vns as well, but in general 
outlines t he demonst rations follo wed a remarkably uniform 
pattern. 1J:he r e we ~~e s i gnificant differences from place 
to pl ace, but the point t o be emphsi zed is t he nearly 
unanimous display of p opular , spontaneously expressed s en-
timent against the re gime . And what diff erences t here were 
did not in any way alte r the me ssage which t he East Ge r man 
people sent to their opp r e ssors . As will be s een p resently, 
the revolts throughout t he East Zone s imply affi rmed and 
emphsized what had already begun in Berlin, for they were, 
if anything , of still greater int ensity and bitter nes s . 
The news from Berlin sp r ead rap idly through East 
Germany on the evening of, and during the night followi n g , 
June 16 when t he Berlin riots began. Witnesses traveling 
f r om Berlin to various parts of t he Zone, and t he b r oadcasts 
of HIAS and NWDR c ombined to pas s the word. By morning the 
fires had been i gnit ed from Dresden to Rostock , from Erfurt 
to Frankfurt-an-der-Oder. But it must be emphas i zed t hat 
t he re was no evi dence of coordinat ion, exc ept t hat produced 
automatically by like-m.indednes s in t he face of unifor m 
p r ovocat i on. The sep arate demonst r a t ions occurred for t he 
most pa rt quite indepndently; in fact, s ome localitie s 
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were in revolt without the slightest r ealization that 
othe r revolts were in progre s s all around them. 
In Magdaburg the first outburst came early on the 
morning of the 17th. Thousands of p eople had gathered 
and all of the signs and p ropaganda posters had been 
d e stroyed. The rioters stormed the FDGB-Haus, SSD head-
quarters, and the dist rict FDJ administra tion. And several 
prisons in the vicinity were forced, ~olitical prisoners 
being freed from some and VOPO guards beaten and disarmed 
when they resisted. However, the attemp t to storm the 
Sudenburg Zuchthaus (penitentiary) failed and twelve 
demonstrators we r e killed by the guards. At the police 
h eadquarters in Ma gdeburg, VOPO s fired on the crowd and 
several of them were ve ry badly b eaten by the enraged throng . 
At 2: 00 o'clock in the afternoon a mechanized Guards Division 
of the Soviet Army intervened; but by the t ime orde r had been 
restored,over 40 demonstrato r s were dead and hundreds injured. 
The mayor of Le i p zig , Ge rlach, distinguished himself 
in that city's demonstration by carrying a sign at the head 
of t he column of strike r s; this was, n e edless to add, by 
no me ans a voluntary gesture. Other asp ects of t he Le ipzig 
revol t were less humorous as p olice fired into the crowds 
killi ng and wounding many. At some points the re was little 
opp osition, however; VOPOs empt ied their pistols at signs 
or threw away the ir weap ons. The crowd was able to enter 
a cou rt build ing a nd de stroy the files, cover signs with 
new slogans, and paint caricat ures of East German officials 
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on streetcars. Ulbricht , Pieck, and Grotewohl a r e iden-
tified throughout the Zone by their most obvious features: 
Lenin- like beard, p ro t uberant belly, and spectacles respective-
ly. Known the r ef ore as "Spitzbar t, Bauch, and Brille," 
t hey make excellent subjects for caricaturists and were 
much in evidence in Le i p zig on June 17th. After noon 
Soviet troop s a r rived and put a stop to the comical aspects 
of the revolt, though not to the carnage. The demonstration 
was ruthlessly put down, but strike s continued t he next 
day. 
Dresden's demonstrat ion was muc h milder than the one 
in Leipzig . Although there was a rudimentary organization 
and demands we r e f ormulated, the strike was slow in starting 
and VOPO opposition often prevailed. 
'l'he picture was somewhat different, however, in t he 
industrial Zentrum where old trade union (and comrrillnist) 
traditions provided a framework for strike action. The 
re volt in this region, which comprises Halle, 'Nolfen, Merse-
bu r g , Bi tte:rfe l d , VJe issenfe ls, and other industrial cities, 
was characterized by l eade rshi p and organization in contrast 
with most other seats of revolt. Meet ings were held t h rough 
the day, even after the Soviet troop s appeared on t he 
scene, under l eaders who appeared ear ly in the day and urged 
their followers to maintain disgipline despite p rovocation. 
Tactics were car efully planned by the strike leade r s in the 
cities of the r e gion and the results were significant in 
direct ratio to the quality of organization. In Halle, for 
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example , a radio station and a newspaper were taken over as 
aids to the strikers. The strike action in Halle included 
the s t orming of SED headquarters and t he killing of a VOFO 
by t hree workers when he was about to fire into the massed 
demonstrators. Prisons were opened and burned. And the 
population gave comple te support to the workers. Stand ing 
out above all, however, was the unusual discipline and fo r e-
bearance which marked the revolt in nearly every city. A 
mee t ing was held at 6: 00 o'clock in the evening in spite 
of the police and t he Rus sians and a call was issued for 
a general strike, but only aft e r the Halle leadership had 
called on the population for moderation and obedience to 
Soviet orde r s. Demands were i s sued at this time for free 
elections, liberation of poli t ical prisoners, · and r esi gnation 
of the government - to the accompaniment of jubilant shouting 
for 11Freiheit 11 and sif!P!ing by the throng - but by nightfall 
the Soviet troops had re gained control. 
'J:he demonstrat ion in Bit t e rfeld achieved even greater 
success. 'r he columns of demonstrators, numbering 10 ,000 or 
more t han the population of t he town, listened to appeals 
by their leaders t hat t here be no resort to force. It was 
decided chat the worke rs should take over the town and they 
did so, impr i soning t he mayor, occupying SED headquarte rs, 
and f r eeing prisoners. Communist official s were saved from 
these prisoners by the s t rike leaders themselve s . The next 
step was the sending of telegrams -to the East German govern-
ment and to High Commissioner Semyonov. The wires stated a 
-179-
comprehensive list of demands which included a workers' 
:provisional government, fre edom for party activity, and no 
national arm~. , in addition to the demands al ready noted in 
other cities. The answer was of cou~se the arrival of Soviet 
troops who took over from the workers in orderly fashion. 
In Merseburg also the number of demonstra tors exceeded 
t he normal population. And they too were on the ir way 
toward establishing wo rker control in the city until the 
' Russians intervened. ·I'he leaders were promised that they 
might meet the next day, but in the course of the night 
these same leaders were arrested. Only five managed to 
escape this Soviet duplicity. 
Example s could be multip lied of course , but these few 
illustrate the basic pattern which p revailed both in East 
Berlin and in East Germany. Casualties were heavy in some 
places and the emotional pitch r e ached high levels in most 
cities and towns. But restraining influences nearly always 
ap~eared in time. Had the r e not been such restraint it can 
hardly be doubted that t h e revolt would have erup ted into 
outright revolution. That it did not must be regarde d as 
fortunate, for revolution would have been calamitous under 
the circumstances. As it was, however, the strikers unanimous-
ly rejected recourse to arms, just as they avoided direct 
conflict with Soviet troops. At the same time it is im-
possible to mistake the bitter harred which moved strikers 
to open prisons at great risk and release t h e political 
,i 
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J?risoners. A clearer example of hatred for the syst em and 
the re gime could hardly be found. 
-~ 
-
• 
• 
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Aft ermath of the Revolt 
The response to the revolt, as it appeared in 
~Nest ern newspapers, was both sober and enthusiastic. 'I'he 
whole western world was stirred by the accounts of East 
German bravery and moved by the bitter finale which crushed 
the outburst. And, except for a few p remature speculations, 
the significance of the revolt was understood. It was clear 
that the revolt could not have been successful against the 
Soviet Army, successful that is in the sense of re gaining 
independence and freedom. Equally clear was t he monument 
which had been erected to human courage opposed to tyranny. 
The revolt was its own justification and needed no tangible 
accomp lishment to lend it significance. 
1I'he official East German response was of course quite 
different. As soon as the newspapers and radio recov.ered 
their balance and rec e ived the proper exp lanations, the 
p ropaganda mill resumed its produc t ion. :rhe papers and air 
waves were full of ind.i ; nation at the Western "provocation." 
Invent ion was heaped on invencion in an effort to persuade 
t h e populace that the re volt had been inspired by the West. 
Grotewohl, in a s :pee ch on June 26th, r eferred to "Go' vboy-
Hosen" and "Texashemden" which he declared were much in evi-
dence. '..lhe Communist newspaper Neu:es Deutschland quoted 
Ulbric.Q.t to the effect· that the demonstrator s had conc entrated 
on liberating enemy agents and war criminals. And Stefan 
Heym's heart bled, in t he Berliner Zeitung of 21 June, that 
the actions of "fascist stormtroop s" had necessitat ed Soviet 
·-
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intervention. By July 28th, Neues Deutschland was trying 
to convince its readers t hat only 5% of the workers had 
participated in the strike. Mingled with these fantastic 
allegations were many tributes to t he Soviet soldiers who 
had saved East Germany. Margot Pfannstiel, in Neues Deutsch-
land for 28 June, described the Soviet soldier in his tank 
looking out over the "fascist terr or" with "relaxed exp ression" 
and "steady gaze" as he thought of home, "the broad fields 
along the Don" where the Stalinez tractor was the instrument 
for noverfulfilled norms." But such bathos was poor con-
cealment for the disowned regime and its continuing troubles. 
De spite the breaking of the revolt and t he continued 
brutal retribution to strikers, violators of t he martial 
law, and even against people "guilty" of we.aring western 
clothes or riding western-made bicycles, the s-t;rikes went on. 
'I'hrough July the r e were protest strike s to secure release · 
of strike leaders, all of course in vain. 
Re tribution was meted out by the Soviet authoritie s, for 
the SED and the govern~ent had been severely shaken by the 
revolt. For a time they even looked and sounded chastened 
IDW the events, but as soon as they regained their sense of 
securit y in the knowledge t hat the Soviet sponsors were not 
preparing their downfal l, they retu:t'ned to t heir former 
arrogance. It is quite underst andable, however , that the 
party and government should have faltered in the face of the 
revolt, for i1hey would almost certainly have _fallen without 
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Soviet support. In some p laces t he SED had even gone so 
far as to dissolve itself during the demonstration, and 
that this was an exception rather than the rule is due 
only to the Soviet Army. 
In retrospect, it is p6ssible to see the situation 
in East Germany building up to revolt. Early in the year 
there had been a spark of hope when Stalin died, the hope 
that a new regime would pursue a different policy toward 
East Germany, but t his illusion was very quickly dispelled. 
People who fled the East during 1953 had spoken more of 
sp iritual poverty than of material want, in contrast to 
most of the earlier refugees. As one commentator on the 
revolt has said, desperation had become greater than hunger, 
which condit i on accounts for the power of the outburst when 
it came. This vvriter, Arno scholz, observed that "hunger 
for a free newspaper and for a free word on the radio is 
greater almost than for meat or butter. 116 
Niore tangibly, however, (and this is not to diminish 
the potency of spiritual factors) one mus t look to the 
peculiar combination of the uNew Course", announced by the 
official newspape r Taegliche Rundschau on the 13th of June, 
and the raising of norms. This latter policy had been 
intermittently emphasized for several weeks, and we have 
6. Ostberlin und in der 
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seen how the confirmation in the Tribuene affected the 
workers on the 16th of June. But the 11 New Course" which 
developed out of a new set of directives issued to 
Walter Ulbricht and reported by him to a Politbuero 
meeting on the 9th of June, gave the appearance of weakness 
and indicated a desire on the part of the re gime to enlist 
popular support. This situation has been described in 
one analysis as analogous to a steam kettle which has built 
up a tremendous pressure within. It is then impossible to 
lift the cover only a little; the slightest opportunity 
for escape brings an unstoppable rush of steam. It is 
interesting that the events of 17 June, though emphatically 
not a revolution, conform to the theory that people revolt 
when they see signs of weakness, and not when grinding 
oppres s ion is at its worst.7 Viewed in this light, the 
"New Course" would seem to be the evidence of weakness that 
was needed to spark the revolt. 
\Vb.atever theory may be accepted to account for its 
origin, the revolt of 17 June had a most interesting 
character of its own. The most striking feature of the 
revolt throughout was its discipline. In most cases this 
restraint was as spontaneous as the demonstration itself, 
for leadership and organizat ion often appeared only at a 
r elatively late stage and in some p laces not at all. In the 
7 •. Bertrand de Jouvenel' On Power (New lfll"rk; v.·k ; ... 7 I !7 <1'1). 
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industrial sector which centers around Hall e and Leipzig , 
where there is a strong tradition of workers' movements, 
it was noticeable how quickly the revolt was organized 
and leadership found. But this was after the revolt started; 
and in Berlin, by way of contrast, the demonstration was 
:put down before either organization or leadership could 
emerge. To be sure, there was some momentary leadershi p 
asserted and a rudiment ary organization aroused additional 
support for the revolt. Yet discip line was evident from 
the very beginning and violence was rare except in the face 
of unusual p rovocation. I llustrations abound; they even 
restrained each other when excit ement t hreat ened to produce 
unwi se actions. The wo rkers had many opportunities to secure 
weapons from disarmed police, but they always chose t o 
destroy them. Nobo dy manufactured "Molotev Cocktails" or 
othe r easily devised lethal instruments. Rathe r they were 
content to fi ght when necessary with stones, umbrellas, and 
other items a t hand. Vdb.en, a s often happened in t he East 
Zone, prisons were stormed, the demonstrators had the 
forethought to separate when possible the criminals from the 
political prisoners and release only the latter . The incident 
of the typewriter noted earlie r could be taken perhap s as 
indication of a conscious devotion to loftier ideals than 
mere negative outbursts against a hated re gime. 
The widespread nature of the revolt has been re garded 
by some as an indication that an underground organization 
• •• 
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coordinated the demonstrations. 8 There is no evidence of 
this. Many towns and cities fought their local battles in 
i gnorance of identical events elsewhere. Berlin was of 
course the originating factor and the news radiated to the 
entire Zone on the night of the 16th. The indications of 
spont aneity are all but unanimous. Even some of the strikers 
could not believe it when they realized that the entir e 
country was in revolt. The demons trators in Lauchhammer, 
a town just north of Dresden, sent a delegation of s trikers 
to Berlin to find the strike headquarters and receive 
instructions or advice. Of course none was to be found and, 
arriving as t hey did on the 18th, they had difficulty es-
caping apprehens ion. Another indication of the spontaneity, 
this instance almost amusing , is the way in which a leader 
was found among the strikers at the Leuna factory near Merse-
burg . A man who was s t anding near the microphone while 
another person was speaking made a remark mo r e to himself 
than to anyone else. He was surprised to hear his words 
echoed by the loudspeaker, and even more surprised when the 
audience so app roved of his comment that he was thrust 
forward to speak. Thus was a leader made. 
With respect to t he Soviet inter vention, t here was again 
abundant evidence of discipline. I t was apparent as if by 
8. For such an interp retation see iJ:'homas Goldstein, "The 
East German Hevolt," New RBp.ublic, 20 July 1953, pp . 
9-10. 
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prio r agreement that t he demonstrat ion was di r ected solely 
against the .SED and government of t he DDR; even when the 
Soviet soldiers fi r ed on the worke rs there was a powerful 
r e straint which did not alway s hold, however, when it was 
the VOPOs firing on their fellow countrymen. And where 
organization developed t he instruction s invariably included 
warnings to refrain from behavior directly offensive to the 
Soviets. 
This restraint regarding the Russians had another side 
however. There seem to have been one or two widespread 
illusions among the worker s about what they might exp ect 
from the Russians. Most popular of these optimistic notions 
was the belief that the Soviet forces would withdraw support 
from the re gime. The other, even more optimi stic but less 
general, was the wild hope that the Soviets would support 
the workers against their oppressors. Needless to add, these 
hop es were soon crushed. 
F'rom the Soviet side of the mat ter there was also an 
evident restraint. In the first place, the Soviet forces 
seemed slow in acting. At least in Berlin a whole day of 
the demonstrat ion passed without a sign of a Soviet move. 
1'his gave rise to the speculat i on in West Ber lin that the 
whole a f fair was being staged. Many, who had limited information 
and who were susp icious of any Soviet move ( or non-move), 
held for a time the theo17 that this was an engineered move 
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to unseat an ineffectual gove r nment. Events of the next 
day exploded the theory, but the delay might be explained 
by an original under-estimation by the Soviets of the 
revolt and an unwillingness to commit their forces needlessly. 
In the end, of course, they had to bring in very large 
forces and act decisively to preserve a bankrup t re gime. 
Even at that the Hussians were anything but ferocious in 
their conduct. In sp ite of the substantial number of 
casualitie s it is obvious t ha t the slaughter would have 
been on a wholesale scale had they been vindictive in 
design. It was apr arent too that t he Soviet corrunand was 
caught unawares, for the troops sent out to quell the riots 
had p lainly not been briefed. ·rhey had only very vague 
no·!Jions of the nature of the demonstration and J;J roved quite 
curious in t heir informal questioning of t he Ge rmans with 
whom they came in contact. Moreover, they seemed reluctant 
to harm the workers with whom they could doubtless identify 
themselves. The conversations which have been reported 
clearly show that during the demonst rations the Russians 
were by no means vengeful. 
To recapitulate briefly the lessons apparent in the . 
revolt i t self, the world has been given proof positive, if 
indeed any such proof were needed, that t he East German 
government and the SED are without popular sup~ort. Not 
only were they oppo sed by workers in revolt; against particular 
measures, the workers were joined by the entire populace 
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and the stated aims quickly expanded to include free 
elections and general restoration of freedoms. The high 
ra-te of defection from the ranks of the police and the FDJ 
would also indicate that the p s rty's own adjuncts are un-
;-eliable and perhap s only waiting for an opportunity to 
desert. The picture of the ranks of demonstrators marching 
arm in arm into a hail of gunfire is assuredly not an 
attractive one, and the whole world might well ponder its 
meaning; but its most disquieting aspect must be the one 
which presents itself to the East German rulers who can 
only conclude that their strength is the Soviet presence, 
that otherwise they are without support. 
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Chapter VII 
Challenge and Response: The Ne w Course, 1953 
Having dealt at some length with the theme of revolt, 
and the d ramatic climax of that story, this cha_f;ter must 
return to a more general treatment of the DDR. Develop- · 
ments during the remainder of 1953 group themselves under 
two main headings, the aftermath of the June rebellion and 
the phase of satellite politics and economics which we 
know as the "New Course". Sin,ce various particular subjects, 
e.g., the refugee exodus (Chapter V), and political and 
cultural affairs (~hapter IV), have already been carried 
through to the end of 1953, it will suffice to confine 
attention here to these two major subjects before turning 
to look at future possibilities. 
What I have called the aftermath of the revolt, al-
ready briefly mentioned in the last chapter, occurred in 
t wo phases. ·rhe SED, at first not very confide nt of con-
tinuing Soviet supp ort and assuredly convinced t h a t no 
other kind of supyort was at hand, inaugurated t wo mutually 
exclusive policies. The populace was to be pacified, by 
means of softer words, admissions of failure, p romises of 
improvement, but was to be ~uni shed as well for general 
disobedience. Obviously whatever gains p ossible by the 
first methods were p romptly nullified by the s e cond. And 
this ambivalence merely reflects the confusion that y ermeated 
the party and government, noticeable also in the halting 
• 
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manner with which all official activity was carried out, 
at least until the c e rtainty of Soviet support was restored. 
It should b~ noted in passing that the Soviet authorities 
had very little choice in this matter: had they unseated 
the puppet regime it would have been taken by the p eople 
to mean that any administration could be deposed by means 
of further revolt. And Soviets retention of the Ulbricht-
Grotewohl-Pieck team meant reckoning with popular hatred 
directly, that is by repression. Thus, while honeyed 
phrases flowed from SED headquarters, the mechanism of 
retribution was already in operation. 
Efforts to pacify the East German people were 
particularly to be noted while the revolt was still in 
p ro gress and directly thereafter. Party functionaries 
from top to bottom were at p ains to acknowledge failures 
and miscalculations; the chorus was even joined by Soviet 
aut horities. And all but the lat ter betrayed their basj.c 
uncertainty - all were waiting for t he off ic ial line to be 
p romulgated. But even after "self-criticism" had ceased, 
there was an appa r ent softpedalling of some of the usual 
p rop aganda phrases; and four months afterward it was noted 
by a Western correspondent t hat t he poster and p lacard art, 
always so offensive to the eye in East Berlin, had lost 
its confident air, was appealing r ather than demanding. 1 
1. Hal Lehrman writing for the Christian Science Monitor, 
10 November 1953. 
• 
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::J~he "soft line 11 , which h ad begun with Pr emier Grotewohl' s 
admission before the revolt got underway that official 
policy had met with "bi -t:;ter resistance, 11 was conf'irmed 
by the ZK SED on 24 June when party officials were ordered 
to adopt a self-critical approach in explaining events 
just past. ·l1he t u rning point was reached when Minister 
of Justice Max Fechner admitted on 29 June that some wrong 
arrests had been made. He even stat ed, apparently over-
whelmed by the ne ed for pacific words, that membershi p in 
strike committee s was not necessarily grounds for c onviction. 
His mistake was made clear to him 17 days later when he 
was dismissed from his :post and replaced by the notorious 
Hilde Benjamin, forme r Vice-:President of t he Sup reme 
Court. 
De spite all of t he admissions, hov ever, the Bast 
Ge r man officials had made it clear from the start that t he 
real blame belonged to the Western agents and p rovocateurs 
who had allegedly fomented the s t rike and r evolt. I f these 
offi cials we re to be believed, 'Nestern int elligence or-
gani zat ions were of truly surpassing skill in t heir manage-
ment of the revolt. 'r his ironical assignment of blame 
also r eceived a .Russian b l essing when Ma jor Gene r al Dibrova, 
Soviet Commandant in Berlin, demanded of the Weste r n com-
mandants a guarantee that "criminal elements" not be allowed 
to enter East Berlin from t he Western sectors. But by 
17 July an additional scapegoat had been foun~, namely 
• 
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Social Democrats. On t hat date Neues Deutschland, while 
confe ssing SED faults such as "formalism 11 and an overly-
bureaucratic re gime, str:ilck out at the Social Democrats as 
blameworthy with respect to t he 17th of June and referred 
to areas where subsequent strikes had occurred as "hotbeds 
of Social Democracy. 11 It may properly be wondered whether 
Fremier Grotewohl himself felt alto gether comfortable in 
2 t h ese days. 
But int eresting as the spectacle of SED abasement was, 
it was overshadowe d by far by the pro gress of repressive 
measur es in taking their toll of alle ged leade r s and 
instigators of the revolt. This had begun during t he revolt 
itself and was in the last analysis mo r e brutal and vicious 
than the o.l:-' erations of t he Soviet Army in r epulsing t he strikers 
and demonstra-cors on_ 17 June . Ma r tial law had been proclaimed 
in East Berlin on the 17th and lasted til l 11 July. And 
already during the revolt t here were summar y executions, 
in Berlin and throughout the DDR, of strikers and strike 
l e aders.3 Immediat ely aft erward, under both Sovie t and 
German aus~ices, the appr ehension and trial of those alleged 
to have p layed leading roles went rap idly forward. Gradually 
the lead was taken over by the DDR stat e and police apparatus 
and the Russians could re t ire to the background where t hey 
most certainly would have preferred to r emain in t he fi rst 
2. Fechner, coincidentally or not, had also been a member 
of the SPD. 
3. Among them the West Berl i ne r Willi Goet·Gling who, in East 
Berlin quit e by ch ance, was executed by orde r of Maj. Gen. 
Dibrova on 18 June. 
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:place. !.rhis r eti rement f .rom the spotlight was marked 
by t h e East Ge r man de le gat ion to Moscow, announced 17 August, 
headed by Ulbricht, Grotewohl, and Nu schke. Behind the 
facade of Soviet-Ge rman negotiat i ons, t he r e sults of 
which will be di s cussed pre sently, the DDR leade r s almost 
c e rtainly re~e ived a fe w careful ly chosen words of advice 
and encouragement on improving the effect iveness of their 
re gi me. 
In addition to the appointment of Hilde Benjamin in 
place of Fechner, another important change marked the per-
sonnel aspect of :punitive action by the state and :pa rty . 
'J:lhis was the removal of Vlilhelm Zaisser, 4 Minist e r of Stat e 
Security, and the t r ansformation of t hat a gency into a 
State Secretar iat within the Ministry of Interior. The 
new State Secretary was Ernst Wollweber, r enowned Co~nunist 
agent of long standing . And with these t wo redoubtables in 
the spotlight, the repres s ion campaign went forward wi t;h 
greater or les ser intensity through t he rest of 19 53, and 
in fact well into 1954. Various lists of victims have 
appear ed as examples of t he manhunt,5 but reliable statist ics 
sho wing the extent of t he camp aign a r e scarce. The most 
acceptable figures come from t he Free Jurist s Committee: 
4. And with him the editor of Neues Deutschland , Herrnstadt. 
The reason given was that both had follo wed a "defea-t;ist 
line directed against the unity of the :party." Mor e p robable, 
however, is that Ulb r icht had found occasion to settle a 
feud. 
5. See, for example, the incomplete list given by Arno Scholz, 
'•Nerner Nieke, and Gottfried Ve t ter, Panzer am Potsdamer 
Platz (Berlin: Verlags GmbH, 1954), 200-205. 
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805 persons were convic t ed on grounds of participation 
in the June revolt, •even of these sentenced to death, 
and eight to life imprisonment. But even these statistics 
were accompanied by the warning that, owing to the secrecy 
surrounding the punitive campaign, the actual totals may 
11 d -'-h f. 6 we excee v ese J.gures. 
Additional signs of stiffening discipline as a result 
of weaknesses uncovered by the revolt were reported in 
September by J. Emlyn Williams in the Christian Science 
Monitor:7 state security were slated for reforms designed 
to increase efficiency; secret police activity in factories 
was to be strengthened; troop operations of the People's 
Police were scheduled for a stricter militarizat ion in the 
sense of emp loying camouflage for heavy equipment and secret 
troop movement; party activists, those who had p roved them-
selves in the uncovering of 11p rovocateurs, 11 were to be 
formed into elite groups within the p arty; 8 and, finally, 
the 5,000,000-member t rade union organization (FDGB) was 
planning a purge (cloaked under the term, "control of member-
ship books")for the period 15 October to 15 November. 
Alongside these efforts at promoting discipline, 
however, occurred frequent additiona l but gradually diminishing 
outbreaks of indignation in the form of strike s and demands 
6. 'r a ges spiegel, 17 June 1955 
7. 22 S,eptember 1953. 
8 . A s.::ilmilar plan was developed for Arbei terkampfgruppen to 
be active in all factories. Die Neue Zeitung , 15 Nov. 1953 
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for the release of prisoners. This wa s al so the pe r iod 
of the food package distribution pro gram following t he 
well-timed suggestion of President Eisenhowe r . This 
skillfully managed program aroused a grat eful r esponse 
on the part of the peop le and a worr ied response from 
the re gi me, which tried not ve ry successfully to dis-
courage its subjects from accepting the packages.9 
* * * * * 
The post-Stalin policy -.vhich we a re accustomed to 
call the "New Course 11 is the most striking develo:.tJment 
throughout Eastern Europe during the last half of 1953. 
That the evidences of relaxat ion came somewhat later in 
the Soviet Union itself, does not mean that the policy 
as a whole is unrelat ed to the changes in the Soviet re gime. 
·:rhe collective leadershi p which succeeded Stalin wa s quite 
evidently persuaded, probably by Malenkov influence, that 
the time had come for lightening, or appearing to lighten, 
the burdens of the peop les in the Soviet orbit. In othe r 
words, the Soviet re gime, with the satellite regimes 
automatically following , be gan to seek popular support; 
or at the least, to allay popular resentment. Putting 
the matte r in its simplest terms, this was to be done 
by offering slight concessions without sacrificing any 
standing goals. The most that would be curtailed by the 
9 . The origi nal program ended on 10 October after 5,500,000 
rations h ad been distributed. New York Times, 11 Oct. 1953. 
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authorities would be the tempo of progress; anQ it was 
doubtless c alculated that present postponement, e.g., of 
collectivization drives, might indirectly hasten eventual 
achievement. In short, this was the effort of a totali-
tarian regime to come to terms with its subjects, even 
if only in an extremely limited sense, to assuage them in 
minor ways in the hope of being able to eschew the 
comparatively difficult and costly administrative-police 
methods at its command , in favor of persuasion through 
propaganda and gradual indoctrination. That the pro gram 
did not work out this way does not necessarily indicate that 
the rulers had nothing of the sort in mind. What we must 
remember in calculations of totalitarian psychology is 
that people who have nothing may be inclined to place a 
considerable value on very small concessions, and even 
on promises if there seems any reason to believe that 
t hey will be kept. On the other hand, a balancing 
psychological factor - in my opinion what the rule r s of 
Eastern Iiiuro _t)e f ailed to weigh sufficiently - is the 
tendency to see in a concession an opportunity for bar-
gaining to make it bigger. This factor is sho\vn in the 
East German revolts, whe r e the people saw a sign of weak-
ness in the apyeal for popular sup.fJOrt and responded with 
the me t·hods at hand in an at t empt to widen the breach. 
And if other peoples of Eastern .J£uro.J!e we r e not in a 
position to revolt, they at l east withheld their coo~eration 
in the expectation of forcing larger gains. 
• 
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.l:he gradual alte ration of policy which we know as 
the ~ew Course had a very uneven development in the 
Soviet sphere, and it is not the pre s ent purpose to 
delineate the whole process, but only to place the Eas t 
German New Course in perspective. 10 The New Course 
was, in fact, first announced as a program in the DDR, 
preceeding by about a month the inauguration by Nagy in 
Hungary. And it was another month before Malenkov's 
8 August speech to the Supreme Soviet introduced a con-
ciliatory line in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Albania 
had joined the ranks, and was followed by Rumania in late 
August, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia in September. So far 
the New Course has been used here in the economic .. sense, 
and in that sense Poland was the last to adop t it when 
Bierut addressed his Central Committee on 28 October. 
'I'he implications of t he policy change varied somewha t from 
count ry to countr y, depending largely on the problems and 
s t ate of· economic progress of each individual land . But 
the central features of the New Course do permit sumrnarizat ion. 
The economic phase falls into t wo main classes, namely aid 
to consumer and aid to a griculture. The first class of 
concession was supJ?osed to provide a much greater stock 
of consumer goods such as foodstuffs, clo-thing , etc., and 
of better quality. In addition it was suggested that wages, 
10 . Chronological data which follows from News from Behind 
the Iron Curtain, November 1953, 34-43. 
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or rather buying p ower, mi ght be increased. Housing 
r eceived somewha t less attention . In short, living 
standards were to be imp roved. Agriculture was to benefit 
in a variety of ways: collectivization was to be placed 
on a "voluntary" basis, tax a r rears cancelled, kolkhozes 
to receive funds for improvement, credits to be incre ased 
and quotas revised to benefit the independent farmer. All 
of t h ese things were :p romised with more or less uniformity 
in Easte r n Europ e. Hungary went furthest perhaps , at 
least in its initial an_nouncement, with the granting of 
p ermission t o the peasants to leave kolkhozes and the 
promised r evival of -free enterprise and trade. But the 
DDR announcement was al s o qui t e broad , including the 
lowe r ing of work norms, stoppage of collectivizat ion, 
increase of food stock s, and the return of confiscated 
c hurch lands. 
~h ful f illment of promis es is, of course, another 
stor y. '.i:here were t o be sur e certain direct benefits 
and we may conclude that the atmosphere became a bit freer 
f rom a time. But the basic tenets of the Ne w Course we r e 
denied by the unwill ingness to make the fundamental 
economic adjustments required. The East German situation 
will be no t ed sp ecifically, but the generalization applies 
throughout t h e Soviet-controlled lands that the New Course 
meant largely promises of ch ange, actual change having been 
effected only in the most limited sense. The peasants were, 
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for example, not allowed to leave the Hungarian collective 
farms except under very stringent conditions which had 
not been apparent in t he original promise; p romised tax 
reductions in Czechoslovakia were far too limited to be 
of r eal benefit to the popula·tion; and Bulgaria, which is · 
most advanced of the sat ellites in the mat t er of collecti-
vization, arranged its benefits to the peasantry so t h at 
t he collectives gained al:JP:L'eciably and the few remaining 
independents scarcely at all. In connection with the other 
b asic p romise, revision of the ratio between he avy and 
light industry in order to increase supplies of consumer 
goods, a glance a·t; investment statistics - even the 
doubtful ones available from the satellites thems elves -
reveals the hopelessly slight alte r ations in favor of 
light industry. 11 It seems cle ar that the New Cour se 
was introduce u to offset economic exhaustion, which had 
come about through overemphasis on heavy industry, and 
inadequate agricultural production, partly the result of 
impatience in collectivization. The New Course was designed 
then to elicit cooy erative effort by the peoples concerned 
toward overcoming these deficiencies. But by the failure 
to adjust fundamental economic po l icies to painfully 
evident needs, the whole p rogram became a colossal attemyt 
to have ones cake and eat it too . 
11. "The ' New Cour se', 11 News f r om Beh ind the Iron Curtain, 
November 1953 , 34-43. 
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When the New Course made i t s debut in Eastern 
Germany, the only signs of relaxation e l se·_;Jhere had been 
a se r ie s of amnesties i n the Soviet Union, Humania, and 
Czechoslovakia during the spring of 1953. On the othe r 
hand , signs of discontent we r e to be found ever~vhere , 
particularly i n Bulgaria where tobacco wo rkers had r e -
portedly rioted , necessitat ing t he intervention of military 
force, and in Czechoslovakia whe r e ant i-inflationary measures 
had reduc ed l i ving standards still furthe r and had set off 
a series of riots and demonstrations lasting through the 
first few days of June. Under t he circumstances a far-
r eaching r evi s ion of policy did not seem out of t he question. 
Wh at ac t ually happened was, of course, a cruel disappoint-
ment t o the oppressed p eoples of Eastern Europe . 
'J:he East German pict ure is complicated by the out-
break of r evolt shortly after the p romulgation of the New 
Course. As a result, the r .:.:f orm measures were introduced 
in fragments, rather tnan a s one comp rehensive p rogram, 
and then briefly acted u_p on only to be r epudia t ed aft er 
a short interva1.12 For example, the rule of law which 
was supposed to regulate police terr or (and wh ich may have 
p rompted Fechner's ill-fated statement) was lost in t he 
punitive r epercussion s of the revolt. Neither Benjamin 
nor Viollweber is like ly to earn a place in h istory as an 
12. "Easter n Germany since t he Hisings of June 1953," 
The World Today , FebrQary 1954, 58-69. 
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eJq)onent of ·the rule of l aw. Similarly, trade unions, 
which had been enj oined shortly after the revolt to 
r ep r e sent t he interest of workers in an imp roved l i ving 
standard, were reprimanded by Ulbricht only three months 
l ater for pas s ing on the "p rovocative demands of enemy 
agencies. II The p rop er trade union function, he explained , 
was to enforce collect ive wage agreements whereby workers 
raise the leve l of production . 13 'I'he same worker p qpu-
lation was s t ru.ck j_n the fall by a new technique to offset 
wage increases: a higher level of quali f icat i on for each 
wage l evel was introduced , ·making it po ssible to camouf lage 
wa ge reductions. 
Re gar ding the basic aims of t h e New Course , there 
is litt le of a favorable natur e to report . Consumer good s 
were scarce in J une and still scarce at the end of the year . 
Such sto j_) - gap me asur e s as the r e lease of r e se r ve food 
supplies i n l at e June, and the emergency importation of 
foo d during the summer were n ot able to work any b as ic 
change . But hea-vy indu s t ry c ontinued to have a wi de 
margin of priority ove r consumer goods p r oduction and t here 
was thus little p r ospect of improvement. And in a griculture, 
t he promise of a_ 1.hal t i n collectivizati on lasted only 
t h rough the harvest season; then Ulbricht dec ided that 
collecti viz at ion should p roceed a s before. 'I'he on ly 
sector of the economy which b enefitted a t all, p rivat e 
t rade , se emed t o have made on l y temporary gains . After 
13. Ibid, 65. 
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t he post-revolt confusion died dovm, the New Course 
became for all ~ast Germans a hollow p romise. Even in 
the cultural sphe r e, where the ~ew Course was supposed 
also to be r e levant, the old straitjacket was shortly 
reimposed. 
The only real economic gain during the rest of 1953 
came outside the scope of the New Course altogether. This 
was the announc ement of various alleviations in the burden 
of exactions imposed earlier by the Soviet Union. ·I'he 
announcement came as an ostensible result of t he Moscow 
ne gotiations between Russian and German officials, and 
included the cancellation of repa ration payments and the 
return of the SAG's to German control, effective l January 
1954. Both measures seem to have been intended to relieve 
t he economic crisis in the DDR , but were obviously of 
benefit only to the state, not to individual workers or 
consumers. Furthermore, an important exception was made 
in the case of Wismuth.-AG, the uranium mining p roject along 
t he Czech border. This remained, along with the forced 
laborers involved, under Soviet control. Thus, the DDR 
joined the other satellites, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, 
and China, in which the Soviet Union had such holdings, 
in regaining control over the joint companies. Yet we may 
be justified in wondering just how great this gain actual-
ly is; as The World Today commented: 
11 the Soviet Union commands many other leve r s of 
influence over the Satellite economies, which are 
indeed likely to be more closely aligned in future 
by means of synchronized Five-Year Plans. r.l'he U. S . S . R., 
• 
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which will continue to dominate the supply to the 
Satellites of many types of h eavy equipment, has 
relinquished its hold only after having weaned the 
Satellites from their traditional trading partners."14 
The general ~icture in Easter n Germany at the end 
of 1953 was not encouraging. ;.i:he propaganda campai9J-had 
been toned down a bit in reco gnition of the impending 
Four-Power Conference. .But othervlise the p rospects r e -
mained bleak - for t he East Germans who needed both p olitical 
and economic relief and for Westerners who entertained 
visions of a reunited Germany. The New Course had been 
tried and had failed; even though the phrase was still used 
in December, it was really a de ad concept. But the re gime 
had r e stored its absolute control. Despite occasional 
outbreaks of indignat ion, the police stat e remained supreme; 
and if the spirit of revolt still lived, openings for it 
-f•y1~ 
to burst i D·i-2 t:~e e;pe;a were carefully prevented. r_rhe 
economy of the DDR remained basically unhealthy, but the 
seemingl y permanent food cris is was not allowed to inter-
fere with the p ro gre :=:; s of sovietization. And the thought 
of self-liberation, which had caught fire in June, had 
become a hope for deliverance from without, directed 
specifically at the impending Berlin Conference. And that 
brings us to the last chapter, prospects for the future. 
14. "Handing Back the Soviet Mixed Companies," rJ:he World 
1I'oday, December 1954, 512. 
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Chapter VIII 
Prospects: Eastern Germany, the Soviet System, 
and the West 
The purpose of this chapter, a recap itulation 
of the survey of sovietization in Eastern Germany and an 
or<:lering of future possibilities, does not include pre-
diction. The predictive function of research, so often 
exaggerated by laymen and too frequently also by scholars, 
is at best a vague concept and generally, in operation, 
tends to oversimplify the problem. I shall set no odds 
on r eunification of Germany nor would I hazard a guess 
as to when it might come. But any treatment of East 
Germany must ultimat ely come to grip s with that question. 
One could easily get t he i mpression in Germany today that 
Wiederve r einigung is the whole of the famous "German 
p roblem." It most certainly is not. It is, however a 
sufficiently important :part of the whole problem that it 
may , at s ome futur e date, ):!resent t he West (meaning the 
Hest ern Powers and West Germany) with an opportunity 
either to resolve substantially to entangle further the 
whole German is sue. And mounting pressure alone, even 
if dip lomatic fo re sight were assumed to be totally lacking, 
will forc e the West to give increasing attention to re-
unification . 
Looking at East Germany from Eastern perspect i:ve, 
the Soviet Union must also attempt to resolve the German 
• 
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problem, alt hough presumably its r esolution would 
d iffer significantly from Western views. The Kremlin 
must a t le ast consider the increased vulnerability of two 
sate llites not yet fully digested, Poland and Cze c h o-
slovakia, shou ld Germany b e united. Poland may well be 
the most vital of all the satellites in Soviet reckoning; 
from t h e stra teg ic :&oint of view it certainly is, lying 
as it does across the North Euro i:Jean p lain which leads 
directly to the Soviet homeland. The tenderness of 
p olish feeling s, presumably even of Polish Communist 
feelings, 1 concerning the western boundary must therefore 
ent er Soviet c a lculat ion. Fo r if a German settlement re-
op ened the Oder-Neisse question , the Soviet Union might 
stand to lose more than just t;he advantage s currently 
harvested in East Germany: Poles and Cze c h s a r e under-
standably more s ensitive than the Russians when West 
Ge r mans talk about Ostdeutschland2 and a loss of territory 
would doubtless decrease the already limited reliability 
of those two People's Democracies. 
Wiederve r einigung thus implies a resolution of seem-
ingly quite incompatible Great Power interests; but it also 
imp~ies a recombination of p resently incompatible elements, 
East and West Germany. The extent of t hi s incompatibility 
could of course be exagge r ated. The will to accomplishment 
1. On this p oint see Hamil ton Fish Armstrong , 'r i to and 
Goliath (New York: Macmillan, 1951) for his interview 
with Berman, 158-160. 
2. Which in Germany refers to areas east of the Oder-Neisse 
line and the Su detenland lost after the last war. 
•• 
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can overcome g reat difficulties, but that will must be 
based on at least rudimentary recognition of the diffi-
culties involved. Whereas much of the talk about re-
unification in the West might lead one to suppose that 
the wish is e quivalent to the deed. 'He may of course 
!10pe that serious reflection is going on behind the 
facade of polit ical oratory. 
The thesis underlying t h is study has been that any 
treatment of present i s sues must rest on an understanding 
of what has happened in t h e years since the war. 'i'here-
fore East Germany h as been regarde d as a unit within the 
Soviet bloc, the eastern orientat ion having been the 
primary one during the years under consideration here, 
and the one which has brought about the change s with 
which the West must now come to terms in one way or another. 
It has thus been pos s ible to leave West Germany on the 
sidelines, along with the certainly very real ties of 
t radition and sentiment binding East Germans to t heir 
\Nestern brethren. In muc h the same way, though admittedly 
the analo gy is not p erfect, one might treat Hungary in its 
post-war existence as a sate llite; but finally one would 
h ave to come back to Hungary's histo ric a l i nheritance, 
under the Habsburgs and since, of a western orientation • 
Thus, unless t h e outstanding asp ect of the German problem 
of the moment were to be i gnored, it becomes necessary 
•• 
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to introduce the additional essential factor, the all-
German question, into our frame of refel"ence. But first, 
a resume of findings in the study ·thus far. 
The :post-"l·var history of East Germany divides itself 
rather conveniently into two periods: the years from 
war' s end to the creation of the DDR, and the years since. 
Division of history into p eriods always p artakes of the 
artificial course, and this division is no exception. 
The founding of a formally constituted East German govern-
ment in 1949 marks the replacement of a l egal anomaly, the 
Soviet occupation, with a legal fiction, the Pieck-Ulbricht 
government. The . government t hus established was not new, 
had in fact existed in substantially the same form for 
many months ; and the occupation was not thereby ended. 
Hence, the selection of this date as turning point, as 
the beginning of satel l ite existence, for the DDR, is at 
best a compromise. If one should wish to emphasize only 
internal developments in the political or economic sphere, 
an earlier date could equally well be chosen. As Hugh 
Seton-Watson observed,3 political sovietization began 
already in 1945 with the authorization for formation of 
Laender goverments; but this does not by itself fulfill the 
conditions of satellitism. 11:he erection of a typical 
Communist Party-dominated state was a g radual process, 
but it was practically completed - if not perfected - l on g 
before the DDH became a reality. (In speaking of a "state" 
3. 'J:he East European E.evolution ( New York: Praeger, 1951), 361. 
• 
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it must be remembered that no s atellit e would conform to 
the classical definitions of a "state".) Similarly, an 
economic pattern had been achieved by 1948 or earlier, 
which would justify the application of the term satellite. 
Howeve r , the continued intrusion of directly applied 
Sovie t power prevents us from forgetting that East 
Germany rested, at l east at the outset, on a more for-
mally acceptable legal basis, namely occup at ion, than did 
t he neighboring sat ellites. In t h is sense , em:phasis on 
external relations might suggest 25 March 1954 as the 
turning point between occupation and fic t ional sove reignty. 
'l'his w<:;. s the date of the Sovie t an.;_1.ouncement grant ing t he 
DDR t he rank of ''sovereign state. 11 Yet t h is move was 
universally recognized as a 11 gestur e devoid of· any meaning 
and a typical example of :r. facade politics'". 4 Actually 
the move was not quite without me aning , but its ·limited 
s~ificance iay in the p sychologic a l sphe re , not in the 
realm of political realities. At any rat e, it was t h is 
t ype of emphasis on external relat ions which seemed to 
govern \:lal t er Lippmann's j udgment when h e wrote t h a t 
even t his move would n ot qualify the DDH. as a satellite. 
"East; Ge rmany," he commented , "is Soviet-occupied terri tory 
with a gove r nment installed and maintained by t he Red Army 
and run by German Quislings. 5n i£his is a perfectly valid 
4. Comment by J. !Emlyn 7/i lliams in the Christian Science 
Monitor, 26 March 1954. 
5. New York He r ald Tribune, 30 March 1954. 
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d e scrip tion of t h e DDR, t o be sur e, but I f ail t o see 
h ow, e x cep t in a p u r e l y formal sens e, it dis t i n guishes 
t he DDR from Poland or Rumania. The occup at ion had by 
thi s time ceased t o be any more deci s ive t h an oth er me ans 
of control op e rat ive in all the satellites, and t he Sovie t 
Ar my had neve r ceased to p lay a r ole, if no more t h a n as a 
threa t , in s everal East European count r ie s . ·rhe most 
t h at c ould be demonst rated with t h is descri:bl tion is t h a t 
~ast Ge r many is n ot a s far advanced as t he o the r s ate l l i t es 
in t he de licacy of the cont rol me chanism. Anothe r type 
of extern a l emphasis, this one s omewh at more realistic, 
wou ld r e ga r d East Germany's relat i ons with othe r East 
European lands as d e cisive. But this t oo wa s a p r ocess 
o f deve lopment ext en ding from 1 947 to 19 50 . By t h e 
latte r dat e , the DDR h a d an obse r v er at Cominf orm h ead-
quar t e r s and was a t l e ast a j 'unior p artne r i n East European 
trade relat i ons . 
In s h ort, since t he whole p r oblem is one of gradual 
deve lopment, any se t ting of terminal dates is a t b est 
a rtif icial. For p r e s ent purpo s es, autumn 1 94 9 wil l serve 
as t he d ividing p oint , but i t can be defendroonly as a 
comp r omi se between intern a l p r oces se s of s ovietization 
and external r e c o gn ition of satellit e status. 
The earlie r p e r iod is of lesser c on cern for t h is 
study but one chan ge s hould b e n oted a s it is of o ut -
stand i n g i mport ance. Between 1 947 and 1 94 9 it was p ossible 
to note a g r adual c h ange in Sovi et aims from the o r i g inal 
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keynote of the occupation. 1!iJhereas 1945-1947 had been 
marked by concentrated effort to maAimi ze r eparations 
and other forms of booty re gardless of' costs measured 
in popular resentment, the t wo years preceeding the 
foundation of the DDH. were characterized by a gradual 
recognition of the usefulness of an East German Peop le's 
Democracy. And this implied more and more concealment of 
exploitation . By 1949 Soviet depradations in East Ge rmany 
had therefore a ssumed a form very like that operative in 
other Soviet puppet states. 'l1.his was perhaps the out-
standing symptom of altered Soviet i ntentions, the 
newer goal being the enlistment of' at l east minimum sup_port 
for the comp letion of s ovie t ization in East Germany. r he 
original policy of di r ect economic gain for the So viet 
Union, coupled with retention of a jumping off place for 
6 the conquest of all Germany, was thus p layed down in the 
interests of erecting anothe r People's Democ·racy. 
'J:he s e cond period, which has been the subject of the 
foregoing account, was principally the per iod of i mp r ovement 
and strengthening of the indirect control mechanism. The 
t wo crucial elements, the SED and t h e police system, have 
already been shown in their ramified significance. Along 
6. r his desire to move westward into Germany constituted 
for s ome ye a r s, as has already been mentioned, a restrict-
ive consideration in Soviet policy. Maneuverability 
was necessarily s acrificed, and sovietization even slowed 
down Jliar:h§.ps, o u.t of de s ire to impress 'Nest Germany as 
favorably as possible. 
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with t his, the characteristic economic p lans and patterns 
underwent a forced development; and the DDR steadily 
grew in stature as an accepted member of the East 
European complex. 
Since the phenomenon of popular resistance has been 
a central t heme in this account so far, it is now appropri-
ate to draw some tentative conclusions with respect to the 
period of concern. We have seen the various expressions of 
opposition as they appeared in response to sovietizat ion 
and culminated in June 1953. It would be inaccurat e to 
speak of t his opposition as a s piraling development, al-
though the total evidence available sugge sts that t here 
was in general a mou_~ting sp irit of r esistance as the 
native communist s took over t he reins of direct control. 
More correctly, one could describe the voice s of p rotest 
as a fluctuat ing response to sovietizat i on , varying in 
i ntensity wi th the acdeness of mate r ial and sp iritual pain 
caused by the various official measures. 'l'his fluctuation 
is shown most clearly b;y· the waves of fli ght from East 
Ge rmany, which offer, however, in sp ite of t hei r portrayal 
of desperation in general, litt le insight into the i nternal 
resources of opposition within t h e population. At any rate, 
opposition never was reduced below a level which cou l d cause 
t he re gime axiety, and neve r reached the height of op en 
revolt unt il June 1953. 
But what of t hat revel t? Vvhat meaning must be found 
in t hat one almost -Qllive rsal outburst of p rotest ? It has 
• 
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been compared with the Kronstadt rebellion of 19217 and 
is sometimes bracketed with t he Tito defection a s a blow 
against t he ext ension of Soviet powe r. Certain t h ing s 
about t he 17th of J une are clear: that it was a monument 
to human courage in the eve r lasting s t ruggle for free dom; 
t hat it was a reminder that human factors continue to exi s t 
re gardless of plans and police (in t his sense perhaps 
justifying the Kronstadt comparison); that t he SED re gime 
had no popular support (which we knew already); and that 
Soviet power was still a necessary, but also still an 
available, prop for the re gi me. One may acknowledge all 
of these t h ings - even granting t he potential value of the 
revolt as a rallying point for a futur e move which we may 
hope can have more success - and yet speculate on t he real 
significance of the revolt. 11his is not equivalent to 
saying that the revolt was in vain. But there a r e factors 
on the other side. Among the se: it ultimately strengthened 
t he re gime by s howing the ext ent to which the Soviet Union 
was committed to it and by pointing up the ne ed for im-
provements in the police apparatus; it called potential 
leadership int o t he open, whereup on the impromptu leaders 
had t o fl ee or were jailed; it discouraged the populace by 
s howing that t he Soviet Army would support the SED and 
government; and it revealed the helplessness of the_ West 
7. "Easte r n Germany s ince the Risings of June 19 53 11 , The 
World Today, February 1954, 59. 
• 
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to assist materially in an actualcrisis. On the positive 
side, we may hop e t hat West ern opinion was t hereby awakened 
to the need for helping the East Germans, always provided 
t hat the practical limitations on that help are recognized • 
But also, we may be pardoned for urging that the revolt 
not be made into a ceremonial myth, lip-service to which 
coul d serve as a substitute for practical action, diplomatic 
action to secure a redress, and spiritual action to sustain 
a sp iritually imoverished people. 
In balance, the revolt cannot be compared with the 
Tito break of 1948. Leaving aside the ultimate consequences 
which cannot now be calculat ed, the immediate practical 
results of the revolt were very meagre and it wo t.1ld be 
dangerous indeed if t he subsequent glorification of it 
were to cloud the important lessons t o be learned therefrom. 
'l1he Yugoslav-Cominform dispute alte r ed the entire political 
balance in Europe. It deprived t he Soviet Union of its 
offensive position in regard to the Mediterranean and 
Southe rn ~urope, left her in a defensive position in Danubia, 
restricted h er control of t he Danube River , and probably 
set t he stage for an event ual change in outlook toward 
. t . 8 AUS rla. 'l'he 17th of June, by comparison, taught us that 
a popular revolt behind the Iron Curtain is hopeless, at 
least so long as there is no poss ibility of outside rein-
forcement. :B'or if such a revolt had been possible, East 
8. Not to mention t he powerful effect on t he whole r e alm of 
Soviet influence and power. But in t his particular the 
East German reyolt was also potent, witness the induced 
outbreaks in Czechoslovakia. For a full treatment of 
Titoism see Adam B. Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952). 
• 
-215-
Germany would have been the logical locus for it. East 
Germany has closer ties than any other satellite with a 
Western country and, culturally speaking, probably feels 
itself closer to the West in general. Further, East 
Germany was the last unit in the Soviet bloc to embark on 
its career as a satellite, with the consequence that sovieti-
zation was not as advanced in the DDR as in other ca~tive 
countries. And, because of Berlin, general p roximity, and 
continuing relationships with West Germany, the DDR had 
remained open to outside influences to a far greater extent 
than the countries sealed off for purposes of sovietization 
since 1945. But the power ava ilable to the re gime p roved 
too much for the East Ge rmans; they had not reckoned with 
Soviet intervention and could c e rtainly not have count ered 
it if they had. Sinc e then, frequently in t h e last t wo years, 
there have been whispe rs that there will be anothe r 17th 
of June. It is neither to be expected nor hop ed for. The 
Soviets have made clear that t hey have no intention of 
lett ing their puppets be overth rown ( quit e aside from the 
p robably improvement in the German forces available to 
p revent a repetition), and this fact has made its impress ion 
on the East Ge r mans. Resi s t ance goes on, in t he quiet 
s ense and with occasional incidents of active opposition; 
but the era of internal resistance is fading as hopes turn 
outward, for reli ance is now upon outside efforts to lif t 
the Soviet yo ke. The existence and cont inued viability 
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of the Federal Republic will, we may confidently expect, 
sustain the spirit of resistance as it has in the past, 
but the futility of self-liberation attempts is surely 
reco gnized . 
'l'he fore going remarks included , however, a listing 
of the principal weaknesses of the DDR as a satellite. 9 
It is appropriate then to speculate at this poi~t on the 
i.m11ression whi ch this makes on the Kremlin. Not only is 
the DDR the least reliable and weakest of the satellites, 
i t is also the most embarrassing for t he Soviet Union 
because it exyo ses rather too obviously the c onventional 
Soviet methods. Embarrassment alone would scarcely acc ount 
for a change of Soviet s t rategy , but conceivably a group 
of factors has been building up to such a change. 
Such a change wa s, t o be sure, little in evidence 
at the Be r lin Conference in January and February 1954 . 
The so-called Eden Plan for reunification of Germany was 
based on free elections in the first instance, and Mol otov 
was content to i gnore this i ssu e as he responded with a 
p roposal for an all-German referendum to decide between 
a peace treaty and EDC. Molotov's starting point was the 
demand for negotiations on terms of equality getween the 
.Bast and 7-Ies·t German governments, and this was obviously 
unacceptable t o the West. In short, the Berlin Conference 
found itself deadlocked on the German problem and could 
9. I have deliberately avoided the thesis, iri my opinion 
rather exaggerat ed by Ygael Gluckstein, that an empire can 
only survive if its "mother" count ry is more advanced ma-
te rially and culturally than its members. Even if this is 
true, it is too long-range in significance to be appropriate 
here. Stalin's Satellites in Europe (Boston:Beacon Press, 
1952), 311. 
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make no advance. ·r his is certainly not much improvement 
ove r previous efforts which had been going on Nith varying 
degrees of urgency at least since 1950. 10 And ~n fact since 
the very beginning of the occupation, despite oratorical 
assurances that t he Soviet Union was the champion of German 
unity , the Soviet policy had not changed fundament ally. 
Yet this is not to say that it cou ld not or will 
not. Among t he considerations which may p r esent them-
selves t o the makers of Kremlin strategy, the following 
seem t o me worthy of attention: l) A choice was made at 
t he beginning whether to use t he Soviet Occup ation Zone 
as a source of goods and equipment useful to the Soviet 
Union, or whether to apply clas s ical coilli"llunist p rinciples 
and t o serve as a helpful neighbor in bringing a Soviet-
style regi me into being . Elsewhere in East Europe, the 
choice gave first place t o the construction of People's 
Democracies, al chough economic exactions f or Russian be-
nefit were never forgot t en. In Germany the decisi on was 
otherwise and sovie-tization p roceeded only as f ast a9 the 
basic aim would permit. jl 1he decision that East Ge rmany 
should also become a Peop le's Democracy was reached later, 11 
and perhaps too late for the initial lo s s of momentum to 
be r egained. But at any rate, the Russians had reaped 
10. 
11. J. P . ~ettl suggests early 1947 as the time of this de-
cision. ·:rhe Eastern Zone and Soviet Polic in German 
(London: Oxford, 1951 , z.~' .. 
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their rep arations and sequestration harvest. 2) ·rhe DDR 
is an exp ose d.. p osition wherein the 22 Soviet divisions, if 
they are ever to be useful as an offensive force, are at 
least at this writing still not sure of protection in the 
rear. This much was clearly shown by the June revolt; the 
German police and military f orces are not to be r e lied up on 
to cover the Soviet rear. 12 3) East Germany do e s not occu-
p y an indisp ensable position in the East Europ ean economic 
complex. In the first ylace, t he satellites a r e not or-
ganiz ed according t o a division of labor whereby they might 
comp lement each othe r economically. They are each en-
courage d t o develop mutually inde~endent economies with 
ties direc t ly to the Soviet Union. Second, t he extent of 
industrial capacity in East Ge rmany is not sufficient to 
make its c ont ribution to the s atellite bloc decisive. East 
Ge rmany does not in general produce items, either industrial 
13 or a gr icultural, otherwise lack ing in East Europe. (If 
all of Germany were here at issue the p icture would be of 
c ourse quit e diffe r ent.) 4) Soviet absory tion in Asia and 
the · de sire to extend its influence the r e may tend to suggest 
a tightening of lines in Europ e. ·rhe p rosp ect of war is 
cert ain ly never absent f rom Sovie t c a lculations , and a 
12. Theodo re H. if/hi te has described the effect t h is realiza-
tion had on SHAPE Headquarte r s where the adequacy of 
rear p rotection for the Soviet divi sions had been assumed. 
"For the first time SHAPE can consider de fense strategy 
in t e r ms of a forward counter-offensive, with support 
ready and available behind the enemy 's lines. 11 Fire in 
the Ashes (New York : William Sloane Asso ciates, 1953), 310 . 
13. F·or some d e tail see Ne t tl, ££· cit., 288- 91. 
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t wo-front war would not be a p leasing outlook . Therefore, 
it is possible that strategy would dictate scuttling t h e 
less fundamental European outposts - naturally on the 
best terms obt ainable. 14 5) Since eff orts on the present 
basis have not advanced the conquest of the highest :B.uro-
pean prize, Germany, there is at l east t he remote chance 
that a basic change might eventually present the Kremlin 
with an opportunity to achieve its purposes through direct 
dealings with an all-German government. It must be re-
membered that there a re other arrangements than the master-
satellite r elationship which might be acceptable to the 
Soviets. Lord Strang's observation has doubtless occurred 
to them also: 11A genuine ly free German peopl e would be un-
likely deliberately to subordinat e itself to Mos cow ••.• 
But the tactics of t he Communists can be insidious; and t he 
follfies which governments can sometimes commit are almost 
beyond belief. ul5 
On the othe r side are the factors which, t o this 
point at least, have been we i ghtier. Some of these have 
been mentioned; most are obvious. Briefly, Eas t Germany 
is now lh~der Soviet control, but there is no guar antee 
that a uni t ed Germany would be anywhere but in the 'Ne stern 
camp ; other satellites are more or l ess reconciled t o the 
DDR, but could easily become restive conf ronted with a 
14. ·.Chis is a point of view which various commen·tators, 
dalter Lippmann among them, have p roposed as a possibility. 
15. nGermany betwe en .&ast and West," Foreign Affairs, A_pril 
1955, 397· 
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united Germany, especially if the boundarie s came into 
question; East Germany could be r egarded militarily as 
a s alient along the ~orth ~uropean plain, pointed at 
Po land and f inally at Russia; it ·' would be difficult to 
t osi "''1 
give up any t erritory without ~sa ~f prestige and reviving 
anti-Soviet hopes elsevvhere in East Europe; and the DDH 
does add to the productive and manpower capacitie s of the 
Eastern bloc, even i f the contribution is not decisive. 
The outlook is then ne ither ove rwhelmingly discouraging 
nor outstandingl y hopeful. The Western Powers are certainly 
obligated to r emain watchful in the event of a p romising 
o~ening , and policy must be flexible enough to make the 
mos·c of such an opening. ·.rile division of Ger:many is, as 
Seton- \7atson c ommented , :9a:rt of the division of Europe 
and there is no reason for one re gion t o have p riority 
over another in the matter of liberat ion; 16 but liberat ion 
need not be an all-or-nothing proposition - it is much more 
likely to be a gradual process in fact - and of all the 
places where a beginning might be made, none looks more 
p romising a t the moment than :3ast Germany. From the Vlest 
German point of view, the government is dedicated to the 
same b asis for reunification as are t he Western Powers, 
namely, "free elections, under international control, for 
an all-Ge rman const ituent national assembly."17 This is 
16. "Zastern Burope and the German Problem, 11 Twenti eth 
Centu:e;y, March 1953, 195. 
17. Walter Hallstein, !!Germany's Dual Aim: Unity and Inte-
gration, 11 Fo:re:ign Affairs, October 1952, 65. 
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a laudable p latform, as is the pressing desire to free 
East Germany from oppression; but wisdom dictates a 
p roper appreciation of the enormous tasks to come with 
reunification, and also a reasonable patience should 
\ATi ede rvere inigung not be as ne a r as .some have pe rsuaded 
themselves. 
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ABS'.I'RACT 
East Germany, or as it is now calleQ, the German 
Democratic Republic (DDH), can only be understood in 
terms of the system of power which has governed it 
since the end of the war. The first phase, from 1945 to 
1949, was the Soviet occupation; and the s econd, from 
1949 to 1~53 and beyond, was marked by the entry of East 
Germany into the East European satellite complex. This 
Eastern bloc is characterizeQ by Soviet-style totalitarian-
ism operating ostensibly under the control of native 
communists in a party which dominates the entire political 
scene, but actually governed absolutely by the Soviet Union 
through such agencies as the army, secret police, and 
diplomatic instruments. 'l'he leading figures of each country 
are thus mere tools for the transformation of their respec-
tive lands into Peoyle's Democracies according to the Soviet 
~attern. This pattern includes not only the political 
structu~e, with its single party domination of government 
and all public activity, and the ec,onomic system, rep lete 
with p lanning, nationalization, and collectivization, but 
also the subordination of every sector of national life, 
e.g., schools, churches, and cultural activity, to the 
service of the state. The DDR has reenacted the ~rocess 
of sovietization which occurred in each of the other Soviet 
satellites. 
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The Soviet occupatio_n of East Germany was at first 
devoted to other yunposes , notably reparations and, 
secondarily, the formation of a bridgehead for further 
exyansion. In 1947 and 1948, however, after the West had 
stiffened its policies regarding the Soviet Union, a new 
emphasis was noticeable. rl'he economy, affected earlier 
by a land reform, began to take on a more specifically 
Soviet appearance, and the strengthening of the p redominant 
arty, the SED, was accomp anied by centralization of the 
East German administrative apparatus. 
By 1948 a new government was being readied, and in 
the fall of 1949, after the West German Federal Republic 
had been announced, the DDR was officially formed. Avoiding 
elections , this _process not having been perfected as yet, 
a new government was set up on the basis of a tyJJ ical 
sat ellite constitution. This was all very carefully managed 
by the SED in its leading posit ion wiihin the National 
Front, which was erected to ease the swallowing of all 
independent political activity. 
Between 1949 and 1953 the system thus inaugurated 
underwent a continuous development. The SED purged itself 
internally and secured its position exte rnally. Ho small 
part in the extension of SED authority was p layed by a 
network of mass organizations, many of which had been 
formed earlier at Soviet insistence, extending the fingers 
of communist control into every social group and every 
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sector of ~ast German life. The p erfection of the single -
list electoral system p r ovided well-nigh unanimous endorse-
ment of the SED and enabled it to translate its will 
directly into governmental s t ructure and p olicy. Decisive 
in the realm of ·administration, by virtue of the terror 
which it brought to bear on the populace, was the police 
s y stem backed by courts res~onsive only to the wishes of 
p arty and state. From the expansion of the p olice arm it 
was but a short step to militarization and the e r ection 
of an army, another connection in which the DDR r eflected 
t rends op erative in all t h e satellites. Policy toward the 
churche s tendeQ to lag some what, but education, the arts, 
and all other social activity were brought unde r official 
su~ervision. In the economic sphere, state p lanning a gencies 
assured a proper emphasis on heavy p roduc t ion at the e x -
p ense of consume r goods, and be gan to push the farmers i nt o 
collectives, Finally, the DDR took her p lace among the 
satellites as an economic p artner i n the East Eu r op ean 
trading compl ex and as a p o l itical b r other d e s p ite a certain 
ske p ticism on the Poli sh side of the relationsh ip. 
Comprehensive thou gh this p ro g ram was, it did n ot 
eliminate opposition. Active resistance i n the f o rm of 
sabot age and esp ionage, quie t oppo s ition i n the homeS' and 
churches aimed a t minimizing the effects of indoctrination, 
and wiQes~read discontent of a general character supplied 
the p opular answe r to sovietization . Unable to p revent 
-~ 
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the introduction of Feople's Democracy, the opposition 
nevertheless bore wi~ness. to the long way yet to be tra-
versed before conformity can be realized. 
The revolt of J·une 1953 was the climax of resistance. 
A peculiar combination of factors, p articularly signs of 
weakness in the regime coupled with further repression of 
th~ workers, produced an outburst which traveled without 
benefit of organization throughout the DDR and would have 
topp lea the re gime had the Soviet Army not intervened. The 
practical results of this revolt were few, but it remains 
~s a monument to human co~rage and the will to freedom. 
The remainder of 1953 was marked by severe pepression 
and the gradual evaporation of the New Course. The latter 
effort to enlist popular cooperation was lost, despite its 
glowing promises, in the round-up and sp eedy punishment 
of those alleged to have participated in act·ion against 
the DDH. Corresponding activity within the p arty resulted 
in the elimination of a faction opp osed to the Ulbricht 
leadership in the SED. 
The All-German question, dominated by the urge to 
reunification, can only be considered in terms of East 
Germany's status, its course of internal develoJJment since 
the war and, more important, its complete subservience to 
the Soviet Union. With hopes for internal action against 
the re g ime s h attered, there remains only the p ossibility 
of adjustment of p ower relations through diplomacy • . 
